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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This independent report has been commissioned by USAID and UNICEF to examine assumptions and 
evidence about the needs and experiences of children and adults who have been forced to serve under the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and have subsequently escaped, surrendered or been captured by the 
Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). In particular it focuses on the process of ‘reintegrating’ 
formerly abducted people (FAPs) through reception centers, and the various challenges facing FAPs when 
they are reunited with their families. In addition it deals with a range of specific issues, outlined in the 
Statement of Work (SOW), including that of women who have been kidnapped, raped, impregnated by 
LRA combatants (commonly referred to as ‘child mothers’), the role of the UPDF in the FAP return 
process, and the part played by the Amnesty Commission.  
 
The field research was carried out for 100 days during 2005 in all the war-affected districts of northern 
Uganda. A variety of methods were used, including semi-structured and open-ended interviews, 
participant observation, and a survey of FAPs who have passed through reception centres (based on a 
sample of 886 FAPs derived from reception center registers). All reception centers were visited and most 
of the large IDP camps. The majority of interviews were with the FAPs themselves or their families, but 
others were made with aid agency and reception center workers, soldiers, government officials and 
community volunteers. An approach taken in writing up the report has been to interrogate prevalent 
assumptions, and where possible provide or cite relatively robust evidence. Where no such information is 
available, or could be collected by the research team, the lack of knowledge is highlighted. The 
background information on the conflict in northern Uganda, HIV/AIDS, mortality rates and conditions in 
the IDP camps, as well as most case studies, quotations from interviews and discussion of existing 
literature is presented in footnotes and in the appendices. 
 
Findings Part 1: The Experience of ‘Reintegration’ 
 
In practice, the term ‘reintegration’ means that FAPs who pass through the official channels (i.e. the 
UPDF and the reception centers) are sent to live with their parents or other relatives in the IDP camps. 
Once they have left the reception centers, follow up and monitoring is minimal. Conditions in IDP camps 
can be appalling, and social life is constrained by the threat of LRA attack and the controls imposed by 
the UPDF and Local Defence Units (LDUs). In spite of these factors, the majority of those FAPs who 
have been sent to the IDP camps remain there (of the 415 FAPs in the sample derived from the reception 
centers registers who were traced by the research team, around 70 percent were found to still be living in 
the IDP camp to which they had been sent, or had transferred to another IDP camp). This is partly 
because they have no other option, unless they have relatives in one of the nearby towns, or in another 
part of the country.  
 
The material circumstances for FAPs in the IDP camps is usually no worse than it is for others who have 
not been ‘abducted’ and returned through the reception centers (in some cases it may be slightly better 
due to the provision of small assistance packages). However, FAPs are in constant fear of being re-
captured by the LRA and the possibility of abuse from relatives and neighbours (of the 238 FAPs from 
the sample who were actually interviewed in person, or whose immediate family was interviewed, 25 
percent had experienced negative attitudes). Many FAPs also stated that they found it hard to adjust to life 
in the IDP camps after being with the LRA, and there were some who talked about life with the LRA in 
positive terms. The LRA has been effective at imbuing recruits with its values. Setting them aside is not 
always straightforward. In this context it is also important to note that the term ‘abduction’ is not neutral. 
It suggests that there is no agency involved among those who have been with the LRA. This is not always 
the case. For populations in IDP camps a degree of cohabitation with the LRA is inevitable, and many 
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people have been ‘abducted’ more than once. From the research team’s interviews with the respondents it 
was clear that not all people who spent time with the LRA did so by force alone. 
 
One of the ways in which social healing is claimed to occur in many reports and articles about the war in 
Northern Uganda is through traditional rituals of forgiveness. This research suggests that claims about the 
importance of these ceremonies have been overstated. Only 29% of the respondents had participated in 
any ritual (including Christian prayer meetings).  
 
Another issue that has been sometimes exaggerated in discussion of the war in northern Uganda is the 
involvement of children. There is no doubt that large numbers of children have suffered terribly at the 
hands of the LRA. But vastly more have been forced to grow up in IDP camps, where they have also been 
prone to violence as well as the constant threat of infectious diseases. Moreover, the role of adults in the 
activities of the LRA is persistently under-reported. The average age of arrival at reception centers is just 
under the age of 18, and in most districts the average period of ‘abduction’ is less than a year. The 
reported abduction length for females is longer, but most of those taken by the LRA and returning through 
the reception centers have been males. For some years between 1996 and 2003 there were no females at 
all in the research team’s random sample of reception center data. These data suggest that a high 
percentage of those passing through reception centers were both adults at the time, and had been 
‘abducted’ by the LRA as adults. Moreover, reception centers were mostly set up to deal with the needs of 
‘children’. The majority of adults ‘abducted’ by the LRA are never registered by the centers or by the 
UPDF. Data collected by UNICEF from local councils and community volunteers between 1997 and 
2001 showed that less than one third of reported ‘abductions’ were of children. Subsequently, the rate of 
child ‘abduction’ by the LRA may have increased. However, the results of recent surveys based on 
samples are contradictory. One of them has indicated that the rate of adult ‘abduction’ has remained very 
high indeed. 
 
A further issue that is bedevilled with misconceptions is that of ‘child mothers’. The number of females 
passing through reception centers increased dramatically following operations by the Ugandan army 
against LRA bases in Sudan (although it remained much less than the number of males – around 30 
percent in 2003/2004). Many of these women had spent two years or more with the LRA, and they 
returned with children. They have usually been referred to as ‘child mothers’, and have been the focus of 
much concern. The research team confirmed that what has happened to some of these women has been 
dreadful. They may have been forced to kill (in few cases their own relatives or school mates), and have 
been given to commanders as ‘wives’. Actions deemed as misdemeanours have been met with severe 
beatings and other punishments. There are, however, several problems with the way in which the problem 
of ‘child mothers’ has been presented. 
 
First, the percentage of underage mothers in the IDP camps is very high. Although data is unavailable, it 
can be assumed to be in excess of the national average (23 percent of Ugandan women are pregnant or 
have given birth before the age of 18). So using the term specifically for women who have returned from 
the LRA is misleading. Second, the LRA’s abduction of women needs to be looked at in a social and 
historical context. Without condoning what has happened, marriage by capture has been relatively 
common in the past, and the evidence suggests that the LRA has not raped indiscriminately. Contrary to 
some reports, the research team found no evidence that HIV rates are high among ‘child mothers’. The 
women are selected for relatively stable unions that are expected to produce children. Third, although 
most were abducted as teenagers, the majority of those classified as ‘child mothers’ at reception centers 
are over the age of 18 (the average age of those that appeared in the sample of 248 FAPs who were 
followed up and located was 21). Fourth, the number of those classified as ‘child mothers’ at reception 
centers is relatively small (about 5 percent of all FAPs that have passed through). Fifth, the attitudes of 
‘child mothers’ to their experiences vary widely. Some of those interviewed describe a harrowing ordeal. 
Other express affection for their LRA ‘husbands’ and hope to be re-united at some point in the future. 
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Sixth, social attitudes to the children of ‘child mothers’ may be affected by their lineage status. Without 
transfer of bride-price, the children are meant to be incorporated into the lineage of the mother. But this 
implies that they will have claims over her lineage’s land when the camps are broken up. Her brothers and 
their wives may resist this. At present it is difficult to assess the problem, partly because those ‘child 
mothers’ who have been sent to IDP camps have not been there long. However, it may be a material 
factor in the reported abuse that is commonly directed at these children.  
 
Findings Part 2: The Return Process 
 
After escaping, surrendering or being captured by the UPDF, an FAP is supposed to be transported to a 
barracks and kept at a ‘Child Protection Unit’ (CPU) for up to 48 hours. They are then supposed to be 
transferred to a reception center, and eventually reunited with their family. They are supposed to be 
informed about the amnesty, are given psycho-social counselling and are provided with some skills 
training. This research showed that in reality, this process is deeply flawed, not least because it only deals 
with a selection of those who have been ‘abducted’. Most adults who have been ‘abducted’ do not pass 
through the system, and there were many children who claimed to have been ‘abducted’, but have never 
been registered at a reception center. Some key points that emerged from interviews with FAPs who have 
passed through the system include the following. 
 
Treatment by the UPDF was mixed. Some reported kindness from particular officers, but a few (6 perc 
ent) reported abuse. Whatever their subjective experiences, the number of days that FAPs are kept by the 
UPDF exceeds 48 hours. On average they are kept for two weeks. Some FAPs reported pressure to join 
the UPDF or the LDUs, but the research team did not find this to be a widespread problem. The research 
team interviewed FAPs who have joined the 105th Battalion of the UPDF (which is largely made up of 
LRA veterans). They all stated that they chose to join, and all looked like they were over the age of 18. 
Underage recruitment in the the LDUs was found to be a common problem.  
 
Coordination between the UPDF, the Amnesty Commission and the reception centers was found to be 
poor. Very few FAPs are informed about the Amnesty Act. Most of those interviewed from the research 
team’s sample were very confused about it or had never heard about it. Only 25 percent had an amnesty 
card or were aware of the Amnesty Commission. Also those people who have been with the LRA, but are 
not registered at reception centers have no means of obtaining an amnesty certificate.  
 
The reception centers were found to be a valuable resource for many of those FAPs that spend time in 
them. Their most important role was found to be the provision of a safe space in which the FAPs could 
adjust to the transition from the LRA to the IDP camps. For some, it enabled them to recover from 
injuries before having to cope on their own.  
 
However, the research team found that the skills training offered at various reception centers was not very 
effective, and that attitudes to FAPs were not always appropriate. A complaint of adult FAPs was that 
they were treated as if they were children. Children also resented being patronised. The most commonly 
reported complaint about the centers was that things promised were not provided. 
 
The team also found that the term ‘psychosocial’ is used in a very loose way. Little or no psychological 
assistance is provided, and none of those observed giving counseling to FAPs were trained therapists. 
Counseling is interpreted as teaching FAPs how to behave. The word ‘trauma’ is often used, and some 
ideas from psychotherapy inform efforts to help FAPs tell their stories, and even act out what has 
happened to them. But there is no system of monitoring the effects of these strategies, and the lack of 
trained staff involved is grounds for concern. 
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The numbers passing through the centers have varied from year to year. It peaked at over 4,000 in 2003, 
and declined to around 600 in 2005. Partly because the numbers arriving were so high for a period and the 
security situation in the IDP camps so poor, very little was done to follow up on those who had passed 
through in the past. Centers are currently trying to rectify this, but progress has been slow. Follow up of 
individual cases remains very limited. Only 13 percent of the 248 FAPs who were traced had been 
followed up in any way at all (including visits from researchers and aid agencies).  
 
Some FAPS have been visited up by Community Volunteer Counselors (CVCs), and some agencies hope 
to use the CVCs to develop a more holistic approach to follow up rather than follow up of specific 
individuals. The result is that increasing demands are likely to be placed on CVCs. The research team 
found that their capacities and commitment were diverse. Many volunteers also expected some form of 
remuneration for their efforts.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The key conclusions include: 
 
• Assumptions are not always supported by evidence.  
 
• Most FAPs who pass through the reception centers live in IDP camps. 
 
• The return of an FAP may place family networks under strain. 
 
• The involvement of adults in the war has been underestimated. 
 
• Not all FAPs have a negative view of their time with the LRA. 
 
• Large numbers of those who return after being ‘abducted’ by the LRA are outside of the official 
system. 
• The Amnesty Commission lacks credibility. 
 
• Under age recruitment into the LDUs was noted as common practice. 
 
• Reception centers offer a place of safety for FAPs before living in IDP camps. 
 
• Psychosocial assistance provided at reception centers does not involve psychotherapy. 
 
• There is limited follow-up for FAPs who have passed through the reception centers. 
 
The key recommendations include: 
 
• Sending FAPs to insecure IDP camps needs to be questioned and addressed by the concerned 
authorities especially government. 
 
• There is an acute need for donors and agencies to resist received wisdoms about what is 
happening in northern Uganda and base interventions on robust evidence. 
 
• Donors need to resist pressures to support population control strategies. 
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• Some IDP camps should be broken up as soon as possible, while others should be turned into 
permanent peri-urban centers with adequate services. 
 
The Amnesty Commission should be provided with the necessary support to function adequately. 
Reception centers should be assisted to move in new directions and adapt to the situation at hand. 
 
• Coordination between agencies working on the ground and between reception centers needs to 
be improved. 
 
• Where trauma therapy is required, trained staff should provide it.  
 
• Support should be provided for LRA peer support groups but careful monitoring is essential. 
 
• The focus on ‘child mothers’ should be revised. Support projects should be targeted at those 
women in acute need, rather than just those who have spent time with the LRA. More generally, 
funding should also be shifted towards improving the livelihoods of vulnerable women in the 
region as a whole. 
 
• Efforts should be made to ensure that the breaking up of the camps does not lead to the 
immediate expansion of urban slums. 
 
• Donors and aid agencies must work with the government and the UPDF to improve the security 
situation. Without that happening, what can be achieved will remain very limited. 
 
 
 
Pabbo IDP Camp (Photo: Melissa Parker) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
USAID and UNICEF commissioned this study to help assess how to meet the needs of children and adult 
men and women who have experienced ‘abduction’ by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Information 
on the background to the current situation in northern Uganda, including details about the IDP camps and 
the health situation is presented in Appendix 1. The report focuses in particular on the lessons that can be 
learned about the reintegration of ‘formerly abducted people’ (FAPs) through reception centers. 
Reception centers have operated as a mechanism for providing assistance to people after they have 
returned. Profiles of the various reception centers can be found in Appendix 6.2. The Statement of Work 
sets out three principle study questions, broken down into a complex set of overlapping sub-questions (see 
Appendix 7). These questions focus on: 
 
1. The key assumptions under which the reception centers operate and the assumptions made during 
the reintegration process;  
2.  The roles of the UPDF (including UPDF CPUs), reception centers and organizations and 
authorities involved in family tracing and how they meet the needs of the formerly abducted 
children; 
3.  The lessons learned from the current reintegration process so as to establish recommendations for 
sound principles for reintegration of former abductees in the Ugandan context. 
 
The report is structured as follows: The responses to the first two Study Questions make up the main part 
of the report. The findings are divided into two main sections. The first presents findings on the general 
issue of ‘reintegration’ in northern Uganda, and the second examines the stages in the return process in 
some detail, including an assessment of the activities of the reception centers and other actors. The third 
Study Question is addressed directly in the conclusions and recommendations section.  
 
Two underlying points are stressed throughout the report. They relate to the reference in the study 
questions to ‘key assumptions’. First, good information about what has been happening in northern 
Uganda is very limited. The reception centers themselves have not prioritized data gathering, and their 
own records are mostly in a poor state. Data gathering by district officers and by other organizations has 
also been haphazard, and limited by logistical and security problems. This makes it virtually impossible to 
assess the overall effects of particular inverventions, including the success or failures of reception centers 
in assisting ‘reintegration’ of FAPs. The second point is that the paucity of good information has 
contributed to the widespread acceptance of a range of questionable assertions. The tenuous connection 
between many aid workers, human rights activists, journalists and politicians on the one hand, and the 
mass of the population living in IDP camps on the other, has led to chronic problems with ‘echo-speech’ 
and reified categories. Numbers and anecdotes are repeated as if they are based on rigorous research, and 
become ‘true’ simply because they are repeated so often and are so rarely challenged. Similarly, terms are 
employed to classify groups and describe processes, which are often profoundly misleading. The research 
team has done its best to interrogate established perspectives, and to ask in each case if there is evidence 
to support them. In several instances the conclusion is that there is not. 
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STUDY APPROACH AND METHODS 
The research team included seven European or US-based and seven 
Ugandan researchers. In total there were 100 days of field research. 
Following the methodology outlined in the SOW, a variety of 
approaches were used. These included a review of existing 
literature; participant observation fieldwork (both in IDP camps and 
at two reception centers); focus group discussions and interviews 
with officials, aid program staff, community volunteers and FAPs 
(using both open-ended and semi-structured methods), and a survey 
of FAPs who have passed through reception centers.   
In the course of the research, the team visited and reviewed the 
activities of the following reception centers. At each center, the 
research team spoke to center staff (program managers, social 
workers, ‘counselors’, nurses, field workers) as well as spending 
time at the center. The reception centers visited include: 
• Gulu Support the Children Organization (GUSCO), 
• World Vision (children/ adults/ child mothers center),  
• Kitgum Concerned Women’s Association (KICWA), 
• Concerned Parents Association (CPA), 
• Christian Counseling Fellowship (CCF), 
• Caritas Center in Pajule, 
• Rachele Center, 
• Concerned Parents Association (CPA), 
• Caritas Center, 
• Action Against Child Abuse and Neglect (ACCAN) and, 
• Katakwi Children’s Voice  
 
To provide a structure to the research in the IDP camps, the research 
team took a 1-in-50 sample from all the reception centers registration 
books, a 1-in-15 sample from Caritas in Pajule and a gender-specific 
sample of 1/15 from the two reception centers in Kitgum (1/15 of the 
females and 1/15 of the males).2 Once a sample of 886 names had 
been collected, the team attempted to find as many of the IDPs as 
possible and interview them. Choice of IDP camps visited was mostly linked to names in the sample. 
Almost all the larger camps were visited and many of the small ones. By the end of the fieldwork the 
research team had managed to interview 238 FAPs in the sample or their immediate family. Less detailed 
information was also obtained on 177 others. These data have been coded, and analyzed using MS 
Access.  
 
The logistical difficulties of carrying out this research in a short space of time were considerable, both 
because of the breadth of the study and the diversity of actors that needed to be interviewed. Transport 
                                                     
2 This in itself was a hugely time-consuming process, and it was not possible to obtain a sample from some of the centers 
without considerable persuasion (partly because certain centers had understandable concerns about confidentiality of the 
information). At some centers there was no database from which to work, and one had to be generated from hard copies 
of registration forms. For one center it was not possible to obtain data from which to take a sample until the very end of 
the field research. For that center, Rachele, we had to rely on data gathered from visits to IDP camps.  Another center, 
CCF, simply could not be reached in time to be included in the sample. 
THE SAMPLE 
886 Formerly Abducted Persons  
251 female, 635 male 
1/50 from each center 
1/15 male/female in Kitgum 
 
Centers included in sample: 
KICWA, CPA Kitgum, WV Gulu, 
Gusco, AACAN, KCV, CPA Lira  
 
Center Breakdown of Total Sample:  
AACAN: 27 
Caritas Apac: 50 
CPA Kitgum: 139 
CPA Lira: 65 
GUSCO: 55 
KCV: 7 
KICWA: 379 
WV Gulu: 191 
 
Double Accounting: 
45 people from the sample have spent 
time in at least two different reception 
centers 
  
Information Breakdown: 
Information on 415 of sample, no 
information on 471 
 
TOTAL Interviews conducted About 
Sample: 
FAPs from sample: 238 
Camp Leader or Neighbour: 170 
Relative: 90 
Guardian: 3 
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arrangements were a particular problem. Also, the security situation meant that investigation in some 
places had to be kept to a minimum. The research team was unable to find more information about the 
remainder than had been collected by the reception centers at the time of their registration. In some cases 
this was because the team was unable to visit the IDP camp to which the FAPs had been sent (mostly due 
to concerns about the team’s security). In other cases it was because the FAPs had moved within or 
between camps, and the FAPs gave a false name when he or she registered at the reception center, or 
because the data recorded at the reception centers was incorrect in some other way.3 Other limitations of 
this research include the following: 
 
First, interviewing people in the camp setting is challenging. There is always limited time available, 
especially when visiting the camps with a military convoy, and often people are surrounded by their 
family or camp officials, inhibiting what they say. Also, many FAPs have a version of their story which 
they tell and retell. FAPs and their families have come to associate a researcher’s visit with a resource. 
They may give particular answers in order to extract material assistance. Only with considerable time and 
effort can a researcher obtain less superficial answers.  
 
Second, a study methodology that is linked to the reception center registration process potentially 
excludes the majority of people who have been abducted. Evidence from the findings in the IDP camps 
indicated that many FAPs bypass the official channels, including the reception centers. This has also been 
found to be the case by other research teams using structured survey methods.4 The reintegration 
experiences of these FAPs fall outside the main focus of this study (although, where the research team has 
information, it has been mentioned).  
2. FINDINGS PART 1:  ‘REINTEGRATION’ IN NORTHERN 
UGANDA  
‘[The formerly abducted people] must accept that they have already been forgiven.  They 
must believe in the Amnesty Act; that it is real. They must accept that the community has 
forgiven them.  They must go back to their own communities; we must not share negative 
attitudes with them; we must tell them that the communities are waiting for them and will 
welcome them warmly. They should learn to receive education from the community and 
to turn to the structures that are there to help them.’ 
—World Vision Reception Center staff member at an Amnesty 
Commission workshop 
 
‘At the center we convey the message that if you behave well, you will have a good 
life… But we try to prepare [the FAPs] for life in the camps … we talk about the poverty 
and death … you don’t have to have been abducted to experience bad things … and we 
don’t tell them that everything will be ok … No! There are challenges ahead.’ 
—GUSCO Reception Center staff member 
                                                     
3  There are FAPs who have gone through the reception center system more than once, and have become adept at 
keeping their identity unclear. In addition, we found that some FAPs give false names for their parents (perhaps to 
make it hard for Ugandan security forces to locate them). This research team became adept at finding out where 
FAPs were, but there is no doubt that many more might have been found if we had had more time. 
4 The preliminary results of the most important recent survey were released in April 2006 as ‘SWAY Research Brief 
1’ (available at www.sway-uganda.org). This study of war affected youth in northern Uganda is based on surveys of 
more than 1,000 households and nearly 750 youth from eight sub-counties in Kitgum and Pader districts. It found 
that only half of boys and men taken for more than a week ever passed through a reception center, and fewer still 
have received amnesty or any form of assistance. 
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‘Actual ‘reintegration’ cannot happen in a disintegrated community. All we do is just 
prepare children for life in the camps… We may never succeed in reintegrating our 
children if we cannot get rid of the camps.’ 
—The Director of CCF Reception Center, Pader 
2.1 WHAT DOES ‘REINTEGRATION’ MEAN? 
Within the framework of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes, one of the 
main purposes of reintegration support is to assist persons who have been associated with fighting forces 
to return to civilian life as valuable and productive members of society.5 Although support for 
reintegration in northern Uganda is not within the framework of a formal DDR operation, the same 
principles apply. Effective programming involves striking a balance between meeting the needs and 
desires of ex-combatants and their families and those of the communities into which they are 
reintegrating. Usually this involves supporting ex-combatants to acquire a similar range of skills to those 
that civilians may already possess, and help to access the same opportunities and services as the rest of 
the population. While this may involve special programmes because of the particular experiences and 
needs of ex-combatants (for example, psychosocial support, accelerated education, skills training or 
temporary livelihood support), ultimately there has to be a level playing field of opportunity between ex-
combatants and their families and the wider civilian population (often achieved through making 
reintegration programs equally accessible to other civilians). This applies to children as much as it does to 
adults.6 Otherwise, especially where serious human rights abuses have been committed, ex-combatants 
will be resented by the wider community and programming for their support will breed the stigma, 
discrimination and rejection that it is often seeking to ameliorate. 
Global experience has highlighted a series of general approaches that are relevant and important when 
reintegrating former child soldiers and other separated children back into the community. These include 
working with the community as well as with the child to support return and reintegration, the necessity of 
considering age as an element in the reintegration strategy, the importance of family reunification where 
possible, addressing the challenges faced by girls and the need for follow-up to monitor the progress of 
children in their new environment.7 Many of these are articulated as good practice principles in the Cape 
Town Principles and Best Practices, adopted by UNICEF and NGOs in 1997, and the Inter-Agency 
Guiding Principles on Separated and Unaccompanied Children, adopted by the ICRC, UNICEF, 
UNHCR, IRC, Save the Children UK and World Vision International in 2004. The Cape Town Principles 
include the statement that: ‘All efforts should be made to keep or reunite children with their families or to 
                                                     
5 See, for example, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1999, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: principles and guidelines.   
6 See Action for the Rights of Children (ARC), 2002, Critical Issues: child soldiers, p26; Robinson, M., 2003, 
Community-Based Approaches to Reintegration of Children Affected by Armed Conflict: An Overview of 
Approaches, Lessons Learned and Challenges, A Presentation to the European Network for a Research Agenda on 
Children and Armed Conflicts European Seminar on Programmes on Reintegration of Children and Adolescents, 
Boys and Girls, Involved in Armed Conflicts, Innocenti Research Centre, p5. 
7 See Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into Armed Forces and 
on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa, 1997, UNICEF;  Verhey, B., 2001, Child 
Soldiers: preventing, demobilizing and reintegrating, World Bank, Africa Region Working Paper Series; Robinson, 
M., 2003, Community-Based Approaches to Reintegration of Children Affected by Armed Conflict: An Overview 
of Approaches, Lessons Learned and Challenges, A Presentation at the Innocenti Research Centre on Programmes 
on Reintegration of Children and Adolescents, Boys and Girls Involved in Armed Conflicts; Inter-Agency 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Working Group (IDDRS), 2004, Children and DDR (draft); 
Verhey, B. 2003, Going Home: Demobilizing and reintegrating child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Save the Children UK.  
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place them within a family structure.’8 However, this guide to good practice, like most others, also 
recognizes that there is no one model that can direct how to effect the social reintegration of children – 
local realities have to be taken into account.9 In particular, in times of conflict, acute strains may be 
placed on families and social networks.10  
So, what are the local realities in northern Uganda? In Kitgum, Pader and Gulu Districts 90% of the 
population are living in camps for internally displaced persons in squalid conditions, where mortality and 
morbidity rates are alarmingly high, kinship networks under enormous strain and security very low. Vast 
numbers of school-age children are not receiving any meaningful education. Few persons, adults or 
adolescents, have access to livelihood opportunities – safe access to land is highly restricted and the 
micro-economy is very weak, to say the least. Many of those who have returned from the LRA over the 
past three years have never lived in IDP camps before. This may not be the case for those who have been 
abducted in the last few years, but even so, if ‘reintegration’ is taken to mean a return to social or 
economic normality as a productive member of society, the use of the term to describe what happens in 
northern Uganda is something of a misnomer. The terms ‘reinsertion’ or ‘reunification’ are perhaps more 
appropriate. The social and economic conditions in which the bulk of the population of the war-affected 
parts of northern Uganda are living are unacceptable and cannot be regarded as conducive for a return to 
‘normal’ productive life for FAPs. By force of circumstances, FAPs are returning to social and economic 
conditions which are inappropriate for all persons, formerly abducted or not. 
Accordingly, the conditions in northern Uganda pose huge challenges to programming in support of 
‘reintegration’. Reception centers and any other programmes supporting ‘reintegration’ have to try to 
identify what can be done to support the return of FAPs while maintaining a level playing field, in a 
situation in which virtually the entire population is destitute and disenfranchised. Responses have 
included attempts to ‘sensitize’ family members and neighbors to accept returning FAPs and the 
provision of ‘packages’ of non-food items. Some centers have gone further and tried to provide FAPs 
with school access or vocational training. Given the context, what might be achieved by such 
interventions is inevitably limited. But there is also a further problem - one that makes a proper 
assessment of the return process very hard indeed. With few exceptions, reception centers have little 
information about what has happened to FAPs after they have been sent back to the ‘community’. The 
ability to follow-up with individuals has been severely compromised both by limitations of access 
imposed by security and the sheer numbers of individuals involved. Reception centers do not know much 
about what has actually happened to most FAPs after they have passed beyond their gates, and what is 
reported as ‘successful integration’, is largely anecdotal information about a few cases.11  
The lack of real information has fed rumors and assertions, which are commonly cited as ‘facts’. 
Reception center staff is aware that going to live in an IDP camp is far from ideal and that their 
knowledge of what happens to FAPs in the camps is limited, even for those FAPs who have passed 
through their own centers. Nevertheless, claims are sometimes made about what is going on that are 
determined more by notions of what ought to happen than by evidence. Although the team did not 
                                                     
8 UNICEF (27-30 April 1997). Cape Town Principles and Best Practices. 
9 See Action for the Rights of Children (ARC), 2002, Critical Issues: child soldiers, pp26-45. 
10 Various writers have drawn attention to the acute strains that occur in family networks during war and upheaval. 
See, for example, Igreja, V. (2004). Cultural Distruption and the Care of Infants in Post-war Mozambique. Children 
and Youth on the Frontline. J. Boyden and J. de Berry, Berghahn Books: 274 pp. 
David Tolfree, amongst others, has drawn attention to the potential dangers of ‘fostering’ arrangements. He notes 
that ‘Traditional fostering involves an element of exchange and is rarely based on the best interests of the 
child…Spontaneous fostering in emergency situation will usually reflect cultural norms and practices…’Tolfree, D. 
(2004). Whose Children? Stockholm, Save the Children. 
11 During the time the team was in the field the improving security situation meant that some centers began to 
significantly enhance their follow-up work with FAPs. The results of this were, however, not available prior to 
finalizing this report.  
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encounter staff in the reception centers who specifically referred to the Cape Town Principles or the Inter-
Agency Guiding Principles, a series of general implicit and explicit expectations underpin the approach 
that relate to best practice guidelines, particularly as they relate to children. These include the following 
assumptions.  
• The best place for the child and young adult is with his or her family and back in the community;  
• Family structures can support the returned FAP; 
• The communities will be accepting of those who return from the LRA; 
• The FAP will be willing to live in a displaced setting in order to be with their family. 
The team found that when questioned about their activities, many reception center staff justify and defend 
what they are doing with reference to such ideas, and will often elaborate them by mentioning the 
Ugandan Amnesty Act, or special ‘Acholi’ capacities to forgive, or the prevalence of ‘traditional’ 
welcoming rituals. An issue that must be confronted, is whether conventional child protection procedures 
are being followed blindly, thereby closing down investigation of possible alternatives, or whether 
reception centers are making an implicit or explicit assessment of what is the best that can be achieved in 
extreme circumstances. Whatever the case, in northern Uganda the expectation that families and 
neighborhoods can provide a benign and caring environment in the harsh conditions of IDP camps is open 
to challenge. Perhaps there has been no choice, but vulnerable individuals have been systematically 
located in places that cannot be effectively monitored in part because they are too dangerous to visit. It is 
against this background that the team set out to establish empirically what has been happening to FAPs 
who have returned from the LRA. 
2.1.1 WHERE ARE THEY NOW? 
One ‘fact’ that is commonly cited in Gulu town is that 60% of FAPs who have passed through reception 
centers are now living in the municipality. Sometimes this was even mentioned by people who would also 
talk about the willingness of families in the IDP camps to receive their relatives back from the LRA. 
Although no studies could be cited which confirmed large scale FAP residence in the town, some 
informants at reception centers thought it was likely because they had sustained relatively close personal 
links with particular FAPs who were living nearby. The research team’s findings, however, reveal that it 
is incorrect. Evidence from the survey of FAPs suggests that a large number have settled in the IDP 
camps. An important finding from the semi-structured interviews with a random sample of FAPs and 
their families is that movement away from the IDP camps has been over-emphasized.  
The research team followed-up with 415 FAPs who had passed through reception centers. Of these, the 
research team was able to interview or obtain detailed information about the whereabouts of 238. Of 
these, only 24 had moved to the district capital, 20 joined the UPDF, 1 joined the LDU, 5 had returned to 
their reception center for training, 9 were away from home at boarding school, 1 was in prison, 9 had died 
and 41 had moved to another IDP camp. The remaining 128 were still living in the IDP camps to which 
they had been sent. The 177 other FAPs who were followed-up with could not be located for an interview 
in the time available. Most were also said to be usually resident in the IDP camps. However, the research 
team was unable to verify this (and it is possible that some informants claimed that FAPs were resident in 
the IDP camps in the hope of obtaining relief items).  
The pie charts below present information about those FAPs whose whereabouts the research team was 
able to confirm, and also show how these differ between those who reported at reception centers between 
1995 and 2000, and those who reported between 2001 and 2005.12 It is striking that the patterns are 
                                                     
12 Note that if the 177 others who were reported to be normally resident in the camps are included, the percentage of 
those resident in the camps would be even higher. 
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similar, with the exception of those being educated away from the camp, which is higher in the more 
recent cohort.  
These data suggest that, in spite of the acute difficulties, most FAPs who have passed through the 
reception centers remain with their families or within the same IDP camp (even when they returned 
several years ago).  
Where Are They Now? Returnees 1995 - 00
n=59
Transfer
19%
Municipality
14%
Dead
7%
UPDF
5%
Village camp
55%
 
Where Are They Now? Returnees  2001-2005
n=179
Dead
1%
LDU
1%
Prison
1%
RC/ Training
2%UPDF
4%School
5%
Municipality
16%
Transfer
20%
Village camp
50%
 
 
The findings from the IDP camps suggest the following factors are particularly important in explaining 
why movement out of the camps is limited. 
• First, the social life in the IDP camps is such that returned people are absorbed into the population 
(even if they may not necessarily be fully accepted or ‘forgiven’). The team came across many 
examples. At one end of the spectrum, some families welcome back their relatives, and the 
returned people appear to be re-incorporated into moral networks. At the other end, there are 
restraints imposed on the actions of those who want to be hostile, including local ‘by-laws’, 
which usually include rules about not insulting returned people. In addition, many of the camps 
are large, housing thousands of people. So it can be possible for someone to move from home to 
home in search of somewhere relatively more comfortable. This is particularly so for women, 
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who normally live at the residence of their sexual partner. A few female FAPs told the team that 
they had decided to ‘marry’ after being abused at their parental home.  
• Second, there are potential benefits associated with having a registered FAP person in a 
household. Certain reception centers, notably Rachele, provide relatively generous packages for 
the families of abducted people, as well as school fees for the FAP. This certainly caused some 
resentment. Those who receive less because the center they have passed through was less 
‘generous’ or well endowed complain that they are being treated unfairly, while families with no 
member who has been through a center can often be heard to complain that people are being 
rewarded for having been with the LRA. Nonetheless, the eagerness with which people claim to 
have been ‘abducted’ to researchers highlights awareness that it is the only category of person 
that is likely to attract significant additional assistance from the aid agencies. 
• Third, there are few opportunities to move away from IDP camps. For most people in the camps 
there is barely any source of income. A day’s laboring for a local landowner or army officer is 
enough to buy a couple of sodas in Gulu town. Transactional sex might be a little more lucrative, 
but there are few who can afford to pay for it, and returns are more likely in the form of 
accommodation and food. Most people have little or nothing to sell in the market place. Even for 
those who are supposed to be issued with Amnesty Certificates, the cost of travel to Gulu or 
Kitgum is often prohibitive, let alone the cost of staying in the towns. For many people, 
movement to towns is only possible if they have relatives who can look after them when they 
arrive. In addition, there are constraints on movement imposed by the UPDF and the threat from 
the LRA. In some places it may only be possible to move away from the IDP camp in a military 
convoy.  
‘Night Commuting’ 
The obvious (apparent) exception to these observations about movement is the phenomenon of ‘night 
commuting’. This refers to the daily migration of young people into urban centers in the evening to sleep. 
It was not a primary focus of our research, although night commuter shelters were visited and interviews 
were made with children on the move. Media interest and aid agency responses have mainly focused on 
the very visible night commuter shelters in Gulu and Kitgum towns. These service the municipalities and 
those camps in walking distance. The numbers of young people moving into the town at night have 
declined since the LRA massacres of 2004, but hundreds still make the journey. While concerns about 
abduction remain, there are also other factors at work too. Several of those interviewed said that they 
found the shelters more comfortable than the cramped conditions in their parents’ homes, and some 
shelters provide entertainment and education. There is electricity in the towns too, and the possibility of 
socializing with age mates. In addition, it is important to note that the vast majority of young people 
living in the war zone are unable to walk into the main towns. In this context, the emphasis on night 
commuting at certain very public locations in Gulu or Kitgum seems misplaced. If it is the case that 
children and young adults are vulnerable to LRA abduction, then they are surely much more vulnerable in 
the more poorly protected IDP camps that are rarely visited, let alone studied. Here young people have no 
option but to remain where they are at night. In large camps, like Atiak, Anaka and Pabbo, the team noted 
that there was movement of some young people into the centers at dusk, but this aspect of more localized 
night commuting has been largely overlooked.13  
                                                     
13 It was noted by the team that some of those moving into the centers of IDP camps at night were young women. 
There are also indications that transactional sex occurs quite frequently, whereby women are offered a place to stay 
in return for sex. This was stated to us by people living in the camps. Several researchers have drawn attention to 
this problem in the main towns, it is also very likely to be an issue elsewhere (see, for example, Williamson, 2005). 
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2.1.2 TREATMENT OF FAPS IN IDP CAMPS 
The research team’s data indicates that most FAPs sent to IDP camps stay there. At one level it would 
therefore appear that family structures are robust enough to cope with receiving FAPs back, and that 
despite all the challenges, family reunification has been a relatively successful approach to reintegration.  
The team, however, is cautious about drawing this conclusion. The study was not able to assess the degree 
to which the prolonged war and relocation of the population in camps has lead to a breakdown in social 
accountability (this would require more detailed ethnographic work than was possible within the time 
frame of the research). However, there were indications of acute tensions, some of which have serious 
long term implications. 
The team came across many stories of how ‘reintegration’ into a family network has been possible, and 
there appears to have been willingness for neighbors to accept that the person who has been with the LRA 
was not accountable for their actions. However, less positive accounts are also common. There is no 
doubt that antipathy and resentment of formerly abducted people (especially towards those who have 
passed through reception centers) is quite widespread, although it seems to vary from one IDP camp to 
another. It is manifested in a wide variety of ways, from children calling each other names to physical 
abuse.14  
Of those 238 FAPs in the sample for whom the research team has interview material, 55 respondents (i.e. 
just under 25%) stated that they had experienced negative attitudes since their arrival (including two who 
also stated that their life is now fine). Most of the abuse was in the form of name-calling (e.g. ‘GUSCO 
man’, ‘child of Kony’, ‘bush person’). The average age of those reporting negative attitudes towards them 
was 18. Of those who reported negative attitudes, 14 were women and 41 men.15 The number reporting 
negative attitudes is likely to be an underestimate, because some of those who did not report negative 
attitudes may have been unwilling to talk about such things in front of relatives. 
Just 21 respondents (i.e. less than 10 percent) said that their life is fine now. There is no detectable pattern 
why they felt more positive about their lives than others: some of them had been abducted years ago, but 
others had returned from the bush as recently as 2004. Out of the 21, only five had received skills 
training, a quarter had applied for Amnesty; about half had received a cleansing ceremony. Three had 
previously experienced negative attitudes towards them. Some lived with their families, others did not. 
Individual personality clearly plays a large part in how a person adjusts – a point that came out strongly in 
our participant observation fieldwork.16  
Extracts from interviews about life in the IDP camps are presented in Appendix 4. From these interviews, 
and from our ethnographic field work, it became evident to the team that family relationships are 
generally under even greater strain than is at first apparent. One of the consequences of the upheavals in 
the war zone of northern Uganda is that bride-price has generally not been paid, making the lineage status 
of women and their children ambiguous. To accept a person into a clan implies that a claim is being 
recognized to clan land, which may have serious implications when or if camps are eventually dismantled 
and there is a large-scale return to rural life. Without bride-price exchange, the lineage status of a woman 
                                                     
14 The team recorded a telling example when a group of camp inhabitants were stopped by a group of UPDF soldiers 
and made to slash the long grass and vegetation along the side of the road. This is a common practice, and 
something that people living in the camps have to put up with. While they were working, the soldiers stopped 
another group and singled out one young man. They called him ‘You GUSCO man!’ and told him that no one had 
told him to come back from the bush, so he should slash twice as much as everyone else! By-standers found this 
very amusing. FAP accounts of life in the IDP and life with the LRA are presented in Appendix 6.4. 
15 FAPs expressed different views about the significance of abuse from family and neighbors. Some stated that they 
were very upset about it (a few began crying when they talked about it). Others did not appear to take it seriously.  
16 FAPs and others interviewed stated that likeable and outgoing people are much more quickly accepted than those 
who are disturbed or aggressive. 
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and her children is that of her father rather than her sexual partner. This might place her and her children 
in competition with her brothers’ wives for resources.17 
Furthermore, the lack of bride-price exchange means that affinal relations are unpredictable. Women may 
move from one sexual partner to another, sometimes taking children from a former union with them, but 
sometimes leaving them with their mother, a former co-wife, or perhaps a wife of one of their mother’s 
brothers. All of these people might be considered family members, but the situation does not correspond 
to the caring family unit, which seems to be implicit in so much of the child protection literature. In 
northern Uganda, as in other parts of Africa, family networks are complex, and can be particularly 
dynamic in situations of social stress. Patrilineal and patrilocal traditions have been weakened, even 
though the IDP camps mostly concentrate clans, and matrilineal connections have become more 
significant. The point in this context is that the ‘families’ to which FAPs are returned might actively 
involve their mother’s and father’s, but might not. Very many FAPs are not being cared for by both 
biological parents, and some by neither.18 This does not necessarily mean that they are not loved and 
cherished, but it is a risk. It is perhaps most likely when the FAP has been away for years, and the mother 
has started another family with a different partner. It is not enough to note if a FAP is staying with his or 
her mother or with another relative. There is a need to know how the FAP is being treated. That is 
something that could only be done effectively with a systematic follow-up of individual cases. 
2.1.3 VIEWS ABOUT ‘REINTEGRATION’ 
The research team asked community leaders, social workers, FAPs and their families what they felt 
assisted the returnees most effectively in finding their way back into society. In reply, many used the 
word ‘reintegration’, but were usually quick to qualify that ‘reintegration’ did not mean returning to a 
normal kind of life, given the IDP camp situation. Many of the answers  received dealt with what would 
be desirable for successful ‘reintegration’ if only it was possible, rather than what has actually worked in 
practice.  
It was striking that the language used by respondents, including the FAPs themselves, tended to replicate 
that of the reception center social workers. There was, for example, much talk of ‘sensitizing’, ‘trauma’, 
‘counseling’, and ‘children’. Problems are raised with the use of these terms later in this report; here they 
are placed in inverted commas, like the word ‘reintegration’ itself, to indicate that our informants used 
these expressions, or their local language equivalents, in response to the team’s questions. Below is the 
summary of the main general issues raised by out respondents. 
Structured facilitation of return: The need for adequate facilitation is a constant theme in the 
statements of respondents. Most people have views about how it should occur, and drew attention to 
shortcomings. A point repeatedly stressed was that ‘reintegration’ could only be attempted if there is a 
structure that supports such an endeavor, whether it is a strong family, a well-trained camp leader or a 
community volunteer who is aware of the issues that might arise. Family members, FAPs and community 
leaders all said that they need reliable facilitators to mediate between them. The research team witnessed 
occasions when FAPs were first reunited with their relatives after many years. It could be a very difficult 
encounter, in which people would not know what to say to each other. It was easy to see why tactful 
management of the meeting was considered so important. Many informants also emphasized that follow-
                                                     
17 That is what happened among returning refugees to the West Nile region of Uganda in the 1980s. It could happen 
in the current war zone on a huge scale. At present, people living in camps are all so impoverished that the notion of 
competing over clan assets may seem remote. Nevertheless, relationships may be affected now by what is 
anticipated for the future. 
18  We tried to assess this systematically in our survey of those who had passed through the reception centers, and it 
was clear that quite a large number of FAPs were not living with a parent. However, in most cases we were not able 
to assess what this meant. For example, a parent might be living nearby or a woman might be living with a sexual 
partner. Also the terms ‘father’ and ‘mother’ can carry wider connotations than biological parent.  
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up by reception centers should be an important part of facilitation. As one informant put it, it makes the 
FAPs ‘disciplined, because if they start getting disorganized, they are counseled.’ Several FAPs said that 
follow-up visits reassure them that there is still someone out there who cares about them. However, it was 
widely recognized that in practice follow-up very rarely happens.  
Reinsertion packages: Not surprisingly, all FAPs felt that the packages of foodstuffs, commodities and 
money given to them on leaving reception centers were helpful. But it was also mentioned as a cause of 
resentment among people who had not been ‘abducted’, both by some FAPs and by their neighbors and 
families. Moreover, FAPs could not understand why different centers and agencies provided such 
different things. For example, those who were not having their school fees paid complained that it was 
unfair that others had been given sponsorship. Incomprehensible inconsistencies were also highlighted by 
camp officials. One camp commander pointed out that the reception centers were not giving equal support 
to all FAPs in his camp and that the ‘Amnesty Commission has issued certificates to some formerly 
abducted children and not to others. The children complain that the community leaders do not seem to 
care for them in the face of such differences.’  
A warm reception: Camp officials often mentioned that, ‘first and foremost, children have to be loved’ 
and they need to be given a warm reception, because ‘the first thing that makes ‘reintegration’ successful 
is the welcome.’ They explained that how a ‘child’ is received 
back home sets the tone for the duration of their stay. Virtually 
all camp leaders were adamant that each family needs to be able 
to provide a welcoming ceremony at the very least.19 The FAPs 
who told the research team that they were warmly welcomed 
say that they felt comforted when they saw that the community 
was indeed receiving them well, as they had been told: ‘At 
World Vision, they told us that there were people to talk to us 
when we are at home. And so… there was no need to go back 
to the center again when we have reunited with our families.’  
Many camp officials also emphasized more complex healing 
and cleansing ceremonies, even though relatively few of the 
FAPs in this study sample were reported to have actually 
received such a ceremony (e.g. 19 percent in Gulu and 9 
percent in Pader). It was often claimed that they were important 
for ‘the community’, because they reduce fear of the FAPs, including fear of their spiritual pollution or 
cen. One mother described how after her son came home; they had to first cure him with a goat-
slaughtering ceremony. Preparing such ceremonies gave camp leaders an opportunity to ‘sensitize’ the 
community and to make sure that ‘we are going to use a better language, because if we use a bitter 
language they (i.e. the FAPs) may go back to the bush.’ It is important to note this link between 
ceremonies and what might be termed public education. This is certainly an important part of their current 
role in northern Uganda, and helps explain why certain leading activists have given them such emphasis.  
Attitudes to healing amongst FAPs themselves were very mixed. Some confirmed that ceremonies could 
be beneficial; others were disinterested and seemed a bit surprised as to why they were being asked about 
them. Overall, research findings using semi-structured interviews (as well as our participant observation 
fieldwork) suggested that healing could have an important place in helping some FAPs become integrated 
into social networks, but for others rituals were largely irrelevant. 
Keeping FAPs busy: One of the most disturbing aspects of spending time at IDP camps is the sight of so 
many people, including children, sitting around for hour after hour with nothing much to do. Camp 
                                                     
19 This, however, strictly referred to welcoming ceremonies, not healing or cleansing ceremonies.  
The term cen refers to a kind of 
spiritual pollution, affecting those who 
have performed violent acts, or who 
have witnessed them, or been in 
contact with death. Sometimes it is 
talked about as if it is a kind of 
vengeful ghost. At other times it refers 
to a malevolent spiritual force that 
emanates from the affected person. 
There is also the idea that cen may 
accumulate in a person over time. 
Various local healers attempt to 
control or mediate cen, including 
ajwaki (spirit mediums) who can 
perform rites of exorcism. 
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officials stressed that ‘reintegration’ worked best when the FAP is actively involved in activities, and 
FAPs themselves commonly contrasted the relative freedom they had enjoyed in the bush with the 
boredom and constraints of life in the camp. Camp leaders stress that encouraging children to play games 
is a good idea – although the research team did not see evidence of this happening (apart from during the 
very occasional visits to some IDP camps of aid agencies that specialize in organizing such activities – 
e.g. War Child).  
Counseling: It was also emphasized that FAPs need to be ‘counseled always on how to stay with other 
people and to socialize well with people,’ because this makes them ‘gradually forget their past life.’ Many 
FAP’s themselves would say this. When asked who should counsel them and what kind of counseling did 
they want, answers tended to refer to advice about proper ways of living given by relatives and neighbors. 
Group activities: A wide range of group activities was mentioned as being helpful, including traditional 
dances, sports activities, school or joint business activities. However, these things were usually mentioned 
as being a good idea, rather than what was necessarily happening, and informants in the camps noted that 
many FAPs remain rather separate from the rest of the population.  
Peer support: Some FAPs emphasized the need to establish strong peer support networks. Not all agreed 
about this. Other wanted no reminders of what had happened to them. The team noted that in FAP peer 
support groups (such as a darts club), the hierarchies of the LRA tended to be replicated.20 Members of 
these groups, and those who like to meet with other FAPs on an informal basis, said that jointly finding a 
way of thinking about a better life in the future can be an energizing experience. It makes the FAP feel as 
if their time in the bush was worth something, rather than the beginning of a wasted life. At the very least 
their experience can help others.21 
Predictably, all of those interviewed drew attention to barriers and obstacles to successful ‘integration’. 
Foremost among these observations are the following: 
Limited economic opportunities: A huge problem that was mentioned by just about everyone was that 
the economic opportunities in the IDP camps and in the urban municipalities are very limited. Even those 
FAPs who had received some training found that they could not secure an adequate income. Overall the 
research team found little evidence that any technical skills learned at reception centers have proved 
adequate to secure a livelihood.22  However, the difficulties that FAPs have in earning an income are 
probably no worse than for most other people living in the region.23  
Treating adults as children: Linked to the absence of a viable livelihood, a common complaint among 
adult FAPs is that they are not taken seriously, but are treated like children both at the reception centers 
and after they are sent to the IDP camps. They state that they want to be given a choice as to how they 
live, and to be taught things that actually enhance their skills and capacities, rather than assuming that 
they have nothing to offer.  
                                                     
20 One indication of this was that FAPs who had a rank in the bush were invariably the first to speak on behalf of 
group members. In some groups, the FAPs’ bush ranks were incorporated into administrative arrangements. 
21 As one FAP explained: ‘Other returnees from here are traumatized. They always refer them to me to counsel 
them. I always counsel them and tell them about the problems we faced from the bush. So I ask them, “Do you want 
other problems?’ In case if the government imprisons you, like that one who already is a thief, and who refused to 
listen to my instruction. He has been imprisoned.”’ 
22 There were very few exceptions to this: some FAPs reported that the bike they had been given secured them a 
livelihood as a boda boda (bike-taxi).  
23 The team noted that a ‘skill’ that some FAPs have learned at the centers is how to make applications and requests 
to aid organizations (and to researchers). Moreover, many FAPs have had their first experiences of living in a 
municipality while residing at the reception centers, and this potentially afforded them choices, which they 
otherwise would not have had. For a relatively small number, it becomes apparent that returning to the IDP camps is 
not the best option.  
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Pessimism: Many FAPS said that they often felt unable to move on with their lives, because they felt so 
pessimistic about the future. This was said by some to make settling down in the camps or towns almost 
impossible. Those who reported no hope for the future were also often those who contemplated going 
back to the rebels.24  
 
Distribution of soap and other essential items, Opit IDP Camp (Photo: Melissa Parker) 
 
 
Security situation: All of those interviewed mentioned the security situation in the IDP camps. Fear of 
‘re-abduction’ was often mentioned by FAPs, and staff at reception centers also expressed concerns that 
those who have passed through the official system might be particular targets. In addition there are 
concerns among many FAPs that people in the general population will attack them.  
Concerns about the LRA focus on ‘revenge’ attacks on IDP camps that have apparently welcomed 
returning combatants, and also to the possibility of LRA punishments for those who escaped from the 
LRA (as opposed to those who were released). These fears are well grounded. The attack on Pagak camp 
in May 2004, for example, was a ‘retaliation’ against the population’s positive public reception to 
surrendering LRA combatants (which was reported on the local radio station). Since then there has been 
an improvement in the security of some camps, but they all still remain vulnerable. Even when the UPDF 
and LDU engage with the LRA, the consequences may not be very reassuring. Those who have 
previously been with the LRA state that they feel especially vulnerable during these kinds of incidents.  
The LRA has been able to move deep into a camp at night, and there have been worries voiced that 
specific returned people might be targeted for ‘re-abduction’. The team found no evidence of this actually 
happening (although it probably has in the past). However, the team came across several people who had 
stories about being abducted three or four times without having been specifically targeted. It is common 
for FAPs to describe how people who had tried to escape are executed. The survival of FAPs who have 
                                                     
24 Most state that to actually do so would be impossible. As one put it, ‘I felt like going back but I know even if I go 
back to the rebels, no one will welcome me.’ However, we know of one confirmed case where it has happened. 
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experienced multiple abductions indicates that this is not always the case. Nevertheless, all FAPs say that 
running away from the LRA is very dangerous.25  
Fear of the UPDF: The LRA is not the only security hazard that was mentioned in interviews. The 
UPDF and Local Defence Units (LDUs) are responsible for the security of civilians (there is next to no 
civilian policing in the IDP camps). However, reports of human rights violations by soldiers are not 
uncommon. Soldiers enforce curfews and persons found beyond the designated boundaries without 
permission and knowledge of the UPDF/LDUs are at risk of being beaten or worse. When soldiers feel 
under military threat, their behavior can be particularly unpredictable and harsh. 26 
Treatment by family and neighbors: This issue has been discussed above. Even if they are accepted or 
tolerated now, some FAPs expressed concern that the situation would not last. A commonly heard 
complaint was that after an initial welcome, FAPs started to be called ‘bad names’, particularly when it 
become clear that they would not receive extra relief items.  
Most of those who have passed through the reception centers are living in the IDP camps. However, some 
are unwilling to take such a risk. The research team carried out multiple interviews with a ‘peer group’ of 
former LRA veterans (i.e. FAPs who had been with the LRA for several years and had been engaged in 
armed combat), including some middle level officers. They were living in Gulu municipality and admitted 
that they feared living out in the IDP camps, because of what might be done to them. Similarly, one of the 
‘wives’ of a senior LRA commander who was staying at World Vision asked what could be done for her 
children, who, she was sure, would be harmed if people found out who they were.  
2.1.4 ‘ABDUCTION’ AND ATTITUDES TO THE LRA 
Attitudes of FAPs to their experience of being with the LRA vary widely. A problem with the use of the 
term ‘abduction’ (mako in the Acholi and Langi languages) is that it is not a neutral term. It allocates no 
agency to those who are taken. It suggests that they are passive victims.  
                                                     
25 Many recounted how they had tried to escape, but were recaptured and severely beaten or even forced to kill 
someone.  One of the GUSCO social workers described what happened to a boy  at the center after being re-
abducted: ‘Since he had escaped from the rebel’s captivity not so long ago, they swore to kill him, along with all the 
other children who dared to escape but were recaptured…. He and four other boys were tied up and lined up ready to 
be killed. One by one the boys were hacked with a machete - the rebels always say they cannot waste bullets on 
'escapees’ or 'abductees’. He was the last in line and luckily for him – when the third boy had been killed, a UPDF 
helicopter which was following the rebels came in view, quite low and started firing at them. The rebels took off, 
leaving him behind where the soldiers later picked him.’  
According to another FAP, also at GUSCO: ‘I ran away the first time but I was caught then I did not dare to try 
again because I knew for sure I would be killed if I was caught. It was sheer luck that separated me and some boys 
from the rebels – I decide to escape then. […] I wanted to come back and continue with my schooling.’ Even talking 
about escaping after arrival like this can be considered foolish. It was striking that many FAPs claim that they were 
captured by the UPDF (‘I did not escape; I was just captured by the government soldiers. I had not even thought of 
escaping before’), and had not tried to escape (‘I did not escape, I did not even think of doing it. What was the point 
anyway? We were captured by UPDF soldiers during a battle.’) This was especially the case when they were 
interviewed together with other FAPs. In private, some said that they thought other FAPs would report them to the 
LRA if they admitted that they had returned voluntarily. 
26 In one attack at Atiak camp, which occurred while members of the team were staying there for the night, a group 
of LRA launched an assault in the early evening, quite close to the center. The local UPDF responded, and a short 
exchange of fire ensued, with casualties on both sides. The events that followed were very revealing. The UPDF 
soldiers moved around the camp shouting at people in Swahili. Then they made everyone put out fires and lights, 
and anyone found moving around near the main street was beaten. The soldiers were in a panic and their behavior 
unpredictable and potentially dangerous. In the morning, the body of the LRA combatant who had been killed was 
still lying in the road. No one had been allowed to cover him with leaves, as is the custom, and the local pigs were 
eating his body. In this way, cen was spread amongst the population. It seemed the camp population were being 
terrorized and punished for what had happened. 
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This is certainly the case in very many instances, but in others it is not. In some IDP camps we found 
informants who told us that they had been ‘abducted’ several times. One man said it had happened to him 
eight times. Often these people are taken for relatively brief periods to carry food or give directions. But 
the fact that they have survived to be ‘abducted’ repeatedly indicated a degree of (perhaps unwilling) 
cohabitation with the rebels. Quite a lot of people have faded in and out of contact with the LRA, and 
have kept a close contact even when living in an IDP camp or municipality. For large number of people 
living in camps, putting up with the LRA is not so different to their experiences of the UPDF (both 
constrain activities and occasionally require free labor).  
Moreover, once someone has been ‘abducted’ and kept (i.e. not quickly released) by the LRA, they are 
initiated into a new kind of life and inculcated with new values. Some young women taken as ‘wives’ and 
young men trained as combatants described to us how they came to accept the LRA way of life, and 
strove to gain status within it.27 This might be considered evidence of their remarkable resilience in 
appalling circumstances. But it would be a mistake to assume that they have led a life of pretence for 
months or years.  
The attitudes of our FAP informants were remarkably diverse.28 Some had clearly had an atrocious time, 
and remained appalled and terrified by what had happened, or expressed nothing but bitterness for those 
who had abused them. Several did indeed show signs of deep mental disturbance. In one interview, a 
recently returned young woman stared into space and recited the story of her experiences in awesome 
detail, talking for more than two hours in a monotone, and ostensibly showing no emotion. She talked 
about how she had participated in killings and what she had eaten as if they were the same kind of thing. 
In contrast, a few FAPs surprised the research team by being indifferent to what had happened to them, or 
even amused by it. One young woman said that it was good in the bush, because she did not have to 
worry about being abducted by the LRA any more, and then fell about laughing. Others make a clear 
distinction between life in the bush and life in the reception center or in the IDP camps, and suggest that 
different rules apply in each situation. It was also striking how some FAPs (especially those who might be 
categorized as ‘veterans’) described life in the IDP camps and life with the LRA as if they existed in 
separate moral spaces. There were FAPs who expressed affection or respect for LRA commanders. In 
addition, as has been noted above, there is a strong sense of camaraderie among some FAPs, and LRA 
hierarchies, including gendered hierarchies, tend to be replicated in peer support groups.  
A point that emerged from the interviews and discussion with FAPs was that it was often the shifting 
between the world of the bush and the world of ‘normal’ life that was most difficult, painful and 
disturbing, not the actual living in the other moral space itself. Once the rules are established and clear, 
conforming to them could be comforting and reassuring. For some FAPs, there was an acute sense of loss 
in not being able to integrate their lives in the bush with their lives since their return, and that living with 
people who had not been in the bush meant a kind of denial of their experiences. These were people who 
had attained status in the LRA – command responsibility and ‘fame’. In the IDP camps they could not 
build on this achievement. It was only others from the LRA who recognized it. This was compounded by 
the advice they had been given at reception centers not to talk about their experiences with neighbors in 
the IDP camps, and was one reason given why FAPs seek out each other’s company after they are 
                                                     
27 To give examples, here are three quotes taken from interviews with (male) LRA veterans at one IDP: (1) ‘I was 
striving so much to get a rank. That is why they sent me to go and lay an ambush: I would go. I was given difficult 
tasks. I would perform them, because I was striving to get the rank and that was how I got it.’ (2) ‘Killing in the 
bush: to the commanders it was fame. When a commander orders killing, he becomes famous.... Everybody would 
struggle to get a rank or to be famous.’ (3) ‘Fighting was very nice for us, especially when we were on the winning 
side. If you go and find you have killed many of your opponents you are very happy. It was not bad, we felt it was 
nice.’ 
28 This sort of information rarely emerges from structures and semi-structured research methods, but emerges over 
time as a relationship is built up during participant observation or sometimes in very long, open-ended interviews. 
Appendix 6.4 presents several short extracts from interviews about life with the LRA. 
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released from the centers. The research team does not offer these observations to suggest that no FAPs are 
traumatized by their time in the bush, far from it, but information is too limited to make sweeping 
assertions, and things are certainly much more complicated than is generally suggested. It certainly makes 
no sense to assert that the LRA and FAPs do not have values, and it is unfortunate that this has been 
promoted as a piece of received wisdom, both in the media and by aid agencies. 
Staff at most of the reception centers made the point about the lack of values amongst FAPs. A World 
Vision publicity booklet quotes the director as saying: ‘We have to go to the community and help the 
children keep on the right path. They have grown up with the LRA. Many of them do not have values.’29  
Views about the lack of values among FAPs are of course affected by the notion that the LRA has no 
perceivable agenda. But, even leaving aside the political manifestos that have been distributed at various 
times, this is obviously not the case. The LRA may have become a way of life with certain benefits to 
those who accept it, such as access to selected women as ‘wives’, nevertheless, like Alice Lakwena’s 
Holy Spirit movement before it, the LRA has a project in wanting to make a new Acholi society – one 
that may incorporate non-Acholis, and that is purified of corruption and immorality. The war and killing 
is a form of healing, of cutting ‘wrong elements’ out of society and purifying it. Doubtless most people 
reading this report would view this as a warped and pernicious ideology. It would be wrong, however, to 
suggest that it is not based on the articulation of shared values.  
The power of the LRA is strongly linked to spiritual and moral values and its emphasis on healing rites 
and religious ceremonies, which are contrasted with the corruption, political compromises and impurity of 
life in Uganda, Africa and the world as a whole. Those who have participated in LRA rites may say that 
they do not believe in them any longer, or that they came to reject them, but the team did not come across 
any who deny their effects on behavior. Joseph Kony, like Alice Lakwena, has effectively harnessed 
widely recognized and feared spiritual forces. Many FAPs said that they believed, or even still believe, 
that he can see into their minds, and would know if they tried to escape. Some also observe that their 
spiritual experiences with the LRA were much more intense than anything they had experienced before or 
afterwards. For many FAPs, their time with the LRA was a time when they were close to the spirit world, 
maybe even to God. The Director of CCF Pader noted that some of those who come to her center 
comment that they spent many hours in prayer when they were with the LRA, but now are only expected 
to pray for relatively short periods, and they are not expected to take God so seriously.  
It is important to recognize that rituals are not just the expression of beliefs, but that they also shape or 
create beliefs. As religious practice demonstrates everywhere, regular collective performance of rites 
affects what people come to think is true, and this is particularly so for children. The LRA has been 
persistently underestimated as a military and political force partly because its institutionalised system of 
promoting and regulating values has been dismissed as incoherent madness. If only that was so!30 Extracts 
from interviews with LRA veterans are presented in Appendix 4. 
                                                     
29 When asked to elaborate on this remark, he said that children arriving at the center: ‘… do not value human life … 
it is a value that just is not there. They have no feelings, they have lost the ability to feel...Many have had to kill their 
own parents, or watch others kill their parents … they have killed with regularity and dismissiveness ... it has 
become as simple a task as tearing up a piece of paper’ [at which point he tore up a blank sheet of white paper].We 
asked if they have actually come to value other things; and that it is a question of them having different values, 
rather than no values. Commenting on a particular FAP who had just arrived – an obviously terrified young man in 
good physical condition but with badly cut bare feet from running for miles in the bush – World Vision’s director 
remarked: ‘Well, he has come to value being alive and eating food … but you must remember that he has been 
living with great fear under the control of a commander. Maybe you are right … they have changed their values  [in 
the bush] … it is not that they have no values.’ But is it really the case that those who have spent time living with the 
LRA only value eating and staying alive? The evidence is that there is much more to the LRA than that. Indeed, the 
evidence points the other way. 
30 A detailed discussion of the LRA is beyond the remit of this report. Interested readers are referred to Finnstrom 
(2003) and Allen (2006). 
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2.1.5 TRADITIONAL HEALING AND LOCAL FORGIVING 
Over the past ten years, there has been a great deal of emphasis by local and international NGOs on 
traditional and religious healing. A view has been promoted that the people of northern Uganda, and 
especially the Acholi, have a special capacity to forgive, and that local understandings of justice are based 
upon ‘reintegration’ of offending people into society. It has even been argued that this is not only a 
mechanism through which FAPs are re-incorporated into society, but even that it offers a way of 
resolving the war itself, and is a viable alternative to the criminal justice measures promoted by the 
International Criminal Court (which has been investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
northern Uganda).31 Much of the discussion focuses on certain rituals, notably a blessing ceremony which 
involved the FAP stepping on eggs, and a more complex reconciliation ceremony called mato oput. The 
issue has been picked up by the media. The New York Times, for example, rarely publishes articles on 
Uganda, but in April 2005 chose to run a substantial piece on the topic.32 Performance of traditional 
healing ceremonies has also been funded by various aid agencies. 
The team’s research findings indicate that there are several serious problems with assertions made about 
these ceremonies. One is that ideas about ‘amnesty’, ‘forgiveness’, ‘reconciliation’ and the setting aside 
of punitive judgment are not conceptually distinct in the Acholi language (or the related Langi language). 
Timo-kica means ‘doing forgiving/reconciliation etc.’ and can be used for all of them. So talk of 
‘forgiveness’ may not mean quite what it suggests in English. Amongst other things, the conflation of 
different notions makes it hard to explain why the Amnesty Act – a legal instrument – has to be 
periodically extended by parliament (although amnesty granted to an individual under the terms of the act 
is not timebound). The attitudes to forgiveness or amnesty are not as consistent as is so often asserted.33 
Many of those spoken to, begin by saying that they want timo-kica but go on to express enthusiasm for 
prosecution and punishment. Claims about Acholi forgiveness need to be closely interrogated, and 
certainly not taken at face value. The following are the key points about traditional healing that emerged 
from this research. 
                                                     
31 For example, one generally excellent study comments that the Ugandan Amnesty Act is seen to be compatible 
with Acholi dispute resolution mechanisms: ‘culturally, people’s ideas of forgiveness are entrenched. They don’t kill 
people; they believe the bitterness of revenge does not solve the problem. So it was easy for people to accept the 
idea of amnesty. The culture is for compensation.’ The report quotes a religious leader as saying that: ‘Some people 
say you can’t give in to Kony. But when you look at the Acholi people, they believe in mato oput, which is a 
reconciliation ceremony here. In Acholi culture there is no death sentence, because they know that the death 
sentence increases violence. They practice that in their culture, so why not in this?’ Thus, its is claimed, there is a 
clear feeling that the amnesty is based on values that are seen as compatible with the context in which it is being 
applied (Lomo and Hovil, 2004: 45). Many otherwise thoughtful and well-informed contributions continue to assert 
this view without serious question. For example, on February 1st 2005, the Civil Society for Peace in Northern 
Uganda issued a briefing paper. It contains the following statement on ‘traditional justice mechanisms in Acholi’: ‘it 
is worth mentioning a few words about the Acholi justice system, which is based on compensation, reconciliation 
and ‘reintegration’.  The main objective of the justice system is to integrate perpetrators into their communities with 
their victims, through a process of establishing the truth, confession, reparation, repentance and forgiveness.  
Mechanisms such a mato oput and bending of the spears are ancient Acholi rituals which, despite many years of war 
and displacement are still being practiced in the sub-region, and have the support and confidence of the majority of 
Acholis and their traditional leaders….’ CSOPNU (2005). The International Criminal Court Investigation in 
Northern Uganda. Briefing Paper. C. S. f. P. i. N. Uganda, Civil Society for Peace in Northern Uganda. 
32 Here is an extract from the article: ‘The International Criminal Court at The Hague represents one way of holding 
those who commit atrocities responsible for their crimes. The raw eggs, twigs and livestock that the Acholi people 
of northern Uganda use in their traditional reconciliation ceremonies represent another. The two very different 
systems - one based on Western notions of justice, the other on a deep African tradition of forgiveness - are clashing 
in their response to one of this continent's most bizarre and brutal guerrilla wars…  Lacey, M. (2005). Atrocity 
victims in Uganda choose to forgive.’ New York Times. New York. 
33 An important exception is the recent questionnaire-based study by the International Center for Transitional 
Justice. International Center for Transitional Justice (2005). Forgotten Voices: A population-based survey on 
attitudes about peace and justice in northern Uganda. Berkeley, Human Rights Center, University of California, 
Berkeley. 
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Some FAPs state that they have undergone a 
form of local or religious ritual, from ‘stepping 
on eggs’ and sprinkling water, to Christian 
prayer meetings following their return. Of the 
238 FAPs from the sample who were 
interviewed in person (or whose immediate 
family members were interviewed), just 69 
stated that they had been involved in such a 
ceremony. They generally say that they found 
these re-assuring, and that is made them feel 
more relaxed.  
While secular reception centers, notably 
GUSCO, encourage FAPs to participate in such 
rituals, the institutional attitude at Christian 
reception centers, such as World Vision, is less 
positive. One World Vision staff member 
explained that he has found that some FAPs, 
especially the children, are upset by the violence 
in sacrificial ceremonies, and dislike the ritual 
ablutions because they remind them of the 
healing rites that were performed by the LRA in 
the bush. 
In general, the research team found that the role of local healing in ‘reintegration’ has been overstated or 
misunderstood in many reports. The rituals and ceremonies that FAPs have undergone are not 
compensation rituals and they do not necessarily indicate that someone is forgiven and fully accepted. 
Rather, they can be part of a process, the first stage of which is to recognize someone has returned, and 
can be considered to be a social person. Such rituals are, for example, performed when someone returns 
home after working in another part of the country for a period.  
From the scores of interviews carried out, the team concluded that rituals of healing are quite common, 
but they do not confirm that the community as a whole has set aside accountability for crimes aside. 
There was no widespread enthusiasm for mato oput or other ceremonies performed by the Paramount 
Chief. On the contrary, some Acholi people spoken to are adamant that such public rituals are useless, or 
make things worse by concentrating cen in the urban centers. Not surprisingly, Madi, Langi and Teso 
informants are even more dismissive. They have also suffered at the hands of the LRA, so why should it 
be the Acholi who do the forgiving? Most of those talked to, in the IDP camps mixed concern about the 
security implications of issuing warrants for the arrest of Kony and his senior commanders, with a 
willingness to see them prosecuted and punished. Certainly there was no general rejection of international 
justice. Often there was concern about how such legal measures are going to be applied, and why it has 
taken so long for their plight to be noticed.34  
                                                     
34 Furthermore, the emphasis on Acholi customs as a means of dealing with the LRA has other unfortunate 
connotations. In Uganda, especially in the south of the country, there is a tendency to demonize the Acholi people. 
For political and cultural reasons they are caricatured as innately violent. It is not uncommon to hear people in 
Kampala say that they should just be left to get on with their war on their own. All the talk about the Acholi 
forgiving those among them who have killed and mutilated can seem to reinforce the perception that they are not 
like other people and have their own ways of managing themselves. In our experience, the majority of Acholi, Madi, 
Langi and Teso who have been affected by the war want a more adequate security response to the situation and 
some form of legal accountability for those who have abused them, both in the LRA and the UPDF. 
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Overall, the team’s findings corroborate those from the 2005 ICTJ & HRC survey of adults. Over 2,500 
randomly selected adults in Gulu, Pader and Kitgum Districts were asked: ‘What is Justice?’ The most 
common responses were ‘compensation’: 8 percent, ‘assistance to victims’: 10 percent, ‘truth and 
fairness’: 11 percent, ‘reconciliation’: 18 percent, and ‘trials’: 31 percent. Just 7% of respondents 
mentioned ‘traditional justice’.35  
2.1.6 THE ROLE OF ADULTS IN THE LRA 
The SOW for this report, like most documents relating to the war in northern Uganda, highlights the 
plight of children. This is understandable. By any criteria, what has happened to children is appalling. 
However, a finding of this research is that the role of adults has been under-emphasized. Of course this 
depends on what is meant by the terms ‘child’ and ‘adult’. There is a tendency for local people to refer to 
‘our children in the bush’, and it is probably the case in most African societies that someone is viewed as 
a ‘child’ until they have produced children themselves and are living in their own home. But if a child 
means a person under the age of 18 years, then many assertions about the war have to be treated with 
skepticism. In this subsection, we examine two aspects of this issue. First, we discuss our data on patterns 
on ‘abduction’ and the results from other surveys. Second, we point out that allocating the status of 
‘child’ to all FAPs is not just misleading, but affects responses by reception centers. 
The research team has been unable to find evidence that over 80% of LRA combatants are children, or 
were abducted children (a figure that even appears in the ICC press release about the Ugandan referral36). 
This does not mean to say that it is certainly untrue, but it is not a figure that appears to be based on data 
about ‘abduction’ – or indeed any other source that  the team could discover. Perhaps not surprisingly, it 
is countered by UPDF soldiers, who claim that those they end up actually fighting are mostly adults - 
many of them well into their twenties or older. The two LRA fighters killed in exchanges while the team 
was researching in the IDP camps were certainly not children, although they may have been abducted as 
children.  
Significantly, the average age of arrival at reception centers is just under the age of 18. Many of those 
who pass through the process are mature adults, including quite a few of the so called ‘child mothers’, and 
a significant proportion of these people were abducted close to or after their 18th year. It is also important 
to note that the vast majority of those who arrive at reception centers are male. The impression has 
sometimes been given that girls predominate among FAPs, partly because of the publicity and concern 
that was focused on those abducted from St. Mary’s College Aboke in 1996. The reception center data 
counter common assertions, but it needs to be stressed again that they are partial. There is ample evidence 
that a large proportion of abducted people never go through the reception center process at all.  
UNICEF carried out a survey of all ‘abductions’ that had been reported through local councils and 
community volunteers between 1997 and 2001 (including short ‘abduction’s of just one day). It found 
that a total of 28,903 people had been taken from Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Apac and Lira Districts between 
1990 and 2001.37 The most intense period of ‘abduction’ during this decade occurred soon after the failed 
peace negotiations, with over 6,000 reported ‘abduction’s in 1996. Fewer than 10,000 of the reported 
‘abductions' (less than a third of the total) were ‘abductions' of children (i.e. people less than 18 years of 
age). The largest number of ‘abductions’ was of people aged 18-35 years (about 45 percent). The overall 
majority of those abducted were male (about 70 percent). By the end of 2001, about 16,000 abducted 
people had returned (i.e. they had escaped, had been freed by the LRA, or they had surrendered or been 
captured by the Ugandan army). Just fewer than 13,000 were still missing (i.e. still with the LRA or 
                                                     
35 ICTJ & HRC, 2005. Respondents could give more than one response. 
36Internationl Criminal Court (2004). Press Release: Background information on the situation in Uganda. The 
Hague, International Criminal Court. 
37 UNICEF (2001). Abductions in Northern Uganda and South-Western Uganda: 1986-2001. Kampala, UNICEF. 
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dead), of which 5,555 were thought to be children. The vast majority of those who had returned had done 
so within a year of their ‘abduction’ (almost 80 percent).  
AVERAGE AGE OF ARRIVAL AT RECEPTION CENTER/ 
AVERAGE ‘ABDUCTION’ LENGTH  
(1995 – 2005) 
Male     Female    
District Age StDevAge Abduction Length  District Age StDevAge Abduction Length
Kitgum 20 10 30  Apac 17 5 1,445 
Apac 19 10 255  Gulu 16 4 616 
Pader 19 7 241  Kitgum 16 6 558 
Gulu 18 6 256  Pader 16 4 895 
Lira 18 6 167  Soroti 15 0 46 
Katakwi 15 5 425  Katakwi 14 2 200 
Soroti 14 0 640  Lira 14 2 122 
Abduction length relates to number of reported days in captivity. Data is based on entire 
sample of 886 FAPs 
 
Numerous further reported ‘abductions’ have occurred since 2001, but the system of collating data broke 
down during the upheavals in 2002, and is currently in the process of being re-established. It may be that 
patterns of ‘abduction’ have 
changed during the past four 
years. Reporting at reception 
centers suggest that large 
numbers of children were 
abducted after UPDF operations 
against LRA bases in Sudan 
began in 2002. Many adults 
were also abducted at this time, 
but some informants have 
suggested that there might have 
been a shift in LRA strategy. It 
was perhaps less necessary to 
abduct adults as porters to 
transport food over long 
distances, because LRA groups 
were operating from Uganda. 
There may also have been a 
demographic factor. The IDP 
camps are known to have a very 
high fertility rate and low life expectancy. A significant majority of the population is under the age of 18 
(more than 55 percent are under the age of 15). 38 
Such trend in increased child ‘abduction’ may be reflected in one of two large-scale questionnaire surveys 
carried out in 2005. The WHO Mortality survey of July 2005 estimated that 1,168 people were abducted 
                                                     
38 WHO and T. R. o. U. M. o. Health (2005). Health and Mortality Survey Among Internally Displaced Persons in 
Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts, Northern Uganda, World Health Organization: page 11. 
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between January and July and had not returned home within Gulu, Pader and Kitgum Districts. All were 
of people below the age of 35, and 46 percent were below the age of 15. However, this appears to be an 
extrapolation from just 28 reported cases in the sample of 3,830 households.39 The other recent 
questionnaire-based study interviewed 2,585 randomly selected adults in Gulu, Kitgum, Lira and Soroti 
Districts.40  The results were very different. They suggested that the scale of ‘abduction’ is extraordinary: 
40 percent of respondents claimed to have been abducted themselves, and 31percent claimed to have had 
a child abducted. In Gulu and Kitgum the figure for adult ‘abduction’ was over 50 percent and for 
children 38 percent. If these self-reported ‘abductions’ really occurred, then the total numbers involved 
would run into the hundreds of thousands. Even allowing for ambiguity in what is meant by the term 
‘abduction’, this is unlikely.41 
While recognizing problems with the data sets, there are some important points to stress. The scale of 
child ‘abduction’ has been terrible, and so have the experiences of some of those who have been 
abducted. But the evidence from this study shows that it has not been the only form of recruitment to the 
LRA. More adults than children have been abducted, although it is possible that this has changed since 
2002. Also, the number of males ‘abducted’ exceeds that of females, and the majority of ‘abducted’ 
people never pass through reception centers (or, for that matter, the UPDF).  
Adult ‘abduction’ and the incidence of ‘abduction’ outside of the reception center process are well known 
to those working on the ground, even if they are down-played (or even denied) by reception center staff 
and government officials. Many people interviewed expressed views about it, one of which was that 
adults and those outside the reporting system only spent short periods of time with the LRA, and were 
less ‘traumatized’ than those who go through the official process. It is possible that this is the case, but it 
is worth bearing in mind that there is little information on those who have not passed through the 
reception center system. Of the FAPs talked to who had not passed through reception centers, many were 
indeed only taken for short periods, but others had spent months or years with the LRA. Moreover, the 
data from the reception centers show that many of those who passed through had actually not been with 
the LRA for long periods.  
Although the research team was unable to make a rigorous assessment, the findings tend to confirm that it 
is mostly adults who have been abducted as porters, sometimes on a rather affable basis. But the team also 
found that some adults choose, or were compelled to join the rebels as combatants. Another finding was 
that those abducted as mature adults and kept by the rebels were usually male. The team found that if 
adult females are kept, they are almost invariably still young, because they are selected as ‘wives’ 
(although a few women in their mid 20s who were interviewed were retained by the LRA as domestic 
servants for those selected as ‘wives’).   
The absence of so many abducted adults from the formal ‘reintegration’ process, and the emphasis on 
children within the system has contributed to an assumption that all FAPs can be treated like children 
irrespective of their actual age. Several FAPs who were at reception centers, or had passed through them, 
                                                     
39Ibid: page 20. 
40 International Center for Transitional Justice (2005). Forgotten Voices: A population-based survey on attitudes 
about peace and justice in northern Uganda. Berkeley, Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley. 
41 There are clearly weaknesses in all these data sets. The data collated by UNICEF are based on reported 
abductions. There may have been reasons why some people avoid this process, not least because it might involve 
questioning by the UPDF. On the other hand, surveys based on self-reported abductions (i.e. when the person 
interviewed states that he or she has been abducted to the researcher) indicate much higher rates. However, such 
claims have to be treated with caution, because there can be incentives to claim to have been abducted. The Rachele 
Reception Center in Lira, for example, has found that a high percentage of those put forward as formerly abducted 
children for its education sponsorship program from some agencies have in fact never spent time with the LRA. This 
is one of the reasons for the often-noted tension between the Rachele Center and other groups involved in 
‘reintegration’. The WHO data is also flawed in that the sample used was designed to assess overall mortality rates, 
and is really too small to make reliable estimates on abduction. 
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complained to the team that they were treated as if they unable to think for themselves. These included 
several ‘child mothers’ who were in their late twenties. Some said that they found the attitude of reception 
center staff patronizing. A few complained that they were not allowed to be with their sexual partners.  
In addition, it was observed by reception center staff that the power dynamics that had been in place with 
the LRA have sometimes being replicated in the centers. For example, ‘child mothers’ who had been the 
‘wives’ of commanders were said to expect other FAPs to wait on them like servants. The research team 
did not see this happening, but it was apparent that some ‘child mothers’ had a sense of their status and a 
confidence that others lacked. The team also noted that LRA military ranks were informally replicated in 
social gatherings away from the centers, for example in peer support groups, at the Labora Farm project 
(see Appendix 3) and within the UPDF. 
Several reception centers have recognized the replication of LRA ranks as a problem, and have tried to 
deal with it. Some, like CARITAS, have a policy of only accepting FAPs who have not had a rank in the 
LRA. This was said by staff to make the FAPs in the CARITAS centers more manageable. Those centers 
openly accepting adults (i.e. recognizing that many FAPs are over 18) try to keep them apart from most of 
the children. World Vision in Gulu has three separate centers, for ‘child mothers’, ‘adults’ and children. 
Nevertheless, there remains a tendency to conceptualize all FAPs as being like children, to allocate them 
little agency, and to expect them to show that they are ‘normal’ and ‘good’ by following instructions.  
Many of those who have spent prolonged periods with the LRA learned to use the rules to their own 
advantage. They made choices that enabled them to become integrated and to try to achieve a high status, 
and they do not regard their time with the LRA as a completely negative experience. The team’s 
impression is that such incorporation into the LRA is as representative of people passing through the 
reception centers as the harrowing stories about abuse recounted in most reports and articles – which is 
not to suggest that these people have not been abused also. Indeed, it is perhaps those people who found 
meaning and status in violence that are the most ‘traumatized’ of all. After all, the psychiatric concept of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder emerged in the US as a way of interpreting the pathological tendencies of 
Vietnam veterans.  
What passes as ‘counseling’ at reception centers has little to do with psychotherapy. It is more like an 
education in how to behave properly in the ‘community’. Arguably, there are positive outcomes to this 
kind of approach, but there are also significant dangers, which are compounded by weaknesses in 
monitoring and follow-up. Most FAPs who at one point accepted LRA values may regret having done so, 
but (without necessarily apportioning blame) it is the case that very violent people have been sent out into 
the population with no mechanism of surveillance.42 Whatever the merits of the blanket amnesty 
procedures, it seems a risky policy.  
More generally, the association between the LRA and children has contributed to the argument that those 
who have performed atrocities must be forgiven, and the assertion that such a view is widely accepted by 
the population as a whole. This too is open to question. 
2.2 ‘CHILD MOTHERS’ 
The SOW requires inclusion of a section on ‘child mothers’ in the report. The following issues have been 
addressed: 
• The context in which the problem of ‘child mothers’ has arisen 
                                                     
42 One of our key informants amongst LRA veterans has now returned to the LRA. A recent survey of nearly 750 
youth from eight sub-counties in Kitgum and Pader districts. Has found that: ‘A surprising number of abducted 
youth, including a third of the children, say there was a time they felt like staying with the LRA. More than a tenth 
admits to having felt loyalty to Kony, and having ambitions to become a commander.’(SWAY, 2006). 
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• Data on ‘child mothers’ who have passed through the reception centers  
• The diverse attitudes and experiences of those classified as ‘child mothers’ 
• Current responses to ‘child mothers’ 
 
In addition, Appendix 5 includes numerous extracts from the research team’s interviews. 
2.1.1 THE CONTEXT 
In recent years there has been a great deal of concern voiced about the plight of ‘child mothers’. This is 
partly because the number of ‘child mothers’ arriving at reception centers increased following the Iron 
Fist Offensives of the UPDF across the border in Sudan since 2002. Most ‘child mothers’ have been 
rescued, handed over by the LRA or escaped during the past three to four years. Understanding of the 
phenomenon has been powerfully influenced by the success of the book Aboke Girls in representing to the 
outside world what is happening in northern Uganda, and various international aid agencies, notably 
World Vision, have been lobbying for the foregrounding of the issue in assistance programs. Not 
surprisingly, stories about ‘child mothers’ have been picked up in the media. There is now a widespread 
perception that the raping of girls by the LRA is one of the most important aspects of the war, and 
assisting those abused should be a priority for funding. A consequence is that several of the reception 
centers have emphasized the needs of ‘child mothers’ as a special group, and run projects aimed at 
helping them. There are also constant pressures from some donors to expand such activities. 
There is no doubt that young women, some of them pre-pubescent, have been abducted, and have been 
given as ‘wives’ to LRA combatants as a reward for their actions. Many ended up as the ‘wives’ of 
commanders, and some commanders have many such ‘wives’. Kony himself is said to have had more 
than forty. There is also no doubt that the experience of this form of marriage has been harrowing for 
many of the girls who were forced to go through it. However, there are also various things that need to be 
considered in an assessment of the ‘child mother’ problem, all of which are largely being ignored – 
although, as with other externally driven policy agendas, many local staff are well aware of the 
complexities and contradictions in what they are doing. 
The issue of ‘child mothers’ in northern Uganda is generally discussed as if it is something completely 
new and radically different from the social norm. This is not entirely so. The notion of a ‘child mother’ 
has to be set in the wider context of early marriage in Uganda as a whole. According to the 2000 
Demographic Health Profile, 13 percent of women were mothers or pregnant for the first time before the 
age of 17, 23 percent before the age of 18, and 54 percent before the age of 19.43 The age of consent is 18, 
which means that the families of almost a quarter of Ugandan women up to this age could theoretically 
bring a charge of ‘defilement’ (and this is partly why so many ‘rape’ cases are brought to court). The war-
affected districts of northern Uganda were not included in the 2000 survey, but are known to have a very 
high fertility rate, and it can be assumed that the percentage of technically underage mothers is well in 
excess of average national rates. Set against these data, applying the term ‘child mother’ specifically to 
women returning from the LRA with children is unhelpful. It is a point that was not lost on the director of 
CCF in Pader. 
‘Child mothers’ are really a general issue in Acholi society and that issue is 
overshadowed by the emphasis on formerly abducted ‘child mothers’. The donors miss 
the point a bit by forgetting everybody else.’ 
What potentially sets those currently classified as ‘child mothers’ apart is not so much their age, but the 
fact that they were forced into sexual unions. However, in this respect too there are things to consider. 
                                                     
43Republic of Uganda (2001). Uganda: Population, Reproductive Health and Development. MoF Population 
Secretariat, Planning and Economic Development. Kampala. Page 25.  
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When a young man has no access to resources with which to begin negotiations over bride price, an 
alternative is ‘marriage by capture’, or ‘elopement’, sometimes with an element of force. Some earlier 
studies about the Northern Uganda region during the early and mid 1980s, found out that women would 
quite often describe their first sexual encounters in ways that involved something that was not dissimilar 
to ‘abduction’. A girl might be collecting water away from the village and be intercepted by a boy and his 
friends. They would then take her somewhere and sexual intercourse would occur. The girl was supposed 
to resist, although it was often said that this was part of a ritual, because she will have indicated that she 
wanted to be taken beforehand. The Acholi poet, Okot p’Bitek wrote an essay about such procedures back 
in the 1960s, which he called ‘Acholi love’. But some of the women interviewed who had experienced 
this kind of marriage were rather less positive.  
Going back to pre-Protectorate times, marriage by capture was practiced on a relatively large scale as an 
aspect of local wars. Local war leaders and chiefs formed alliances with ivory trading companies and 
raided neighboring areas for slaves to transport tusks and also for women to take as ‘wives’. Even after 
the setting up of Protectorate rule, it remained common for girls to be given in various kinds of dispute 
settlement. They might be handed over at a very young age in compensation arrangements, including 
mato oput ceremonies, to produce children for the wronged lineage in compensation for those that had 
been killed.  
Thus the LRA practice of abducting young women as wives has historical and cultural resonances. There 
are reports of more conventional rape by the LRA, but they are rare. Indeed, there are also accounts of 
LRA executions of combatants who have sexual intercourse without permission. The girls are mostly 
taken to become ‘wives’ in much the same way as chiefs and war leaders in the past – including ancestors 
of some of the current ‘traditional’ chiefs (rwodi). It is not the only way in which LRA activities mimic 
aspects of previous upheavals. It may also be a reason why, contrary to some reports, HIV infection 
among FAPs is low (or at least there is no evidence that it is higher than among similar age cohorts in the 
IDP camps – The research team only came across one confirmed case of HIV among ‘child mothers’).44  
None of this condones the dreadful things that have been done to some young women by the LRA. The 
point is simply that in taking young women as ‘wives’, the LRA has systematically manipulated and 
corrupted certain existing conventions and moral norms. This is a crucially important aspect of its power. 
The LRA is not something completely alien. Its atrocities are finely tuned. 
2.2.2 DATA ON ‘CHILD MOTHERS’ 
The prevalence of children who are mothers in the population as a whole and also the practice of 
elopement means that the use of the term ‘child mothers’ for girls raped by the LRA gives a misleading 
impression. Moreover, the confusion is made worse by the fact that many of those classified as ‘child 
mothers’ are actually over the age of 18, some do not in fact have any children, and a few did not even 
have sexual intercourse during their period of ‘abduction’. Such ambiguities in the category make it hard 
to assess the scale of the ‘child mother’ problem.  
In a sample of 238 FAPs whom the research team followed-up and interviewed (or whose immediate 
family members were interviewed), only 11 women who were classified as ‘child mothers’ (4.6 percent). 
All but one arrived at a reception center between 2002 and 2005 (about 6 percent of those interviewed in 
the sample who arrived between 2001 and 2005). Their ages ranged from 14 to 31, with the average age 
being just over 21 years. The average period of time spent with the LRA was 5 years, with the longest 
being 10 years. Four women in the group were with the LRA for less than a year. Two or possibly three 
were abducted as adults (i.e. over the age of 18). The average amount of time they had spent at reception 
                                                     
44 For details about HIV/AIDS rates, see Allen,’Aids and Evidence: interrogating some Ugandan myths, Journal of 
Biosocial Science, January 2006.  
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centers was 150 days, ranging from one who spent 360 days at a combination of KICWA and World 
Vision to a group of three who spent between 30 and 44 days at KICWA alone. None of them had been 
followed up after leaving the reception centers, although four of them had attended training courses in 
tailoring. Two of them used to have a child, but it died. Three of the group were unequivocal about 
wanting to be with their LRA ‘husbands’, while three were unequivocal about not wanting this. For one 
the issue did not arise, because her ‘husband’ had been killed. The remaining five either did not say what 
they thought about their ‘husbands’, or were ambiguous about their intentions.45  
Some centers, such as the CCF Center at Pader and the Rachele Center in Lira currently focus much of 
their attention on ‘child mothers’, and the percentage of ‘child mothers’ among those passing through 
these centers is relatively high (particularly at CCF). The team was also told that Pader was a district in 
which the numbers of ‘abductions’ of adolescent girls was particularly high, and many of the 
approximately 140 ‘child mothers’ who had passed through Rachele had in fact been abducted from 
Pader. Apparently, the reason for the concentration of girl ‘abduction’ in Pader was because the district 
was an area that the LRA moved through when returning to Sudan from Lira District. However, other 
centers also have prioritized ‘child mothers’. In Gulu town, for example, World Vision has opened a 
separate center for them, and many ‘child mothers’ are sent for skills training at St.Monica’s education 
center in the town, run by the Catholic Church. Adding up the numbers of all ‘child mothers’ that have 
passed through all centers is not a straightforward task. Ambiguities in the category are a difficulty here, 
as are the poor records at several centers. Another factor is that concerns about ‘child mothers’ have 
grown over time, and in the past keeping a running total was not a priority. It was striking that when 
reception center staffers were asked about numbers of ‘child mothers’ they would often estimate it at 
much higher than their records actually indicated.  
From the available evidence, the total figure of those who have been classified as ‘child mothers’ at all 
the reception centers is around 1,000. That means that they comprise about 5 percent of all those FAPs 
who are recorded as passing through the reception process – about the same percentage found in the 
sample. It may be that there are also some ‘child mothers’ who have not passed through centers, but only 
came across one case. The incentives for ‘child mothers’ to go to the centers is high, because they are less 
likely than men to be interrogated by the UPDF, and have become a special category of funding and 
support. For example, at World Vision those identified as ‘child mothers’ are offered training in ‘micro-
finance management’, and receive a donation of 300,000 Ugandan shillings to buy equipment.  
2.2.3 RANGE OF EXPERIENCE AND ATTITUDES 
In addition to the ‘child mothers’ in the sample, the extracts from respondents met in IDP camps, those at 
the World Vision reception center for child mothers in Gulu, and a group of seven at St.Monica’s training 
school in Gulu are presented in Appendix 5. They reveal how attitudes and experiences vary very widely. 
The following are key points that emerge from them. 
First, some ‘child mothers’ do not actually have a child and most are technically adults (although the 
majority were ‘abducted’ before they were eighteen). Second, several spoke warmly of their LRA 
‘husbands’, and would rather go back to them than to their parents or other relatives. Third by no means 
most of these women appeared to be ‘traumatized’ by their experiences with the LRA, and some seem to 
have had a relatively comfortable time compared to many other FAPs. Fourth, a few of the women had 
serious physical injuries, and the possibility of eking out a living whilst carrying such injuries was 
                                                     
45 Our sample data may be compared with a data set from CPA Lira (which no longer operates as a reception center). 
According to this reception center’s records, 32 ‘child mothers’ passed through in total. Their average age on arrival 
was 22. They had all been abducted as children between the ages of 10 and 15 between 1988 and 2002, and had 
returned between 1999 and 2003. The average period with the LRA was 3.5 years. The longest period of ‘abduction’ 
was 11 years, and seven women were with the LRA for a year or less.  
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daunting, if not impossible. Staff at the reception centers were doing what they could to facilitate 
appropriate medical care while they were at the centers, but follow-up was poor after they left. As noted 
above, the research team only heard of one confirmed case of a ‘child mother’ being diagnosed as HIV 
positive while staying at a reception center. Fifth, the ‘child mothers’ who had passed through reception 
centers had very mixed experiences of being reunited with their parents and relatives.  
With respect to this last point, it is important to note that the mothers themselves have a different 
relationship to their relatives than the children that come back with them. The women who return are 
generally accepted back as part of their father’s and/or their mother’s family. If the woman’s parents are 
still together, she is likely to assume the clan status of her birth and, at least in theory, be able to make a 
claim on clan resources, including access to farmland once it can again be accessed (i.e. when the IDP 
camps are broken up) Through marriage, her lineage status would in effect change over time to that of her 
husband. However, in these cases, the ‘husband’ is an LRA combatant who is unlikely to pay bride price, 
and who may or may not at some future date claim the children. This places the children in a very 
ambiguous position.  
If they are accepted back into the family along with their mother, the family is effectively accepting them 
as members of a particular clan, and this potentially gives them rites over clan lands. It also potentially 
places them in competition with the children of their mother’s brothers. As a consequence, there may well 
be unwillingness for a family to accept the children as well as the mother. Many of those women talked to 
who had returned to their families in the IDP camps complained that their children were called names, 
and even their own family members started to become unfriendly once it was clear that the family would 
not be receiving lots of additional items from aid agencies. How widespread this problem is cannot be 
ascertained at present, partly because of the lack of follow-up by the reception centers and also because 
most of these women have only been sent back to the IDP camps quite recently. It is striking, however, 
how many ‘child mothers’ gravitate back to the municipalities (the majority of those interviewed by the 
team were living in Gulu or Lira towns). There is a clear reluctance to take their children back to the 
camps. A few ‘child mothers’ were explicit in interviews that their children would be persecuted and 
might even be killed by neighbors.  
There is also another factor at play here, too. In Acholi and Langi society there is an acute antipathy to 
incest and a fear of its consequences. Relatives traced through both the father and mother’s line cannot, or 
at least should not, be married. Several ‘child mothers’ who shared a ‘husband’ in the bush explained that 
they wanted to stay near each other so that their children could know each other and could be aware that 
they share the same father (i.e. so that they would learn that they were siblings). Others, in contrast, were 
determined to move to another part of the country, and to hide the identity of the father of their children. 
2.2.4 CURRENT RESPONSES TO ‘CHILD MOTHERS’ 
An obvious limitation with current responses to ‘child mothers’ is that the use of the term directs attention 
away from the fact that so many adolescent girls in northern Uganda are living vulnerable and 
impoverished lives, and are likely to end up becoming pregnant at a very early age. Those classified as 
‘child mothers’ are sometimes very seriously abused people, but by no means all of them are 
incapacitated or needier than other FAPs. In general, ‘child mothers’ who pass through the reception 
centers are positive about their treatment, partly because they are aware that they can have more access to 
assistance than other FAPs, notably in the form of skills training – although none of the ‘child mothers’ 
we interviewed had yet managed to set up an economically viable enterprise. It was also noted that the 
reception center staff tended to be more flexible with ‘child mothers’ than with other groups. At the 
World Vision center they are allowed to come and go, unlike other ‘children’. However, the diversity of 
outlook among the ‘child mothers’ resident at the same place can be a problem Those who had been the 
‘wives’ of senior commanders can assert their authority over others, and those who have been deeply 
disturbed by their experiences, or physically mutilated by the LRA, are understandably troubled by being 
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forced to stay with women who want to be reunited with their LRA ‘husbands’. Conflicts with other 
residents were mentioned as a bad thing about the center by almost all the ‘child mothers’ interviewed at 
World Vision. 
3. FINDINGS PART 2:  THE RETURN PROCESS 
3.1 HOW DO PEOPLE RETURN FROM THE BUSH?  
The impression is often given in reception center and aid agency reports (and by the UPDF and the 
Amnesty Commission) that everyone, or almost everyone who returns from the LRA does so through a 
well established procedure of reporting.46 
This procedure is: 
1. The FAP is rescued or captured by the UPDF, escapes or is released by the LRA. 
2. If the FAP escapes or is released, they either report to the UPDF or a local authority who then 
takes them to the UPDF.  
3. The UPDF organizes transport to the nearest CPU where the FAP is fed, given first aid and 
questioned. A person can be kept with the UPDF for a maximum of 48 hours. Severely ill people 
are taken to hospital by the CPU and are under CPU supervision there, often jointly with the 
reception center. 
4. The FAP is then transferred to a reception center. 
 
The UPDF insists that this system runs almost seamlessly and that nobody goes straight to a reception 
center since no application for amnesty is possible without having gone through the barracks. Those who 
bypass the system entirely and do not report to either UPDF or an LC constitute ‘a negligible number.’47 
However, this number cannot be so negligible: 5 percent of the 238 FAPs interviewed from the sample 
said that they had not gone through the UPDF at all. It is important to note that this is five percent of 
people who have been through reception centers. The percentage of people who have been abducted but 
go home directly is larger. This is indicated by surveys of self-reported ‘abductions’48, but also by the 
more robust UNICEF data for the period 1997-2001. In the period 1997-2001, there were 28,903 who 
were recorded as having been abducted by the LRA. 49 This is more than the total number of people that 
have passed through all reception centers up to 2005.  
• Those from the research team’s sample, who passed through reception centers, but not the UPDF, 
explained why they never spent time at the barracks. One went straight to the reception center and 
the UPDF ‘only came and asked me some questions when I was already at World Vision.’ 
Another went home directly specifically to avoid the UPDF, but then ‘the soldiers went to his 
home and arrested him.’ Others relied on themselves or community structures: ‘I never passed 
through the hands of the UPDF or even an LC. My father was advised by his friends to take me to 
the reception center which he did.’ A group of returnees avoided the UPDF by sticking together 
and making it directly to the reception center: ‘We used to coordinate among us because we came 
                                                     
46 The term ‘reporters’ is generally used for FAPs who have gone through these channels by reporting to the UPDF, 
but here we stick to the FAP acronym. 
47 CPU officer 
48 Notably: International Center for Transitional Justice (2005). Forgotten Voices: A population-based survey on 
attitudes about peace and justice in northern Uganda. Berkeley, Human Rights Center, University of California, 
Berkeley. 
49UNICEF (2001). Abductions in Northern Uganda and South-Western Uganda: 1986-2001. Kampala, UNICEF. 
The survey was only carried out until 2001. 
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back like civilians.’ Returnees are scared of the UPDF and they rather risk not getting an amnesty 
certificate than dealing with them. Some have responsibilities at home that cannot wait. Many, 
however, might not be aware of the problems they will encounter in applying for amnesty without 
a letter of introduction from a center – but then many might not be aware of the amnesty at all.50 
• For abducted adults, avoiding reporting altogether is very likely, but the research team came 
across many children too who had stories of having been abducted which appeared to be true. 
Reception center staff have repeatedly said that they are aware of a large number of people who 
stay out of the official system after their escape and CVCs based in camps refer to this as well. In 
addition, the large number of people who were unaware of the amnesty further underscores that 
the official channels are not how most people return from the LRA.51  
 
A typical answer from a camp leader when asked about those who had come home directly was:  
 
‘There are very many here in the camp. … I said that the formerly abducted children 
should form themselves in groups. At registration I discovered that some of them have 
not passed through the reception centers… I reported to the local leaders and they are 
aware of such children in the community.’ 
 
The divergence in the experience of return by FAPs was a subject about which many of the respondents 
had strong and often contrasting views.  
• A problem pointed out by various social workers and community officers was that when FAPs 
went to reception centers, the ‘community’, and sometimes even their parents, thought that there 
had been a transfer of responsibility. Many parents, it was claimed, think that once a child has 
passed through a reception center, the center is now going to take care of the child, even after it 
has been sent home.  
• One CDO said that his office actually discourages children from going to a reception center 
because of this. ‘When children are taken to new environments … [the parents and the 
community] don’t see it as their responsibility to reintegrate or counsel these children…they see it 
as the responsibility of [the center].’  
This view was expressed most strongly in Lira District. On a day that the team was visiting the District 
Headquarters to interview officials, almost 100 recent reports of CVCs were being collated. All the 
reports related to returning children (i.e. people under the age of 18). Just 39 had been sent to reception 
centers (GUSCO, World Vision or CPA), and the remaining 59 had been sent straight back to their 
families. The research team was told that in Lira, adults were not being registered by CVCs,52 but were 
supposed to go to the RDC or the UPDF. 53 As one official put it, this was done to facilitate 
‘reintegration’: 
 
                                                     
50 See section on the Amnesty Commission 
51 However, this area needs further research beyond the scope of this study. There are no robust numbers available 
anywhere on how many people have been abducted and bypassed the system. In fact, there is really no robust data 
available on how many people have been abducted overall.  
52 In some camps, CVCs have attempted to register all those who have not been through a center, yet have been 
abducted, but have had to abandon the exercise because the demands on the CVCs for material support just grew out 
of proportion.  
53 The view taken in Lira District is that FAPs at the centers were said to become used to receiving things without 
having to work for them. It occurred to us that this view might have been influenced by a local antipathy towards the 
Acholi at the reception centers. Most clients at the reception centers are Acholi, even including the Rachele Center 
in Lira town. However, Lira district officials themselves strenuously denied this. 
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‘We concentrate on the children because of UNICEF, Save the Children etc… but discourage 
them to go to centers…. Most Langi by-pass the centers… We encourage them to go straight 
home, where CVCs can handle them, if they have training…. At the centers they learn certain 
behaviors… They are mixed with children who are already hardened. They learn bad things, and 
the community accuses them (of being from the LRA) when they come back, and even if they 
have been given material things and ‘counseling’, they go back to their [disturbed] mental state 
after leaving.’ 
 
In the camps, however, there were very different views about the benefits of the reception center 
activities: 
 
• While some camp leaders said that ‘there is not much difference between someone who has gone 
through a reception center and someone who has not, most point out at least a few material 
differences. People who pass through centers usually come back with some sort of package, and 
this provides an incentive for relatives to accept them.  
• The CVCs were most positive about the relative benefits of going through reception centers. They 
commonly stated that they find FAPs who have been through reception centers easier to handle: 
‘The difference is that talking to those who passed through the reception center is easier 
compared to those that did not pass through the reception centers. Also behavior alone can 
differentiate the two. Those who came home directly are rough and those who passed through the 
center are polite.’  
3.2 THE UPDF 
3.2.1 TREATMENT AT THE UPDF 
FAPs are terrified of the UPDF. Leaving the bush and the LRA is a frightening experience in itself, but 
surrendering oneself into the hands of the enemy is the worst part for most. Many are convinced that the 
UPDF will kill them, yet they take the risk and escape nonetheless. One boy describes this situation as 
having ‘had no fear whether I would be killed or not, because I had decided to come back home and that I 
don’t mind whatever might happen. However, I thought that I would be killed.’ 
Many FAPs say that they were first scared of the uniforms ‘because in the bush we were told that UPDF 
kills’. In the bush, the UPDF is commonly referred to as Walalo – ‘the tribe that eats people’. Those who 
report fears of being killed by the UPDF say that this fear eased once they were transferred from the 
detach to the barracks, because generally they were treated much worse by the detach, but ‘when I 
reached the barracks and talked to someone whom I found there, I was strong-hearted.’   
Those who reported losing their fear gave very specific descriptions as to how the soldiers made them feel 
safe. Sometimes it is based on a personal connection (‘The soldiers were from her village and so at first 
sight they began to cry for the injuries I had sustained from the bush’). But in most cases it is based on the 
treatment the FAPs experience: warm welcomes and being given biscuits straight after being picked up by 
the UPDF, being given water for bathing, porridge or other food and soda to drink, being allowed to 
watch movies even with the other soldiers, receiving wound treatment and general reassurance that there 
was no reason to be afraid.  
This reassurance comes up again and again as a major factor in making people feel comfortable. In 
general, those who were soon informed as to what will happen to them seemed to feel more at ease: if the 
soldiers told them that they would be taken care of at a reception center, people lost their fear. Those who 
reported feeling safe and comfortable with the UPDF usually explained that they appreciated being 
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thanked for leaving the bush as well as any advice given (‘They told me that since I was now out, God has 
helped me and will continue helping me in the future…They were telling me not to be worried… I am not 
the only one with such a problem, and I did not choose to go to the bush… We should also not worry 
because there is nothing wrong that will happen to us.’)  
While many reported feeling safe in the barracks, others felt threatened and neglected. The questioning 
process is a difficult experience and not being given enough food (some report ‘serious hunger in the 
barracks’), or not being given a blanket, clothing or medical treatment for obvious wounds, contributes to 
feeling unsafe. Despite the CPUs, the presence of many soldiers is seen as very intimidating. ‘I didn’t feel 
very safe there, because in the barracks you see the guns and there is too much shouting. The people 
weren’t nice to me. You cannot be a friend with a soldier,’ said one boy. Another stated: ‘I wasn’t so safe 
in the barracks because I was still staying with people from the bush and I was still under soldiers.’ 
Language barriers are a major contributor to fear. One FAP says that he felt safe at the main barracks as 
opposed to the detach since he was the only Langi in the detach, but there were some fellow Langi 
soldiers in the main barracks. Another said that ‘other people were very bad to me since I was a Teso, it 
was only another Teso in the UPDF who helped me otherwise I would have been killed.’ The security 
situation contributes to a stressful or reassuring experience (‘I was 
scared while with the UPDF because the rebels constantly attacked 
the barrack where I stayed, so I could not feel safe’ or ‘I felt safe at 
the barracks because the UPDF were many and I wasn’t threatened 
I could be attacked by LRA.’). 
3.2.2 QUESTIONING BY THE UPDF 
Respondents and reception center staff confirmed that most FAPs 
are quite intimidated by the interrogation. The questioning process 
is not a streamlined one. Most of those who recalled the 
questioning were interrogated by several people in various settings: 
in the detach, in the barracks, in the CPU. When asked who 
questioned them, a typical answer was: ‘There were very many 
soldiers, so I don’t know them one by one, and I don’t know their 
rank.’ Questioning focuses on military and strategic aspects: FAPs 
stated that they were asked the following kinds of questions. What 
are the plans of the LRA? Are they willing to come back? What are the discussions in the bush? What 
type of gun are they using and how many do they have? Could you tell us the number of rebels in the 
bush? Have you been to Sudan? Could you tell us how the commander operates the rebel group? How do 
you get food from the bush? What do the rebels say about the government? Will they fight until they 
overthrow the government? Where does Kony get his powers? How do the people in the bush behave? 
How do they kill and how many killings did you witness? How were you abducted, how did you escape? 
In special instances, questioning can go on for days, weeks and even months. This happens when a FAP 
can provide strategic information about hidden weapons or future moves of the LRA (‘I stayed in the 
barracks for four months, because we were always moving to the bushes to collect what we had hidden in 
the ground, like the guns, and bullets...’; ‘The soldiers kept us for so long in Gulu barracks because they 
also wanted to see how some of us who stayed for long, would cope up. And they wanted to understand 
whether we do not have the intention of going back to the bush.’). 
3.2.3 TIME SPENT WITH THE UPDF 
Once the children or adults reach the Child Protection Unit (CPU), the maximum amount of time to be 
spent there – 48 hours – seems to be rarely exceeded in some districts (Gulu, Kitgum, Lira) and more 
Average Number of Days Spent 
with UPDF 
Year Days with UPDF
1995 7
1996 2
1997 18
1998 12
1999 14
2000 66
2001 8
2002 16
2003 8
2004 23
2005 8  
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often in others (Pader). In either case, those who reach the CPU have in the vast majority of cases already 
spent a considerable amount of time in the hands of the UPDF. The average amount of time spent with the 
UPDF54 across all districts, both genders and all years since 1998 was 14 days. 55 
Most UPDF soldiers readily admit that the process of getting the child to CPU can be lengthy and is not 
necessarily controllable by the Child Protection Unit. Most of the time this is due to transportation 
problems: FAPs are typically picked up in fighting areas, often far away from barracks, the nearest CPU 
or even an NGO who could provide transportation. Time spent with the UPDF also is based on what kind 
of information the child might have. Children with rank or those rescued from strategically important 
battles are questioned in much more detail. This is a clear problem: some children have reported that the 
only time they were harassed by soldiers or pressured to join the UPDF was during their time with 
detaches. There have also been cases when returnees were hassled by frontier guards on their way to the 
CPU. 
3.2.4 RECRUITMENT INTO THE UPDF 
The UPDF often states that they are very careful about recruiting former LRA combatants. Soldiers working 
in the CPU in Kitgum or Gulu have said that they do not pressure FAPs to join the UPDF, but some FAPs 
wish to join out of their own initiative. On the surface, there is also an awareness of the issue of recruiting 
children into the army – Public Relations Officers are very quick to point out that nobody under the age of 18 
is allowed to join the UPDF. However, at one of the CPUs, the research team was introduced to a female 
soldier who deals especially with female FAPs. While the officer on duty was very happy to point out that 
they were aware of gender issues, he did not find anything wrong mentioning her age – she was 17 years 
old. 
So there is clearly a gap between publicity and reality when it comes to recruitment into the UPDF. Most 
people from the research sample, who had passed through the UPDF, were asked to join, but purely as an 
option: ‘the officer was also saying that if I wanted to join the UPDF I was free to join. But I was also free 
to go home.’ The majority of people state that they were not pressured and that it was actually made clear 
to them that they were free to do whatever they wanted. However, in most cases this also means that they 
were not made aware of other options open to them: The research team found that that hardly any FAPs 
were informed about the option of applying for amnesty in the barracks.  
Others, although a smaller number, reported being persuaded (‘The soldiers suggested that anybody that 
wanted to join UPDF could do it and that if any one did, they would give him 10,000 Ugandan Shillings 
there and then’) or pressured (‘They suggested that I join the UPDF since even if I came back home I 
would be killed.’). The prospect of joining the UPDF is a daunting thing for some (‘The UPDF asked me 
to join them but I refused and then I escaped from them and I came back home.’). Occasionally there is an 
emphasis on the virtues of being with the UPDF (‘They told me to join the UPDF because there was no 
use of us going back home because maybe our parents are even dead now and that UPDF soldiers get 
good salary…’). 
Most commonly, the FAPs did not want to join because they felt tired of fighting (‘I said no. At least let 
me suffer from home…because I’m suffering from having been in the LRA army and I can’t go back to 
suffer again.’). Others said that they left their options open, telling the soldiers that since ‘we had 
overstayed in the bush; we wanted to first go home and see our family members. Then if we want to join 
them, we would come back later.’ Some received advice (often from parents, sometimes from the 
                                                     
54 124 respondents specifically declared the number of days they had spent with the UPDF.  
55 This is an average based on rounded numbers. There was an extreme case in the year 2000 of a man who spent 
over a year in the hands of the UPDF. 
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reception center) to not stay with the UPDF (‘I told them that I still want to pass through the rehabilitation 
center where my trauma can be removed I then later would join them.’). 
3.2.5 THE 105TH BATTALION  
The 105th is a battalion made up of former LRA combatants and is deployed in southern Sudan and two 
districts in the north of Uganda. This has been the subject of much controversy, first because it has been 
suspected that some of the recruits may be under the age of 18 and second because it is questionable 
whether someone with a track record of human rights abuses in the LRA should be given a job in the 
army. There are concerns that such a battalion might be used to terrorize populations, because so many of 
the recruits will have already perpetrated atrocities. The battalion has had a low profile since it was 
formed, fuelling speculations in the community that the UPDF is in fact using it as ‘cannon fodder’ in 
Sudan.  
Within the UPDF there is a strongly held view that recruiting former combatants into the UPDF and 
giving them proper training is one of the most effective mechanisms of ‘reintegration’. The UPDF (and 
the NRA before it) has done this on several occasions, including with rebel groups operating in Acholi 
area. According to some senior officers, a big problem with recruiting from the LRA is that some of them 
are underage when they surrender or are captured. Many of them join the Local Defense Units (LDUs) 
and then apply to join the UPDF, but they have to be turned away if they are not yet 18.  
The soldiers interviewed in the 105th Battalion barracks all looked like they were over 18. The barracks 
itself is located in an isolated spot some 20km from the edge of Gulu town. The Battalion was created in 
2004 and after three intakes; the number of soldiers is 912. The research team was told by the UPDF 
Public Relations Office for Gulu that 180 soldiers would be at the barracks on the day of our visit. This 
number turned out to be more or less accurate. Welcomed and introduced officially, the research team 
was shown around the barracks, which looked like many other soldier camps in northern Uganda. The 
research team was soon allowed to move around freely and to conduct interviews. The soldiers reacted in 
a friendly, if slightly reticent, way to the research team’s presence and questions. All of them spoke the 
Acholi language and only a few spoke Kiswahili, the official language of the military. A couple of the 
commanders came from other parts of the country. 
The soldiers undergo four months of training, which is referred to as ‘refreshment.’ If a fighter used to 
have a rank within the LRA, he is allowed to keep that title. In the Battalion there are about 50 former 
LRA fighters with ranks up to that of a captain. The battalion commander was a lieutenant when the 
research team visited the barracks (he was subsequently promoted). Therefore, some of the soldiers in his 
Battalion seemed to have a higher rank than him. However, the division intelligence officer confirmed 
that the former LRA officers in the 105th Battalion are paid as privates, and do not fulfill the same tasks as 
UPDF officers of their rank. After an LRA officer undergoes training, whatever his LRA rank, he passes 
out as a second lieutenant.  
According to the battalion commander, the 105th has a number of achievements to its credit, such as the 
capturing and killing of senior LRA commanders. He also explained that through their experience in the 
bush, the 105th understands the movement of the LRA. In addition they know where weapons are hidden, 
and where the LRA have bases. Challenges, as he explains it, are multiple:  
‘The soldiers in the battalion hardly speak the military language Kiswahili, they have to 
get used to the code of conduct and they are still traumatized from the atrocities they have 
committed.... The community is not yet ready to receive them. That is why the barracks is 
located where there are no civilians around.’ 
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The UPDF Public Relations Officer for Gulu underlined the problem of behavior: ‘they have to get used 
to the culture in the UPDF; in the bush they did not have any rules…’ In making such a statement he 
echoed those of staff we spoke to at the reception centers.  
Only a few of the soldiers interviewed in the 105th Battalion could imagine living in the IDP camps. Some 
concerns were raised about the stigma of being a former LRA fighter, but none of those spoken to said 
that their families had rejected them. They said that, ‘Life is good here; if you compare it with the life we 
would have in the camps.’ They also noted that the main difference between being in the bush with the 
LRA and being in the UPDF is that in the bush they were forced to fight, whereas now it was their own 
decision. They did not give the impression that being deployed against their former colleagues was a 
particular problem. One explained that in the barracks they drank soda and ate good food, which they did 
not have in the bush, and which they would not have in an IDP camp. A woman in military uniform, but 
with a baby on her back, said that she does not fear her community ‘but only the rebels in the bush.’ 
3.2.6 LOCAL DEFENCE UNITS 
LDUs are locally recruited paramilitary groups whose task it is to protect IDPs and roads allowing the 
UPDF to have more capacity to move in the bush. In practice, the FAPs told the research team that they 
are sometimes deployed deep in the bush in places where the UPDF does not want to operate. Their 
training is usually very poor and their pay scales are low. It was striking that UPDF officers frankly 
admitted that many LDU recruits are under 18, something that is manifestly the case in some of the more 
remote IDP camps. The problem of underage recruiting was blamed on the local councils, because they 
are nominally responsible for the LDUs. However, the LDUs are in uniform, are armed and are under 
UPDF command.  
This set-up is considered dangerous for both the recruit and the community by many reception center staff 
and agencies working in the camps.56 LDUs, as one social worker succinctly put it, are a ‘negative 
livelihood option’, operating on a circle of voluntary recruitment as a ‘catch-net for under-age LRA 
fighters’ who are already trained and find it easiest to slip into this lifestyle. There were many accounts of 
how pressure on FAPs to join the LDUs can be intense, although the research team was unable to confirm 
them. In the research  sample, only one person had joined an LDU. It is likely that the situation varies 
considerably from place to place, depending on the attitudes of LCs and the local UPDF officers. 
3.2.7 AMNESTY AND THE UPDF 
When providing the FAPs with next step options, assuring that they apply for Amnesty should be the 
most obvious commitment. CPU soldiers state that every single FAP picked up by the UPDF knows about 
the amnesty, yet the former LRA fighters do not necessarily believe that it is real. That is why the CPU 
invites the Amnesty Commission to visit the CPU to photograph the children and talk to them. The reality 
is very different. Hardly anybody from the sample heard about the amnesty while still in the barracks57 
and reception center staff have confirmed that most who arrive in the center do not know about it. A few 
of the respondents had heard about the amnesty in the bush, but clearly needed more information. Those 
who learned about the amnesty in the barracks found it reassuring (‘It was only after they told me about 
the amnesty at the barracks that is when I got courage because I knew nothing wrong was going to 
happen.’). It made them feel safe. 
 
Why information on the amnesty is not provided more systematically at the barracks is hard to say, but 
remains an urgent issue. Is it lack of resources and engagement from the Amnesty Commission; or failure 
to see how important the amnesty is to FAPs? Or is it the belief that most FAPs know about the amnesty 
                                                     
56 We heard many stories about accidents with LDU weapons, usually carried by children. 
57 See section on the Amnesty Commission 
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because it was their main incentive for reporting in the first place? Or is knowledge about the amnesty 
used as a bargaining tool in trying to recruit future soldiers who are made to think that they will not be 
safe if they went back to the community? Possibly it is a consequence of all these things, but the research 
team was unable to make an adequate assessment. The Amnesty Commission confirmed that their 
resources are overstretched, but UPDF officers often seemed unaware of the lack of information about the 
amnesty given to FAPs. 
3.2.8 COORDINATION WITH RECEPTION CENTERS 
Some CPUs are run in very close cooperation with a reception center; the reception center monitors the 
CPU, mainly to make sure that people do not overstay.58 Theoretically the center is informed about each 
FAP upon arrival at the CPU (yet, not necessarily upon their capture by the UPDF). The reception center 
even provides facilities at the CPU in some cases, such as sanitary equipment and clothing. While no 
center staff is allowed to be present during interrogation, they are usually allowed to meet with the FAPs 
straight afterwards. This set-up, however, is seen as problematic by some reception centers, as the main 
concern of the interrogating army officer is inevitably of strategic nature and not child protection. 
Reception center staff that have pointed this out say that they have no influence on the army chain-of-
command and that there is no effective monitoring of the UPDF’s work by the center. So if the army says 
that they have to keep children longer in the CPU for ‘intelligence and strategic reasons’, the reception 
centers have no way of enforcing the 48-hour rule. 
Another frequently violated rule is that FAPs are supposed to be taken to their home district as quickly as 
possible. Each FAP is supposed to be in a reception center in their own cultural setting to facilitate 
rehabilitation. However, the research team came across numerous cases where respondents were taken 
from their home district to another center without being told why. Reception center staff have complained 
that it happens regularly that the local center is overlooked by the UPDF in favor of another center. This 
points to serious mistrust between centers: centers accuse each other of being friendly with the army to 
ensure that FAPs are taken to their centers in order to keep up numbers - and donor contributions. 
Without commenting on these accusations, there is an apparent conflict of interest. If a reception center is 
so concerned about receiving FAPs from the UPDF, will it intervene if FAPs are not being treated well by 
the army?   
                                                     
58 This is quite a recent development in some districts (for example Kitgum), where the reception center took over 
the monitoring function from the Community Development Officer. This change was initiated because children 
stayed in the barracks far too long and there were some reports of abuse and even torture to extract information. In 
Gulu town, GUSCO and Save the Children have a long standing arrangement to monitor the CPU. 
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For the future, educational facilities are crucial, and not just at primary level (Photo: Tim Allen) 
 
3.2.9 CREATING A CHILD-FRIENDLY ENVIRONMENT 
Some UPDF-officers and CPU staff are trained in child protection issues, advised by Save the Children in 
Uganda and monitored by the reception centers. The CPUs are set out to create a child-friendly 
environment, but there is flexibility in what that actually means. While the social workers are generally 
confident that most children are treated in a decent manner (CPUs have been strengthened considerably 
and returnees generally no longer receive Prisoner-of-War treatment), there are glitches that are often due 
to lack of transportation, resources or individual behavior.  
When asked what their child protection training entailed, CPU soldiers explained that they learned about 
the innocence of children returning from the LRA, that they are victims of forceful recruitment, that they 
are ‘Ugandans just like the UPDF soldiers’ and that it is the soldier’s job to protect every Ugandan. They 
also said they learned the basics of international humanitarian law and principles regarding children in 
armed conflict. However, as mentioned earlier, there seemed to be no recognition in one CPU about the 
problems of employing a 17-year-old female soldier in the CPU itself. One problem acknowledged by 
officers in the CPUs is that not every soldier stationed with a detach somewhere receives this training and 
that individual’s behavior is often difficult to monitor and control. This is particularly significant as the 
UPDF acknowledges that FAPs stay with a detach or even in the barracks far too long, because of lack of 
transport.59 When transport is provided, it is often without escorts, and the FAPs ride in military vehicles. 
                                                     
59 This is mainly the case in districts where the security situation is still tense. 
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This too was mentioned as a cause of concern by reception center staff, because there have been incidents 
where military vehicles carrying FAPs were ambushed.  
The CPUs also vary greatly in their set-up. In some, staff make a point of not wearing uniform, in others 
they are always in military attire. While some CPUs are entirely separate from the barracks, others simply 
consist of a tent within barrack grounds. When describing their experience at the CPU, respondents from 
the research team’s sample were acutely aware of such arrangements. Usually a strict separation into 
gender and age groups was appreciated. It is clear from the responses that there is normally a gender 
division in sleeping arrangements (even though at times it is only through ‘a boundary dividing the boys 
and girls’), but much less emphasis is put on separating adults and children (‘We were not separated with 
the elder returnees, but a female was separated during the night’), especially during the day (‘Children 
and elders were only separated during time for sleep.’). There was not much awareness of the potential 
problems of mixing children and adults although officers from the CPUs have reported difficulties when 
FAPs with an LRA rank are kept with others. Usually, they try to keep those with rank separate and even 
take them to district headquarters since they are usually interrogated much more thoroughly. People with 
ranks often pose a problem in the reception centers, too – they expect different treatment, tend to bully 
others, and they generally need more time to adjust to the new life. For several of the respondents, it was 
always a problem to be accommodated with those with higher rank, wherever it occurred. 
But spending time at the barracks or CPU with other FAPs also meets with very different sentiments: 
while some FAPs point out that being with their friends from the bush was the most reassuring part of the 
UPDF experience, others see this as disturbing as they encounter people they remember as killers in the 
bush. Some FAPs insist on their rank: ‘The returnees knew me, and they used to fear me and give me 
respect, because in Juba I was trained among the Arabs in artillery.’  
3.2.10 ABUSE BY THE UPDF 
Six percent of respondents60 recounted being personally abused while in the hands of the UPDF. The 
severity of this abuse varies. Some report being beaten or threatened with physical punishment while 
being interrogated: ‘I was almost beaten by some soldiers because I did not have the amnesty card, they 
said I should get mine.’ Much of the abuse is name-calling and intimidation:’ Soldiers used to say these 
are people who stay in the bush, why keep them? They should be killed… Other soldiers were good to us 
but some of their women called us rebels….’ and:’ When I was caught by the UPDF, the UPDF harassed 
me and threatened to kill me, but one commander said: ‘Let’s take him to the barracks.’ Other cases are 
more severe and go beyond threat. One girl told about an incident where soldiers lit a fire to burn her and 
other FAPs: ‘Then some civilians put out the fire and rescued two of us, but other FACs got burnt - two 
girls and six boys got burnt in the incident.’ 
People report that the soldiers sold food reserved for FAPs, saying that they were killers from the bush 
and did not deserve proper food. Many report having their personal belongings taken. Most reception 
centers as well as UPDF burn personal clothing and provide the FAP with something new to signify the 
beginning of a new life, but this seems to be viewed as theft by some FAPs. Other stories are less prone to 
misunderstanding (‘The UPDF…collected all the money that I had planned to go with back to school.’). 
There are reports too of ransom being paid for cattle (‘Some of the cattle [that belonged to this FAP in the 
bush] that escaped were found and kept by the UPDF who asked some money for keeping the cattle. I 
then paid 19.000 Ugandan Shillings for keeping the cattle.’). 
Some FAPs report fighting between soldiers about how the FAPs should be treated: ‘Every one was good 
except one soldier who never wanted us to be given food but the UPDF leader said we were innocent.’ 
There are stories of neglect turning into physical violence. One boy said that the soldiers kept saying that 
                                                     
60 14 in total 
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he should be punished for what he did and was hence not given proper food and fainted as a result. The 
soldiers took him while he was unconscious to be ‘thrown into a pit latrine…but their leader stopped them 
and said he should be taken back into the house.’ At times, there seems to be little sympathy among 
UPDF individuals with the FAPs’ situation: ‘They even refused to call my parents to take care of me but 
luckily enough, the staff of Lacor hospital sent a radio announcement, calling my parents to come after I 
had stayed at the hospital for one month.’ A few FAPs have more harrowing tales of being kept inside a 
building in the barracks for days and weeks, sometimes without any explanation (‘They never wanted me 
to come out of the barracks. They refused to allow my mother to bring me home. I just cried and forced 
myself to come out of the barracks. I forcefully entered the vehicle of World Vision that collected 
returnees in the barracks.’).  
3.3 AMNESTY AND THE AMNESTY COMMISSION 
3.3.1 AMNESTY AS AN INCENTIVE?  
The Government of Uganda and many donors view the Amnesty Act as the major incentive for 
combatants to leave the LRA. It is assumed that most FAPs have heard about the amnesty on Mega Radio 
or through word of mouth. Hearing former combatants 
describe a life in peace and security outside the bush 
persuades active combatants to leave the rebel army.  
Empirically, however, information about the role of the 
Amnesty Commission appears to play little role in 
coaxing FAPs out of the bush. Only 25 percent of 
formerly abducted people who have gone through 
reception centers had received an amnesty card, 
applied for amnesty or in fact even heard of the 
amnesty commission.61 This low number is even more 
striking considering that the people in the research 
sample were those who did go through most of the 
official channels, and certainly went through a 
reception center.  
Of those who had heard about the amnesty, many had a 
negative impression of what it actually meant. In the 
bush, LRA commanders tell combatants that the 
amnesty is actually a government ploy to lure people 
out of the bush and kill them.62 Commanders deny 
their soldiers access to radios and make every attempt 
to suppress information. This seems to be the main reason why many FAPs choose to bypass the official 
system and do not report to the military or any other government body.63 
 
                                                     
61 We broadened this category from ‘received amnesty’ to ‘applied for or even heard of the amnesty’ since the 
number of people who had received their amnesty card was so small.  
62 In responding to the point that the amnesty does work as an incentive, the UPDF often emphasizes that high ranks 
are known to have reported as a result of the amnesty. However, using commanders’ return as anecdotal evidence 
means overlooking that these are the best-informed rebels. It is the foot soldiers that lack information.   
63 see section on UPDF  
THE AMNESTY ACT 
The Parliament of Uganda enacted the Amnesty 
Act in 2000. It offers amnesty from prosecution for 
crimes committed in armed rebellion against the 
government since 1986. 
The Amnesty Act established the Amnesty 
Commission to promote the amnesty law, grant 
amnesty, demobilize and disarm FAPs, and 
reintegrate and resettle FAPs to communities of 
choice.  
Children above the age of 12 and adults who 
spent more than four months fighting in the bush 
are eligible to apply. They are required to report to 
the Amnesty Commission or any civil or 
community leader, armed forces or government 
officers and denounce rebellion.  
Each FAP is issued with a certificate of amnesty 
and the person is exonerated for crimes in the 
rebellion. The Amnesty Commission then provides 
assistance to those with certificates in order to 
resettle into the community. 
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3.3.2 ACCESS TO THE AMNESTY COMMISSION 
The first point of contact between a 
returnee and the Amnesty Commission 
is most commonly the reception center, 
although it really should be while FAPs 
are still with the UPDF. Amnesty 
Commission and reception center staff 
confirmed that relations are good. The 
centers call upon the Amnesty 
Commission to teach ‘demobilization 
classes’. In those classes, the 
Commission provides the FAPs with 
information about the amnesty law, the 
value of forgiveness in society, the value 
of peace versus violence and the value 
of peace in terms of their personal 
development and education.  The FAPs 
are told the benefits of being out of the 
bush, such as bathing with soap or 
getting medical treatment. However, 
while both reception centers and Amnesty Commission confirmed a good working relationship it is 
important to note how few returnees found out about the amnesty while in the center, so while the 
relationship might be good, information flow still needs to be improved. 
There seems to be no access by the Amnesty Commission to FAPs still with the UPDF. Whether this is 
because of lack of Amnesty Commission staff or for other reasons was impossible to determine – the fact 
of the matter is that it has simply become the established system that the Amnesty Commission works 
with the reception centers, rather than with the UPDF.64 Since less than 1 PERCENT of the people 
interviewed in the sample said that they had been informed in the barracks about the legal meaning of 
amnesty, the UPDF clearly does not put much emphasis on working with the commission. It is possible 
that ignorance about the amnesty might be a factor leading some people to opt for recruitment into the 
army.65 
3.3.3 AMNESTY AND ‘REINTEGRATION’ 
There is much confusion amongst FAPs about what amnesty actually means: for some it means receiving 
a package,66 others believe that they have been granted amnesty if they have gone through a reconciliation 
ceremony. Others have lost faith in the amnesty, because they had been consistently turned away from the 
Amnesty Commission’s offices. The probability of receiving an amnesty package of assistance items is 
regarded as so low, that many just do not bother claiming it - not realizing that not applying for amnesty 
could have legal consequences. Being granted amnesty from the Amnesty Commission to obtain legal 
immunity from prosecution was barely ever mentioned as an explanation about what amnesty means. 
                                                     
64 The UPDF, however, has clear guidelines as to how to proceed with FAPs. Confidence building is considered a 
major factor: one focus is to spread the word that the UPDF and the Amnesty Commission do not kill FAPs. One 
way is through leaflets distributed before attacks that show pictures of former FAPs to prove that they are alive.  
65 see section on UPDF 
66 Staff from the amnesty commission have confirmed that they are on the alert about people not wanting amnesty, 
but the package that comes with it.  
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Part of the reason why people do not understand what the Amnesty Commission does is that the terms 
‘amnesty’ and ‘forgiveness’ are not distinct in the local languages. The same word ‘timo kica’ is used for 
both. Various activist groups are especially prone to confuse the two ideas even arguing that there is an 
Acholi system of justice based on forgiveness which is superior to more conventional law making and 
enforcement. Rather naively, many aid agencies seem to have taken this at face value. Interviews in the 
IDP camps reveal considerable antipathy to those who have been with the LRA. At present this usually 
seems to be constrained by social controls exercised in the camps. But formerly abducted people could 
become vulnerable when the camps are dismantled, particularly where there are disputes over access to 
land. 
Staff we spoke to from the Amnesty Commission said that 
they needed to communicate general problems regarding 
‘reintegration’ to the government and donor community, 
but they pointed out that the commission itself is not 
responsible for tackling them. The commission’s task is 
specifically to issue amnesty cards and provide 
rehabilitation packages. However, staff confirmed that 
many applicants do not have a good understanding of 
what the amnesty law actually means. They confront 
numerous FAPs at their offices who believe they are 
eligible to receive a certificate and package, although they 
do not meet the criteria for being granted amnesty, having 
spent too short a time in the bush. As a result, the 
Amnesty Commission has identified the need to go out 
into the field to educate and inform people more, but this 
has been impossible to do because of the lack of trained 
personnel, transport and the security situation. Those 
interviewed at the commission also accepted that they 
have not been able to provide much assistance to those 
who have so far received amnesty cards. The slow pace of 
granting legal amnesty has been more than matched by the 
slow pace of disbursement of promised material and financial support.67 Even those equipped with 
packages find themselves resettled into devastating poverty. The 263,000 Ugandan shillings they receive 
are often divided up in the family and do not support the FAP as expected (such as to pay for school 
uniforms and scholastic materials).  
A further major limitation for the Amnesty Commission is that it does not have a viable method of 
assessing those FAPs who fall outside the official system. While it is not the legal position, it has become 
practice in the commission that in order to qualify for amnesty, FAPs must provide documentation of 
having passed through one of the receptions centers. However, there are two types of FAPs who have not 
passed through reception centers: those who returned prior to the inception of reception centers in their 
district and those who have ‘quietly settled’, bypassing the UPDF/CPU/reception centers’ structure and 
returning to their communities directly. As noted above, the UPDF insists that the ‘quietly settled FAP’ 
does not exist at all. Army officers repeatedly said that the only way to return from the bush and be settled 
in the community is by going through the official channels. But this is not the case. 
                                                     
67 Until June 2005, a total of only 217 packages had been awarded in Kitgum since the Amnesty Act was instituted.  
Between June 16th and August 12th of 2005, 1000 additional Amnesty packages had been distributed in Kitgum as a 
result of the World Bank-funded Multi-Country Demobilization and Resettlement Programme. There have recently 
been more applicants for the amnesty, which could mean that the main motivation to apply for amnesty lies in the 
package, not in the legal implication. The Amnesty Commission in Kitgum, for example, currently has a backlog of 
approximately 3500 people waiting for packages, which does not include the people who have registered this year. 
AMNESTY COMMISSION 
OBJECTIVES 
• To promote awareness of the 
Amnesty Law and Peacebuilding 
• To promote dialogue between 
potential FAPs and the government 
• To receive, document and process 
FAPs 
• To promote the ‘reintegration’ of 
FAPs into the community by providing 
material assistance 
• To sensitize community leaders, 
FAPs and other stakeholders 
• To seek support and participation of 
different stakeholders in the peace 
process 
• To ease follow-up of resettled FAPs 
• To develop sustainable means of 
reintegrating FAPs into communities 
so as to eliminate incentives for future 
return to armed rebellions 
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Those who returned from the LRA prior to the inception of the reception supposedly receive a letter from 
the district, certifying that the individual formerly fought against the government and returned some time 
ago. In case of the ‘quietly settled FAPs’, the Amnesty Commission is supposed to evaluate each 
individual to determine if he or she has indeed been with the LRA. In practical terms this is virtually 
impossible in the majority of cases, because the commission does not have the capacity to verify a 
‘reporter’s’ story. The Amnesty Commission can accept a corroborating letter from the FAP’s local 
council. However, this raises issues with manipulation or ‘corruption’ (as the FAP may be related to the 
council member who writes the letter).  
 
In theory, the Amnesty Commission targets all FAPs regardless of passage through centers. But now that 
more packages have become available, the Commission has encountered ever more problems with people 
falsely reporting. As a consequence, if someone claiming to be an FAP has not been through a center or 
reported to an authority figure - and therefore has no documentation - the Amnesty Commission is 
adamant that no certificate will be issued; otherwise there will not be enough resources to help ‘genuine 
FAPs’. This position was confirmed to  by local Amnesty Commission staff and the research team 
witnessed that people were turned away without a letter from a reception center. In Kitgum, there is a 
sample reception letter tacked to the wall with an accompanying note to explain that this is a necessary 
document to bring. 
3.4 THE RECEPTION CENTERS 
3.4.1 ROLE OF RECEPTION CENTERS 
Reception centers were set up to provide a space for people returning from the LRA. They are supposed 
to provide a safe area, basic supplies and basic ‘counseling’ to enable the FAPs to return to their 
community. It is important to recognize that the centers were set up in extreme circumstances because of 
the manifest acute needs of many of those who were returning to their families after having been abused 
by the LRA. They were not set up to do social research, and even keeping records was not initially a 
major concern. They were set up by people who just wanted to help in any way they could. The 
emergence of the centers was largely a hand-to-mouth response to an atrocious situation. It is hardly 
Total Numbers of Returnees Through Reception Centers (from all reception center records) 
 
Note: the very high numbers of the period after 2002 reflect the effects of the UPDF operations 
against the LRA across the border in Sudan 
 
CPA Kitgum KICWA AACAN KCV WV Gulu CCF CPA Lira GUSCO
1995 548
1996 1290
1997 1462
1998 241 1420
1999 93 518
2000 230 246
2001 306 263
2002 507 1002
2003 1030 1468 780 1580
2004 528 989 282 2263
2005 88 145 18 371
TOTAL/ centre 1646 3979 1080 286 10963 650 850 7504
TOTAL 26958  
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surprising that there have been institutional inadequacies – most of which, it needs to be added, are fully 
recognized by staff themselves.  
Centers have made efforts to establish good practice procedures over time, and there have been some 
efforts made at coordination between them (although these had not progressed very far until recently). In 
2005, the numbers passing through the centers had declined to a trickle compared to the years before, 
prompting a debate among reception centers and donors about what should be their role now.  
The perception of this research team, based on time spent in the centers and in the IDP camps and towns, 
is that probably the most important service of all provided by the centers is what might be termed liminal 
space – i.e. a space outside of social life where people are transformed through a process of ‘unbecoming’ 
and ‘becoming’, like in some initiation rituals.  
For very many FAPs the most difficult times they have faced are the period after their ‘abduction’ and the 
period after their return. During these times they do not know what will happen to them and they may be 
in serious danger, or think that they are. Once rules of behavior are established and complied with, life 
becomes easier. The reception centers, for all their limitations, have offered a secure place where FAPs 
can undergo such an adjustment. They learn how to unlearn being a person who lives with the LRA, and 
they learn how to be ‘normal’, or at least less conspicuous. They are reassured about possible retribution 
by the UPDF, and taught how to ‘fit in’.  
This research team observed FAPs arriving at the centers in a state of terror, shaking and jumping 
whenever they are asked a question or hear a sudden noise. Many FAPs are afraid to eat, to sleep, or even 
talk, and it can take several weeks for staff to develop sufficient connection and ‘trust’ with the FAP to 
enable him or her to undertake essential activities for their survival. When they leave the centers, FAPs 
are not like this. Some might well manage this transition on their own, but many others benefit from the 
assistance on offer. Such a conclusion was also reiterated by interviews with some CVCs in the IDP 
camps, who contrasted the behavior of those who had been through the reception centers with those who 
had not (although some of those CVCs interviewed in Lira District gave an opposite view).  
The centers also perform other valuable functions. These include the provision of assistance to deal with 
physical wounds, family tracing, offering access to peer groups and the provision of advice and 
commodities, which have made the transition from LRA to the IDP camps or the towns somewhat easier.  
On the surface, most of the centers offer similar services: basic health provision, a safe space to sleep, 
food, ‘counseling’ and teaching, entertainment and game-playing (see Appendix 2). They also usually 
encourage responsible behavior by transferring simple household duties to the FAP.68 However, centers 
differ significantly in their approach to their work and in their resources. Particular individuals may have 
created smaller centers with a personal commitment to assisting some of those most in need. Others are a 
product of a broader response to the overall situation by international aid agencies. Some have a strong 
Christian agenda; others emphasize local ‘traditional’ healing rituals.  
                                                     
68 See Appendix on Center Services 
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Staff at all the centers pointed out  that they 
were unable to provide the full range of 
services needed by their clients: so while they 
had a basic dispensary and administered first 
aid, they were often unable to deal with more 
complicated medical issues and often lacked the 
funds for referral. Some center nurses said that 
while they counsel girls on the theoretical 
dangers of STDs and HIV, they do not have any 
way of actually sending them for testing and 
dealing with the test result. FAPs are treated for 
wounds while at the center, but do not receive 
any medical follow-up, leaving them with a 
half-treated condition after their return to the 
camps. 
Several centers have offered various types of 
skills training. This is often done only when 
funds are available and usually consists of a 
truncated training session, rather than 
something that can evolve into a viable income 
generating activity. Overall there was little 
evidence that any technical skills learned at 
reception centers have proved adequate to 
secure a livelihood. A complaint from a large 
number of those that interviewed was that skills 
training at the reception centers was largely 
useless. Where it had been made available, it 
was not enough to be able to start a viable 
business. There were also complaints that 
essential materials and tools were not provided.  
The working relationship between centers is often difficult. Although most centers agree that coordination 
and cooperation has much improved, grievances still define the relationships. Notably, centers accuse 
each other of keeping children too long, especially children outside their home districts. It is alleged that 
this has become an increasing problem now that the number of FAPs arriving at the centers has declined, 
because numbers have to be kept up to sustain funding. There are also many accusations and counter 
accusations about centers ‘stealing’ FAPs from one another.  
The District officials in Lira were particularly incensed by the tendency to send FAPs to reception centers 
that were not in their home district. They called this ‘trafficking in children’ and said it was just done to 
keep the numbers high. It was claimed to be a factor in exacerbating divisions between the FAPs and their 
families. Officials in other districts shared this view. Interestingly, the majority of those FAPs who pass 
through the Rachele Center in Lira town are Acholis from Pader or Kitgum Districts, which is a cause of 
much resentment among officials (and reception center staff) in those places. It is, however, hard to avoid 
the suspicion that some to the mutual vilification that occurs is motivated by frustration that this center 
has been able to secure more generous and sustained funding than the others.  
Many reception center staff are acutely aware of how limited their role is in dealing with the complex 
situation in Northern Uganda, but feel constrained to say and do various things because they are deemed 
appropriate by aid agencies and donors. Staff work within a framework that requires acceptance of 
various received wisdoms about what is happening, such as that FAPs are all children or like children. 
AVERAGE DAYS SPENT AT CENTER BY YEAR 
(Some years/ centers missing due to insufficient data) 
Year Centre Days In Centre Sample Size
2003 CPA Kitgum 17 86
2004 22 41
2005 30 6
2000 GUSCO 195 11
2001 26 6
2002 30 3
2003 30 16
2004 21 12
1998 KICWA 60 20
1999 105 15
2000 60 21
2001 26 32
2002 44 47
2003 31 122
2004 37 81
2005 17 16
1995 WV Gulu 360 10
1996 107 24
1997 92 29
1998 140 28
1999 127 9
2000 11 5
2002 141 18
2003 30 27
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These perceptions affect the kinds of things that go on from day-to-day in the reception centers, but they 
do not necessarily determine what staff on the ground think. Indeed, several of those interviewed at the 
centers implicitly or explicitly made a distinction between the apparent or stated guidelines with which 
they work, and their own experiences and views. For many there is a separation between different sorts of 
discourse, and some staff are explicitly critical of the very concepts and practices that they are asked to 
use. 69 Concepts and realities do not match and the dialogue needed to compare the two and effectively 
adjust the framework is slow. Staff often find themselves in a difficult position and do not feel that they 
have the power to criticize the foundation of their organization’s approach.  
3.4.2 EVALUATING RECEPTION CENTER EFFECTIVENESS 
Centers have various accountability mechanisms to their donors, yet there are no established 
accountability procedures to the centers’ target population. Since the role of most centers, until very 
recently, had been largely confined to the center buildings themselves, accountability required by donors 
has never expanded much beyond the fence. It is therefore extremely difficult for the centers to evaluate 
their own effectiveness. Apart from anything else, there is very little information about how particular 
FAPs have coped after going ‘home’.  
Lack of outreach also makes evaluations within the centers problematic. There is no established practice, 
for example, for how long an FAP should spend at a center. As indicated, feelings run high on the issue, 
but there are no effective methods of making an objective assessment. Although there may be some 
information about a few cases, in general, reception centers have no means of knowing if keeping an FAP 
for longer is a useful response to observed difficulties.  
In practice, the retention of the FAPs at the centers and the timing of their release depend on the pressure 
of space at the center concerned and staff evaluation. While there is an underlying concept that 
determines that FAPs should be returned to their families as soon as possible, staff will also talk about the 
need to adequately prepare FAPs for life outside the bush, to teach them what is considered ‘normal 
behavior’, and to actively assist in their social and psychological healing. A judgment is made by staff 
about the well-being of individual FAPs, and there is considerable reluctance to release them from the 
centers if they are deemed to be in particularly acute need or are thought to be mentally disturbed. Length 
of stay in the centers therefore varies widely, from a few weeks to over a year and often it is not entirely 
clear how the best interest of the FAP is determined. 
The decision about length of stay at the center is also influenced by the idea that the FAPs are lacking in 
values, notably about the importance of human life and the respect that should be accorded to playmates, 
elders and teachers. This view of FAPs in practice means that they are entirely left out of the decision 
about what should happen to them. They are not consulted during the process and staff quite openly admit 
that an FAP’s view on their own condition is not taken seriously. FAPs are seen to be unable to judge 
their own well-being and their ability to cope with life after the bush.  
This a complex ethical and human rights issue. The key issues are whether it is in the best interests of the 
FAP (adult or child) to remain at a center, balanced with the need for the protection of persons back in the 
community, and who has the power, responsibility and authority to determine best interest. With children, 
a directly relevant sub-issue is the degree of involvement the parents or legal guardians have in 
determining whether or not the FAP should remain in a center or should be back with the family (or, 
indeed, be somewhere else). The reality is that most centers assume the responsibility to take decisions on 
behalf of FAPs (although they do not have any clearly defined legal authority) and few involve parents or 
                                                     
69 One member of staff at a reception center that had recently been evaluated commented that the process had 
confirmed that evaluations were really about funding and were not helpful for actually doing the job. She was 
particularly incensed by the criticisms of one expatriate consultant who was shocked as the lack of toys at the center. 
She felt that the consultant had a completely inappropriate understanding of what it means to be an Acholi child. 
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legal guardians in the decisions. As regards adults, centers have actually no authority at all to retain them 
should he or she wish to leave – but most FAP are unaware of this.     
To offer an alternative perspective on the centers, the research team decided that it would be interesting to 
ask those who had passed through the reception center system what they thought were the best and worst 
things about it.  
3.4.3 THE CENTER EXPERIENCE: BEST AND WORST THINGS 
The vast majority of respondents had nothing particularly good or bad to say about the reception centers. 
This led to some dispute in the team as to what this actually means. While the non-Acholi team members 
felt inclined to interpret this as ‘the reception center was really not a very memorable place’, The local 
researchers (part of this research team) argued that this lack of emotions either way actually meant that 
people felt quite comfortable at the center and considered it ‘a good place’. About 90 people gave a more 
specific answer. The tables below present their responses. These were not ‘forced answers’ (i.e. the 
respondents were invited to give any answer they wanted), so the categories used to represent their views 
are the interpretation of what they said.  
Best Thing About Center (87 respondents, multiple answers) 
‘Counseling’ was by a large margin the ‘best memory’ of the center. It is necessary to take a broad view 
of what ‘counseling’ entails: some described it simply as ‘talking to someone and getting attention’, 
others pointed out the life skills taught and the actual coping mechanisms suggested by the counselors. 
Some called it ‘advice’; others called it ‘teaching’, ‘learning coping mechanisms and how to keep 
healthy’ and ‘how to conduct myself while in the society’. Coping mechanisms are described as: ‘I 
learned how to be a good child, and ‘how to live in harmony with others.’ General teachings mentioned 
were the idea of being respectful of others, not quarrelling in the community and forgetting about the past, 
and that ‘if someone abuses me, I should not answer, or fight’. One boy explained at length how the 
teaching to be tolerant to abuse and name-calling is still important in his life, and has helped him live like 
other human beings. The concept of forgiveness is often cited: ‘forgive those in the bush for the time you 
spent there and forgive those who might abuse you when you came back home’.  
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The personal nature and the trust relationship of ‘counseling’ seemed particularly important. Often, 
respondents felt comfortable with one ‘counselor’ who made a point of spending time with the FAP. It 
was seen as a positive experience that the ‘counselors’ asked, for example, about nightmares. Many saw 
the role of the ‘counselors’ as almost parental – it reminded them of home how their parents ‘took care of 
them’.  
Most importantly, the teaching/counseling instilled a sense of hope, that ‘things are still possible’, and a 
sentiment that ‘life is not yet over for you only because you have been in the bush. Just make sure that 
you take responsibility by staying away from bad people and by staying out of the bush.’ When asked 
how ‘counseling’ led to behavioral change, one man explained how he used to drink a lot before going 
into the bush, but stopped when he was told in the center that he was wasting his life.  
It is seen as reassuring that the ‘counselors’ could potentially provide more help later in life. Some FAPs 
left the reception center thinking that they could come back for more ‘counseling’ at any time. Although 
in practice that has rarely been proven impossible, it seemed to be an empowering thought.  
The value given to skills and learning is interesting. That is something that most FAP state they hoped to 
obtain at centers but were not given, and it was recorded as the second ‘worst thing’ about the centers 
after ‘empty promises’. Those who mentioned it as a ‘best thing’ tended to add a qualifier: ‘if it had only 
been more training’, or ‘if I had only been given the necessary tools to work with, I could now use my 
skills to make a living.’ A few respondents observed that they enjoyed being taught something new, such 
as a traditional dance and music or even literacy and numeracy. It is possible that some of the responses 
reflected a hope amongst respondents that emphasizing their desire for training might lead to more 
courses being made available.  
Comments on other responses to ‘what were the best things about the reception center?’ can be found in 
the footnotes.70 
                                                     
70 Praying or being taught how to pray is an important source of hope for some. Half of those who answered that 
prayer was the best aspect of their stay at the center also mentioned that they converted to various forms of 
Christianity at the center. They still use prayer in their everyday life and feel that this is the best thing given to them 
at the center.  
Numerous times people confirmed that the games, movies, music and dances helped them to forget about the past: 
‘Football was the best thing for me because I would feel fine after playing football. I always had a relaxed mind 
after playing football.’ The opportunity to sit quietly and read was appreciated; drama and drawing are singled out as 
activities that give confidence. One respondent pointed out that his group won the drama contest with their play 
about life in the bush; another said he liked drawing pictures of guns and rebels.  
Security and feeling safe at the center play a vital role: ‘the center is guarded even at night… it is fenced in or 
surrounded by a swamp so rebels cannot reach it… being in this safe haven felt like a dream at first…the center was 
in town and the rebels would not go that far into town.’ Safety was also perceived on other levels: ‘I feel that I 
should stay only here in the center, because all of us have been abducted, so we don’t stigmatize each other unlike 
home where people abuse me.’ 
Many of those who quoted safety as a center’s virtue also mentioned being treated well by the staff. Being given hot 
water to bathe upon arrival and being treated with human warmth is important. One respondent sums it up by 
saying: “The care they gave to FACs was the best thing at the center.” Food security and to a lesser extent 
accommodation play a major part in the feeling of well-being at the center, so is receiving medical treatment: ‘I felt 
free in the center, because in the bush there were many rashes on my body and the people in the center helped with 
the medicine.’ Receiving goods - from jerry cans, plates, cups, basins, clothing, soap and razor blades to a mattress - 
to keep is a fond memory.  
Making friends at the center to talk to about life in the bush and after escaping is frequently mentioned – especially 
if the friends made in the center are staying in the same camp. One man is still in contact with friends from the 
center and they advise whenever he needs help. The peers become a surrogate family – in fact, one girl even phrased 
it that way: ‘we socialized with each other as if we were family.’ 
Many respondents saw ‘behaving responsibly’ and ‘showing and being shown respect’ at the centre as a major 
achievement. Children and adults felt empowered by being able to show off good behavior, following instructions 
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Worst things about the Reception Center 
81 respondents, multiple answers 
Empty Promises 22 
Other FAPs 20 
Lack of Skills Training 13 
Lack of Support  12 
Staff Behavior 12 
Lack of Follow-Up 10 
Unfair Treatment 9 
Center Infrastructure 9 
Lack of Help with Amnesty  7 
Food 7 
Lack of Counseling 6 
Not Allowed to Leave/ Move around 5 
Not Allowed to Stay 4 
Unfulfilled Expectations 4 
Center Rules 3 
Lack of Schooling 3 
Own Behavior 3 
Sexual Advances 2 
Language/ Cultural Barrier 2 
Lack of Ceremonies/ Evil Spirits  1 
Being exposed as an FAP 1 
Center Programmes 1 
Loss of Trusted Person 1 
Boredom 1 
Lack of Communication with Home 1 
 
 
The vast majority of respondents saw ‘empty promises’ as the worst aspect about the reception center. 
Respondents were aggrieved in part by the sense of being let down by  
• Waiting to be called back to the center to receive a package. 
• Having to fill in a form to receive training or tools, but never receiving them. 
• Being told that the future would be bright and that there were opportunities to go back to school 
or receive training. 
• Promises to be followed-up by the reception center staff to see how they were coping at home. 
• Promises that they would be sponsored for school fees. 
• Promises that they would receive clothes. 
• Being asked about problems, which were written down, but never dealt with. 
 
Respondents tended to make a distinction between specific promises made by reception center staff, and 
more general disappointments about their lives. Even without a specific promise, FAPs were disappointed 
when they found out that the center was not going to pay school fees or find sponsors or provide items 
that they wanted. These expectations seemed to be based on hearsay, rather than on personal interactions 
                                                                                                                                                                           
and by living up to staff’s expectation. People who mentioned their own behavior as their best memory did so 
because they were given a responsible role as either dormitory captain, head girl, head of games and sports, 
entertainment master who taught other abductees music or the elder who was asked to give advice to the young 
ones. Being able to perform visible tasks, such as sweeping the center and weeding the compound are important 
ingredients to make the people feel valued, along with receiving skills training. 
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with center staff. Those who expressed their disappointment about being promised a visit quite often also 
said that follow-up would really help them and would encourage them to cope with life. As one 
respondent put it: ‘I would like to be told how to live well during follow-up’.  
Those who mentioned lack of skills training usually talked about not being given any tools to put the 
skills learned in the center to work or being taught the wrong skills, effectively rendering the skills 
training as useless.71 Boredom in the center was mentioned as an issue, along with feeling useless: ‘I 
stayed for three months in the center. Sitting and doing nothing for three months was too much.’ Some 
FAPs felt that they wasted time staying in the center without schooling. There was one suggestion of a 
special school for the formerly abducted ‘so that we study there to avoid stigmatization from other people 
both at school and in the community.’ Among the respondents, there was a general feeling that the 
reception centers are unaware of the problems awaiting returnees at home – most commonly the complete 
lack of anything to do or generate an income, which, it was claimed, leads to thoughts of suicide in some 
cases.  
A dozen respondents reported lack of help with obtaining an amnesty certificate. Some had lost their 
reception center letter, which is needed to register for the amnesty (explanations included ‘father hid it’ 
and ‘hut burnt down’) and went back to the center to get it reissued, were told that they could not receive 
a replacement and subsequently gave up trying to apply for amnesty. Others complained that their names 
were not on the Amnesty Commission’s list of people who went through the center and thus their letter 
was not accepted as proof. Yet when they turned to the center for help with this issue, the center did not 
help. Many applications for amnesty simply got lost in the long process and frustrations.  
Criticism of the center, rather than the lack of the centers’ involvement after reunification, targeted the 
infrastructure and rules, staff behavior and programs. People criticized lack of space (not enough room for 
accommodation), sleeping tents (several people mentioned that they would prefer to sleep in brick 
buildings) lack of proper bedding, lack of security (people asked for better protection from the UPDF), 
leaking water taps, and poor sanitation.  
While all centers make provision to separate the sexes at night, lack of space in particular led to 
uncomfortable situations for some: ‘What I didn’t like was that some ex-abductees were trying to 
persuade girls (to have sex)’, said one boy. Another blamed the confined space and the daily interaction 
between boys and girls in their center at the time they were there as the cause for ‘love feelings among the 
youth”, and advised the centers to separate girls and boys day and night and to ‘always use different 
venues for both boys and girls and to expand to have enough space to avoid such bad behavior.’ There 
were also complaints there was not enough food or that the food was of low quality: ‘At times, the food 
they cook for us is not well fried and the posho is expired from the stores. We are not allowed to leave it, 
we should eat it all.’ One respondent noted that ‘when we became many, the services became poor and 
harsh treatment came in.’  
                                                     
71 In some instances, those who received training pointed out that it was useless, and another skill would have been 
more appropriate (a woman who was taught weaving, for example, mentioned that she could only make money from 
tailoring). Desirable skills mentioned were tailoring, bicycle repair, anything mechanical and brick laying. One girl 
mentioned that she was scared to ‘advise big people’, but that she thought it would be good if more than one kind of 
skill would be taught, as she and all other girls at the center were all learning tailoring. 
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Comments on other responses to ‘what were the worst things about the reception center?’ can be found in 
the footnotes. 72 
                                                     
72 Not only in busy times was distribution of resources a major cause of grievances among the FAPs. People did not 
feel as if everybody was treated equally, but segregated based on ‘periods spent in the bush, period of escape, and so 
on.’ A common complaint is that some people received gifts and others did not and that such choices depended 
entirely on staff. Discrimination was seen to be based on age (younger ones get more), circumstance (‘child 
mothers’ receive a certificate for their tailoring training, others do not’), and home district (‘training was only given 
to children from a certain district’). A Teso returnee in a Gulu reception center said that the language barrier was the 
worst thing for him. An Acholi Girl amongst Langi said that she was scared to say anything because ‘I am the only 
Acholi here, so I can be hurt.’ 
When staff behavior was criticized, respondents were either referring to a specific incident, person, or general staff 
approach such as ‘the staff did not like that we were stubborn’, ‘the staff used improper language’ or ‘the staff did 
not make us comfortable’. Staff are accused of being abusive towards FAPs – calling them names, stigmatizing 
them, being rude, being incompetent in how ‘to handle people coming from the bush’ or being arrogant. One person 
describes a dramatic incident during which a member of staff accused the FAPs of eating too much. Apparently this 
led to an FAP revolt with the FAPs taking their belongings and trying to smash the locked gate until they were 
begged to go back and settle down by other members of staff. One FAP accused staff of embezzlement – of taking 
money donated by visitors for the well-being of the FAPs. Staff turnover was difficult for those who had learned to 
trust a member of staff: ‘I always go to talk to someone from the center, but we normally find that the old staff has 
been changed or left.’ 
Some of the rules imposed in the center are not looked upon favorably: burning all the clothes and belongings from 
the bush (usually described as ‘leaving the past behind’ by staff) just felt like theft to some FAPs. Segregation of 
children into home districts was criticized and so was the practice of keeping mothers and children apart. One 
woman explained that she had to sleep in a separate room than her eldest daughter and they were only allowed to see 
each other during the day. Restriction of movement while in the center was problematic. Some felt imprisoned 
because the compound was fenced and it made them feel as if still in captivity. Some centers restrict movement out 
of the compound to Sundays, which, as one man said, ‘oppresses people a lot.’ Others felt that they were made to 
stay longer at the center than they wanted to (‘I was just being forced by the staff to stay longer. I badly wanted to 
come back home’) because they rather wanted to go back to school or be with their family. Some simply did not 
want to be in the center because they did not want to be associated with it: ‘I hated being called an abducted child - 
especially by the people who visited the center, especially the Whites who visit the center to support it.’ 
Nine FAPs stated that they wanted to stay longer. Reasons given included the observation that they had made friends 
or that they felt they were not yet in good health. Others simply wanted to stay for no specific reason, but realized 
that the length of stay ‘depends on someone’s health, and how the person relates with others.’ One man recounted 
his problems after returning home: ‘I feel good about being at home but my head, where the rebel beat me, 
sometimes I don’t know what is happening. Then I start shouting and I don’t want anybody to talk loudly near me. 
Sometimes I feel like I am mad because I don’t know what I am doing I would like to still be in the reception center, 
stay there for another three months. Because I was thinking that my head is going to disturb me and I fear to go back 
home because of that.’ Most centers decide when an FAP is ready to go home, but encourage contact with the family 
as soon as possible. There have been cases when returnees and reception center staff disagreed on what kind of 
contact would be suitable: ‘I missed staying with my people and I had no means of delivering messages to them.’ 
The programs offered by the center were not suitable for everyone. One girl recounts her fear when she was asked to 
participate in entertainment: ‘I used not to like dancing (disco) because I imagined rebels would come and attack us 
again. So I could lock the door for everyone not to enter the room.’ Other FAPs said that they needed more care for 
their particular problem. Lack of ‘counseling’ was not expressed as a grievance as such, but it can be deducted from 
the situations described. One man, for example, would complain how people stigmatize him in the camp ‘even when 
it is a small thing that has happened; they say I am possessed with evil spirits from the bush,’ and that he feels like 
talking to someone at the center about such a matter. Another asked for more teaching on ‘…how I should live. 
After staying in the bush for a long time I think we need to be taught how to live among people again.’ Others 
mention problems at home and in the center, because life there is just ‘so different’ from the bush and they do not 
know how to deal with it. Some recount symptoms of ‘trauma’ after being deemed ready for ‘reintegration’: 
recurring nightmares, wanting to kill people, drinking and disturbing others.  
Three FAPs criticized their own behavior as the worst thing at the center: beating children or wanting to kill 
somebody in a fight. Interactions between FAPs in the center are complicated. Apart from general criticism that 
other FAPs at the center just do not behave very well, there are more concrete examples of why people felt even 
threatened while there. There was theft amongst FAPs, physical violence, fighting, quarrelling as well as 
intimidation and bullying of younger children and complaints about a lot of noise at night from quarrelling, 
nightmares and snoring. 
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3.4.4 APPROACHES TO ‘COUNSELING’  
It is not surprising, given what has been going on in northern Uganda for so many years, that many people 
have attitudes and experiences that require mediation, to say the least, before they can re-adapt to life with 
their families. Staff at the reception centers are well aware of this, and several were observed to 
demonstrate a remarkable degree of patience and care, although sometimes they can be heard saying 
things to each other like ‘lo tini wig u bale’ (these children are not sound in the head’). From time to time 
they loose their temper, or express their opinions to FAPs in explicit terms.  
 
Can ‘counseling’ prepare FAPs for life in IDP Camps? (Photo: Elliott Green) 
 
It would be fair to say that reception center staff are not well equipped to manage the transformation of 
what are sometimes termed ‘stubborn children’.73 As the 2005 GUSCO evaluation put it, the capacity of 
professional staff to meet the diverse needs of children and young persons at the center ‘has been limited 
in terms of personnel and training in special issues’. Staff at the center themselves drew attention to this 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Other complaints from FAPs that were recorded in interviews, but not as a response to the question about ‘worst 
things’, included feeling uncomfortable at the center because of meeting people they knew from the bush and had 
witnessed committing atrocities. Some mentioned the bad spirits (cen) other people would bring to the center. The 
spirits would force them to make funny noises at night. Some FAPs said that they were scared of people who would 
‘practice witchcraft’ in the center and turn into dogs at night. They said that those evil spirits could only have been 
stopped by a ceremony, which the center failed to perform. There were also complaints about people who were 
brought to the center although they have never been to the bush and ‘yet they are going to benefit from the training.’ 
73 In one exchange a social worker berated a group of children in the following way: 
‘Please try to behave, we do not want to look after stubborn children, and stop this habit of threatening people by 
telling about what you can do to them or whatever you did to others in the bush. Do you think you will manage 
living in the community if you talk like that? Nobody will want you and you will have nowhere to go but come back 
here. This is how we will catch those of you who are so naughty and disobedient. Look at those who were good 
children while they were still here. All the staff like them. It is easy to help such children when they are in need. But 
if you are disobedient, nobody will want to help you and you will not be liked much because you left a bad 
reputation behind you.’ 
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issue in feedback sessions, and also referred to the problem of staff ‘burn out’ and the lack of mentoring.74  
It is a problem that seems to affect almost all the centers, and to be worst at the larger ones. There is also 
a tendency to assume (or hope) that in the end the families of those returning will manage to provide most 
of the necessary support, and to gloss over the problem with references to ‘psychosocial’ assistance. 
The term ‘psychosocial’ has become a catchphrase amongst agencies working in northern Uganda (not 
just the reception centers) for just about anything to do with assistance that is additional to giving FAPs 
food. It appears to have become a prerequisite for funding proposals to mention it. A misleading aspect of 
its use is that it implies that psychotherapeutic care is being made available. This is not the case.  
Although ‘counseling’ is frequently emphasized by reception center staff and in aid agency reports, this 
research team found that no psychotherapeutic ‘counseling’ is occurring, or at least not in the way that the 
notion of psychotherapeutic ‘counseling’ is generally understood in, for example, Europe or the US. 
There are no trained psychiatrists or psychotherapists working at any of the centers on a regular basis, and 
no facilities or even time for something that might approximate to psychotherapeutic treatment.  
A survey amongst reception center staff showed that most social workers had a diploma qualification 
(41 percent), followed by a Bachelor’s degree (33 percent). Of the social workers, only 41 percent said 
that they had received specific counseling training, 37 percent were trained in psychosocial support. The 
same survey showed most non-social workers at the centers (nurses, caregivers, cooks, social worker 
volunteer) had usually not undergone any specific training for work at the reception center (only 
33 percent  reported that they had received training in psychosocial support, 30% were trained in 
counseling). Yet, 52 percent of the non-social workers said that their main activity in working with the 
FAPs was ‘counseling’.75  
All the centers offer what they call ‘counseling’, but what this means in practice is talking to the FAPs 
collectively and sometimes also individually, and offering instruction and advice. At some centers this has 
a strong Christian component to it, at others it is more secular, or may emphasise local rites of healing. 
There follows a discussion of ‘counseling’ drawn mainly from observations and discussions at the two 
main reception centers in Gulu: GUSCO and World Vision and at the small CCF center at Pader. 
Approaches at these centers and at several others are also summarised in the table insert. 
At GUSCO the approach to ‘counseling’ is mostly secular, although some of the staff are very committed 
Christians and this may affect the advice they offer in an informal way. At World Vision, like other faith-
based centers - such as the CCF Reception Center in Pader - there is a much clearer focus on Christian 
beliefs and values. ‘Counseling’, along with other activities at the centers, is deemed to play a useful role 
in bridging ‘life in the bush’ with ‘life in the community’. Much of the ‘counseling’ is done in groups. 
The term ‘group counseling’ does not carry the same meanings as that usually understood in 
psychotherapy. Rather it is a way of referring to group discussions among FAPs.  
At World Vision, a member of staff typically facilitates discussions on topics such as peace, 
reconciliation, and forgiveness. The topics are not chosen by the FAPs and the purpose of ‘group 
counseling’ is to (i) ‘enable children to learn from each other’ (ii) ‘to educate them on key topics’; and 
(iii) ‘to provide them with the opportunity to discuss ideas in an open forum and thereby counter feelings 
of shame which typically mount in the aftermath of spending time in the bush with the LRA.’ Some group 
sessions also involve debates. Here, children are encouraged to come up with their own topics; and a 
social worker presides – with a view to maintaining order and encouraging as many children as possible 
to speak. A favored debating topic is: ‘Is life in the bush better than life at home?’  Staff noted that many 
                                                     
74GUSCO (2005). Evaluation and Lessons Learnt 2002 - 2005. Gulu, Gulu Support the Children Organisation: pages 
28 and 97. 
75 Lorschiedter, A. (2005, unpublished). Evaluation of a Survey Among Staff in Reception Centers in Gulu, Kitgum, 
Pader, Lira, Apac, Soroti and Katakwi Districts, Martin-Luther Universitaet Halle-Wittenberg, Germany. 
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of them think it is. The reasons FAPs give include the following:(i) that they were free to walk around in 
the bush (ii) there were no parents telling them when to go and dig, and (iii), in the bush they did not have 
to go to school and be with strict teachers. 
At CCF, the orientation towards Christian teaching is overt. ‘Group counseling’ is done in so-called 
‘domestic discussion’, mainly because it is supposed to prepare the FAPs for their life back home. Some 
of them were abducted before the population moved into camps and they need to be prepared for that very 
different life. Girls get special ‘counseling’ on relationships in the family and the role of women. 
‘Counseling’ is based on the Bible and the director explained how she has had to defend herself against 
assumptions that she is recruiting children as born-again Christians. She said that children from the bush 
sometimes remark that they don’t ‘pray properly’ at CCF. The 90 minutes that are allocated to prayer 
daily are nothing compared to the ten hours Kony made them pray before a fight.  
It is quite possible that being taught to pray a different way or a better way than in the bush is helpful. 
Many children who passed through World Vision Gulu, for example, highlighted prayer as one of the best 
things about their time at the center. The main difference between the praying the children experience in 
the bush and in the center was explained at CCF: ‘In the bush, the children are encouraged to surrender 
their life to God, since they can never know if they will survive the next day. While at CCF, we 
encourage them to use the Bible only as a tool in their life.’ A difference from the Gulu-based centers is 
that at CCF the FAPs are encouraged to go to church outside the center. The director commented that she 
wanted them to be out and about in a normal setting before they go home.  
‘Group counseling’ at GUSCO has a slightly more open-ended quality. Sessions take place in the open, 
under a mango tree in the compound. According to GUSCO staff, the purpose is to help children at the 
center address ‘general fears’, which are said to typically include: ‘recurring nightmares and fears of 
acceptance when they go home’. Common issues raised at these ‘counseling’ sessions are: ‘I don’t have 
school fees.’ and ‘when are you sending me back home?’ Staff explained to the research team that most 
children are looking for ‘reassurance and hope’.  
Staff members are meant to ‘monitor each child’s contribution closely … making a mental note of the 
questions they raise; the responses they give and their overall participation.’ If a difficult, individual issue 
crops up then these are often followed up with the relevant social worker as soon as the group 
‘counseling’ is completed that day. Interestingly, FAPs are not encouraged to talk about their time in the 
bush during group sessions. Issues arising from this are addressed in individual ‘counseling’ sessions. 
GUSCO also runs ‘family talk’ sessions. This takes place on a Sunday morning and is carried out with the 
central administrator. He encourages children to ask them whatever questions they wish and to tell him 
about the things they do not like at the center (with a view to finding ways to improve or alter them in the 
future). It is a forum for children to say, for example, that they have mislaid or lost clothes, or that they 
need more soap etc. Sometimes girls and boys are also invited to discuss issues separately.  
The term ‘individual counseling’ also carries different meanings to that usually understood in 
psychotherapy. The term at World Vision is used to convey the fact that a social worker tries to spend 
time with a child on his or her own. This is done to elicit the full story of their abduction and time in the 
bush. These individual ‘counseling’ sessions borrow from some aspects of clinical counseling: they are 
non-judgmental and every effort is made to help the FAP recognize the emotions aroused by their time in 
the bush. This is deemed to be cathartic. To quote the director of the center: ‘if a problem is not spoken 
about, it swells … counseling is cathartic.’    
At GUSCO the team was told that ‘individual counseling’ is not attempted until the child has spent at 
least two weeks at the reception center. It is not compulsory, but strongly encouraged. FAPs are asked to 
talk to social workers if they have ‘any problems’. These include: ‘thinking a lot about the past’; 
‘problems at the reception center’; ‘problems at home’; ‘a desire to go home.’ Most FAPs go once or 
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twice a week, and a small number go daily. The aim of the sessions is two-fold: (i) to help children 
recognize and face their difficulties (and the fears that may go with them) and (ii) to establish a 
relationship with the social worker that will follow them up on their return to the IDP camps – although 
individual follow-up has not actually happened in any systematic way for the majority of FAPs who have 
passed through the center. 
Like at World Vision, an important purpose of individual ‘counseling’ sessions with a designated social 
worker is to encourage the child to talk freely about their experiences in the bush. The assumption is that, 
however awful their experiences, there is merit in creating a space for FAPs to tell an adult the full details 
of their experiences and the range of emotions involved (fear, excitement, terror, pleasure or whatever 
they may be). Staff try to create an atmosphere of trust and to go out of their way to be non-judgmental 
and to demonstrate an appreciation that human beings, whatever their age, sometimes do terrible and 
murderous acts, under duress and the fear or threat that they too will be killed, if they do not commit 
atrocity after atrocity.  
One of the research team members who has considerably experience and knowledge of psychoanalytic 
therapy, asked GUSCO staff if they were sure that what they were doing was really appropriate. How 
could they be sure that they were not making things worse for the child? How could they be sure that it 
would not be better to encourage the FAP to forget all the awful things they had had to do in the bush? 
Was it really appropriate to model sessions, without any appropriate training, on those which have been 
developed mainly in Europe and North America over many decades, and for people with different 
backgrounds, outlooks and experiences?  
The response was interesting and took this form: ‘we cannot prove in an empirical way that it is effective, 
but the informal feedback that we get suggests that it is useful. Children returning to their families in the 
camps often go on to take up leadership positions within the camp; and they are often praised for their 
outlooks and behavior.’ In response to questions about the reception centers promoting a psychological 
healing agenda that are overly influenced by Western models, even if they do not replicate Western 
therapeutic practices, staff typically say  ‘but it works’ and ‘the evidence proves that people who talk, 
move on more quickly’. Perhaps this is the case, but there is no good evidence to confirm it, and there are 
other reasons why FAPs may feel that talking in a certain way about their time with the LRA is useful or 
necessary. It is one of the ways in which they can try to secure resources and also make a case for being 
released from the center. 
Insert: Overview of Counseling Approaches in Reception Centers 
Center Approach to ‘Counseling’ and Related Issues 
AACAN • 4 weeks training for ‘counselors’ (basic ‘counseling’, how to calm down a child with 
flashbacks/ nightmares) 
• Staff is discouraged to spend too much time alone with a child 
• Psychosocial ‘counseling’ training provided by TPO based on the following model:  
- Empowerment of the client / building trust 
- Attentive listening/ probing / encouraging feelings / giving comfort and support  
- Work plan / implementing the work plan/ ending relationship to ‘counselor’ 
• Level of trauma of a child assessed through questionnaire: interactions, response to 
center activities 
• Terminology of ‘post-traumatic stress syndrome’ and ‘psychosocial problems’  
CCF • Individual/ group ‘counseling’/ Christian teaching 
• Group ‘counseling’ is done in ‘domestic discussions’ 
• Special ‘counseling’ for girls on relationships/ role of women 
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Center Approach to ‘Counseling’ and Related Issues 
CPA Kitgum • Take away feelings of guilt, suggesting that time with the LRA was in a different life   
• Clients are told that even after all that happened, they still have the capacity to have a 
good life 
• Girls tend to keep quiet during group sessions 
• ‘Counselors’ find it difficult to assess the individual’s progress in group sessions 
• Group ‘counseling’ is playful/ using games 
• FAPs are taught basic behavioral skills because ‘these are adults who have the capacity 
of children’ 
GUSCO • Mental well-being is assessed through observation of interaction: withdrawal is seen as 
sign of trauma 
• Length of stay at center much debated: no consensus on desirable length, decided on 
case by case  
• Time spent at GUSCO is influenced by the child’s physical, social and emotional well-
being  
• Children are encouraged to talk to social workers about any problems  
• Staff try to create a non-judgmental atmosphere of trust  
KCV • ‘Counseling’ approach based on behavioral patterns (absent-mindedness, aggressive 
behavior) 
• Christian teaching: forgiveness is important 
• Group discussion, individual ‘counseling’, drama and art 
KICWA • Group ‘counseling’/ life skills education 
• Length of stay depends on how traumatized a child is assessed to be by ‘counselors’ 
World Vision 
Gulu 
• Guilt and shame seen as signs of low self-esteem  
• Group ‘counseling’: discussion on peace; reconciliation; and forgiveness  
• Individual ‘counseling’: non-judgmental, allowing emotions to surface  
• Christian teaching 
 
Data needed to make a rigorous assessment of the effect of ‘counseling’ at the centers is simply 
unavailable. However, there are reasons to be cautious to view counseling as equivalent to psychotherapy 
and the psychological healing associated with it.76 
Forgiveness and the hand of God underpin many of the responses that staff make to children at the center. 
Also, social workers go out of their way not to encourage children and adults to dwell on feelings of guilt 
and self-blame that may be aroused when they talk about their experiences in the bush. Indeed, they are 
                                                     
76 While taking into account that many FAPs appreciated the reception centers as a safe haven in which they 
received personal attention, there are some issues worth considering. How is it possible for a child that has endured 
many years in the bush to walk into a reception center and pour their heart out about all the things they have seen, 
witnessed and/or perpetrated? It is one thing for an adult at the center to encourage FAPs to think that they are in 
safe hands and quite another for them to believe that they really are. Indeed, the evidence points to the contrary. 
FAPs often have to be coaxed to eat. They fear the staff may be poisoning their food and the only way to convince 
them otherwise is to encourage them to prepare the food and then eat it with the staff. This response is common 
among FAPs recently returned from the bush. It follows, then, that FAPs are likely to be skeptical of the ‘trust me’, 
‘talk freely’, ‘offload your burden’ scenario. They know they will be returned to their families in the camps and that 
life in the camps is insecure. Allegiances come and go and how are they meant to know whether the reception center 
staff are colluding with the UPDF or, come to that, the LRA? The FAPs have had no pre-existing relationship with 
staff so, how, and on what basis, should they decide that they are only there to help children? The centers will not 
provide a safe environment in a few weeks time, so what is the basis of their commitment?  
Staff at the centers are in a position of considerable authority over the FAPs. It is they who decide when a person is 
‘normal’ enough to leave the center. Participant observation research at the centers suggested that the FAPs learn to 
say and behave in the correct way in order to achieve various ends, including release from the center, if that is what 
they want. We found that many quickly learn that they should tell their stories in particular ways, and we also came 
across some cases where we were told stories that appeared to have been ‘borrowed’ from other FAPs. 
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given a clear message that they are not in any way culpable for the awful deeds they may have committed 
in the bush.  
The Director of World Vision provided a good example of this: ‘Boys in the bush are sometimes made to 
lick the blood of those they have killed. Some react in a positive way to this kind of experience and some 
react in a negative way.’ Our researcher asked him if he could say more about what he felt was a positive 
response. He replied along the lines that the child who felt able to say: ‘I licked the blood, spat it out, it 
happened and life goes on’ demonstrates a positive coping mechanism; whereas the child who says ‘I feel 
so bad that I’ve killed’ is not coping well. They will go on to be depressed, drink and even to commit 
suicide. 
Yet is it not a completely reasonable response to want to reflect on one’s own agency (or lack of) when 
undertaking dreadful acts? It is far from convincing that all you have to do to ‘heal’ is acknowledge that it 
happened and move on. It may well be that the reception centers do not have the capacity to do more than 
they are doing, but that does not mean that what they are doing is necessarily desirable. 
The research team found that few of those interviewed at the centers had much that was positive to say 
about ‘counseling’. In interviews they rarely distinguished between group and individual sessions, and the 
most common answer to questions such as ‘did you find the ‘counseling’ sessions helpful?’ was ‘not 
really’ or ‘no’.  
However, these responses on counselling were not replicated in the survey of those who had passed 
through reception centers and are now mostly living in the IDP camps. Those who pointed out a best 
thing about the reception center were overwhelmingly positive about ‘counseling’. They did not 
necessarily experience it as ‘therapeutic’, but they found it useful. It was perceived as loving parental-like 
care and a form of instruction or teaching about how they should live their lives.  
Of course, in certain respects this is not dissimilar to the instruction or teaching that they had received in 
the bush. The information imparted at the reception centers clearly outlines a moral code appropriate to 
living in the IDP camps, and indicates what FAPs have to do to be accepted. Many IDPs also appreciated 
having someone show an interest in them, and demonstrate a willingness to take what they have to say 
seriously.  
The research team which mostly spent time at the reception centers have been impressed at the care and 
kindness offered by some staff members. The team’s impression is that this was hugely appreciated by 
quite a large number of FAPs. Again it is perhaps worth observing that this interest and concern mirrors 
observations made by some FAPs about life in the bush. Many of them will comment about how things 
improved for them when a certain commander showed an interest in them. It is striking that a large 
percentage of the ‘child mothers’ interviewed would only have positive things to say about the men they 
had been given to as ‘husbands’. This observation may sound more provocative than it is intended to be. 
The point is simply that in the circumstances that FAPs have lived their lives, a person being sympathetic 
to them is something remarkable. 
When it comes to the decisions made by staff at the reception centers about the state of FAPs mental 
health, this is more to do with their social behavior than anything else. FAPs have to behave in certain 
ways to be designated normal enough for release into the community. One reception center staff 
explained that being ‘normal’ means not behaving in any way that is considered strange by the staff: not 
talking at all, keeping to themselves, being rude and disobedient, threatening others, being forgetful or 
lost in thoughts.  
Some staff are quite defensive about their approach to ‘counseling’. They are adamant that the 
‘counseling’ they provide facilitates psychological healing and that it is an integral part of the FAPs 
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‘reintegration’. However, psychological healing and learning how to behave appropriately are two very 
different things. While the ‘counseling’ that is being offered right now has certainly taught behavioral 
skills to FAPs, the research team interviewed FAPs who have very disturbing attitudes about their 
‘abduction’ experience and time with the LRA – such as openly stating that killing was ‘nice’. 
‘Counseling’ has not healed these individuals, and some people who behave in a ‘normal’ way could pose 
a danger when they find themselves in a stressful situation.  
It needs to be added here that there are also different voices within the reception center system about the 
assertions being made about ‘counseling’ and healing. Like the team members who carried out research in 
the reception centers on the issue, the Director of CCF was skeptical about the psychotherapeutic 
discourse. She tries to avoid it at her center. In her view, ‘counseling’ is useful, but only goes so far in 
facilitating reintegration:  
‘The most important ingredient of reintegration is a strong social network in the camp 
and a liveable economic situation…. Donors build too much on psychosocial well being 
based on Western concepts. The children become so sensitized towards possible bad 
behavior they might experience in the community that they go home extremely negative 
and might at times even incite bad sentiments. The emphasis is at times wrong. Children 
need to be prepared for a bad life in the camps, but not for a bad community.’ 
Similarly staff at CARITAS have made the following observations about ‘counseling’ in a recent paper. 
Counseling, as it is done in the Northern Ugandan context, means ‘in the first place to be a good listener 
and give the client space to express his/her suffering if he/she wishes to do so. At the same time we stress 
the importance of exploring and recognizing his/her strength, personal and social resources and 
opportunities.’ However, ‘pretending to train ‘counselors’ in the course of one or two weeks might at the 
end not only compromise professional standards, but also risks to harm the so called ‘counselor’ and the 
counseled clients.’77 
3.5 APPROACHES TO FOLLOW-UP 
Evaluating how effective reception centers are in facilitating ‘reintegration’ is impossible. None of the 
reception centers has carried out adequate follow-up investigations of those who have passed through, and 
at the time of this research some of them do not have a database on which to base such a process. 
Activities performed at the centers have not been judged in terms of data on outcomes. It has simply not 
been a priority for staff although it has been of more concern to donors. This has lead to the adoption of 
some policies, such as ‘counseling’, by all the centers, without any serious effort to coordinate practices 
or find out if they have been effective. Most of the centers do not even know where those that they have 
assisted are currently living. As the numbers of returnees decrease and reception centers have more 
capacity to tackle community work, the lack of follow-up or the lack of a clear idea about what it is 
supposed to achieve now tends to be recognized by reception center staff themselves as the gravest 
oversight in their ‘reintegration’ work. Reasons for the lack of follow-up have included the security 
situation, as well as lack of transport, staff or funds. Also there were other issues at the centers, which 
were more pressing.  
Centers are now trying to catch up on this, but the very low number of respondents who had actually been 
followed-up with proves that there is a long way to go. From the 238 interviews of FAPs in the sample 
and their families, only 31 had been followed up in any way (13 percent). This includes visits from the 
reception center they passed through; home visits by community volunteers and in some cases also visits 
by researchers. Some clients reported that a person had been in the camp to look for them while they were 
                                                     
77Harlacher, T. and A. C. Obonyo (2005). ‘Psychosocial Work’ and ‘Trauma Work’ in Northern Uganda. Seminar 
on Psychosocial and Trauma Work. Cologne, Germany. 
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out digging. Some refer to a visit as ‘follow-up’ when they are collected by the reception center to go 
back for skills training, others when they were singled out for sponsorship for school fees. Of those who 
have not been individually followed up, some report that center staff come to the camp to visit, but not to 
speak specifically to them. A handful of FAPs have been visited by both reception center staff and 
Community Volunteer Counselors (CVCs). 
At the time of this research, there was no clear approach to follow-up, and no agreed indicators that could 
be used in determining a client’s well-being and living environment. There was also no established 
program of intervention if problems were detected. While various agencies had in the past carried out 
‘home visits’, outreach ‘counseling’ (some even claim to have provided therapy in their follow-up), 
assessment of an individual’s well-being or provision of other services, little had happened between the 
collapse in security in mid-2002 up until the end of 2005. However, now that the numbers of FAPs 
arriving at reception centers has slowed down, there is a renewed focus on the issue, and those involved 
have been working to clarify terminology and content. Many questions need to be answered: What does 
follow-up actually mean? What is it supposed to achieve and how can the achievement or even the 
process be documented and measured? How often should it happen? Should there be a unified 
methodology to follow-up, subscribed to by all agencies involved? What are the elements of follow-up, 
such as ‘counseling’, home visits, facilitating communication in the community, and making referrals? 
Factors of good follow-up for successful ‘reintegration’ mentioned by various agencies or reception 
centers were: 
• Achieving a livable economic situation/ income generation activity for the client 
• Ensuring security (possibly through better cooperation with the UPDF) 
• Providing psychosocial support or help in developing a strong social network 
• Donor agencies’ commitment to community work/ funding for community follow-up 
• Clear definitions of what the problems are in the ‘reintegration’ process, so that solutions can be 
offered during follow-up 
• Facilitation of community communication and parent sensitization 
• Providing clients with a perspective that things can get better in the future 
 
These mirror the kinds of response found among FAPs and their families in the camps. There is also now 
a consensus that ‘reintegration’ requires continued support of those who have been in the bush, regardless 
of whether or not they have passed through a center. Ideally, follow-up also means giving those who have 
been with the LRA the resources to generate an income. This is possibly the most important aspect of 
‘reintegration’ and it has been overlooked in the past. Both social workers and FAPs emphasize that 
having hope and expectations for the future is absolutely vital in leaving the experience of the bush 
behind. Life outside the bush needs to provide a viable alternative to life in the bush. 
Case Study: Follow-Up in Kitgum District 
 
This case study is based on extensive interviews with reception center staff and several field visits. 
 
The two reception centers in Kitgum have only recently been able to do follow-up because of lack of 
transportation. UNICEF, offering space in their convoy vehicle, now facilitates transportation. At times, 
the centers have paid for their own escorts when they were unable to get a ride with UNICEF. This 
renewed commitment shows that staff places a strong emphasis on fieldwork. Both centers work on a 
rigid follow-up schedule, devoting a lot of their time traveling to camps to do home visits. This often 
includes all staff, even the medical staff. 
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However, the current set-up in Kitgum makes it almost impossible for follow-up to be done in any 
meaningful way. Travel to camps is only done with escorts or in a convoy. The convoy hardly ever leaves 
Kitgum Town Council before 10 am or even later. Usually, the delegation arrives at a camp at around 
midday and leaves the camp at 3pm at the very latest. The delegation only gets a few hours in the camp. 
These are filled with introductions, locating their clients, gathering community leaders to find out about 
other cases and problems which may not be known to the reception center, talking to CVCs to get a 
briefing on the current situation, sometimes reuniting a person with their family and spending time with 
the clients to learn about their problems and providing some guidance (or what is most commonly 
referred to as ‘counseling’).  
 
Most staff have an established system of splitting tasks. They branch out immediately upon arrival in the 
camp, but the tight schedule makes it virtually impossible to devote enough attention to individual cases. 
It is at most possible to note down a few basic complaints or problems, but it is certainly outside the scope 
of such follow-up work to provide proper ‘counseling’.  
 
Confidentiality during follow-up is a huge issue. With such little time to do actual work in the camps, 
social workers have to rely on quick assistance by camp leaders in locating clients. The arrival of the 
convoy usually draws a crowd and there is certainly a lot of attention being paid to every move of the 
social workers going through the camps. It is near impossible to not draw attention to those that are 
visited by social workers or other researchers, automatically singling out FAPs.  
 
Other agencies’ follow-up works with a different set-up, mainly because they do not need to rely on 
transportation from UNICEF. Some agencies work more closely with the CVCs or other community 
structures in the camp and mainly process referrals for other services. While such referrals are desperately 
needed, this structure is far from anything that could be called organized follow-up. Most of the agencies 
providing services do not share information with the reception centers and are thus not familiar with 
individual case histories. Also, agencies often simply have to work with incomplete data: in many cases, 
forms are not filled out properly and thus only provide an incomplete picture of a client’s situation. There 
has only recently been better communication between agencies to coordinate the work done in the camps.  
 
3.5.1 THE FOLLOW-UP EXPERIENCE 
Of the 13 percent of interviewed FAPs in the sample reporting that they had received a follow-up visit, 
the vast majority had received only one. A few special cases report regular follow-up: One man suffering 
from repercussions (black-outs, dangerous behavior) of a serious head injury had been visited five times 
by a social worker from the center, in addition to weekly visits from the CVC. Another woman with 
medical problems had been visited four times by reception center staff, who told her that ‘if there was no 
improvement I should go and get a hospital form [hospital bill clearance] from the center so that I can go 
to the hospital for proper treatment.’ But these were exceptional cases.  
Most of those followed-up simply described being visited and not much else (‘I then told him I was okay 
and that nothing suppressed me’). Others were given some reassurance or advice (e.g. ‘they encouraged 
me to keep on going and to be disciplined’ and ‘a counselor from GUSCO, asked how often I fought at 
school.’). But those FAPs who complained about a problem usually see little change after the follow-up 
visit (‘They asked me how I am coping with the community and I tell them my problem, all my problems 
[this particular client was very unhappy about staying with his alcoholic brother-in-law]. They wrote it 
down and said they would come back.’). Nevertheless, simply being given attention, talking with a person 
was sometimes much appreciated by the respondents, even if they expected no further assistance (‘I told 
her that I have been having bad dreams but now it has disappeared.’). The problems most often mentioned 
during follow-up were the lack of things to do in general, lack of income, and lack of schooling. 
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Often the intention of follow-up does not seem entirely clear to the client (‘One man and some women 
came also to write our names, they said they were sent by KICWA… We were followed up once by some 
white lady…they took his [the FAP’s] picture and asked what problems he is facing from home.’). In 
many cases, respondents said that follow-up is done as a group exercise. A number of FAPs are gathered 
to voice their grievances to the visitor (‘She told us that she has come to follow-up and see how we are 
staying so we can tell her our problems. We told them that if we would get any skills training, it would be 
good.’). Considering the numbers of researchers who have passed through certain camps (including this 
research team), it is not surprising that the purpose of follow-up visits can be obscure.  
3.5.2 FOLLOW-UP AND THE COMMUNITY 
‘The community now sees as if our culture is eroded because we only have killers among 
us, hence no proper families. There is no hope for the community because they do not 
have homes and see any hope in having security.’  
—Volunteer Counselor   
At present, numerous different agencies are doing various bits and pieces of follow-up. This can create 
tension in a community since not everyone is treated equally. Tension ranges from stigmatization, 
because of the special attention given to an FAP, to drawing LRA attention to someone in the camp, 
because of continued visits. At times, problems arise because other families are mourning their losses 
(‘The formerly abducted children are a big problem in the community because their coming back has 
created tension in the community especially for the parents whose children/child has/have not come back 
may be they could have been killed or have not come back yet.’). 
While some respondents report such attitudes, others indicated that communities can also be welcoming. 
One social worker, in fact, pointed out that a return to the family is in some cases only possible because 
neighbors provide informal humanitarian services when the family lacks resources.  
Reception center staff and IDP officials are well aware that such support networks need strengthening, but 
that follow-up visits are too random or infrequent to really tackle problems of any kind. There were also 
numerous complaints that reports are being written and passed on between agencies, CVCs and the 
CDO’s office but nothing seems to happen. It was speculated that they were hardly ever read.  
There is now a general move amongst agencies towards a more holistic definition of follow-up: it should 
consider and evaluate the condition of the individual as well as the community. Such community-based 
follow-up needs to address problems of all vulnerable people as opposed to an individual that has a 
connection with a reception center. However, the consensus is less clear when it comes to defining what 
follow-up aims to do beyond gathering information. This may be because of unclear information about 
what assistance is available and who is responsible for providing it. If the aim of follow-up is defined as 
improving the individual’s and the community’s living situation, how can that be achieved?  
Many camp leaders and CVCs point out that there is much need for support of those who have been in the 
bush but have not passed through a center. However, continued assistance is vital also for those who have 
received reception center ‘counseling’ and a package. FAPs return home with the comforting knowledge 
that someone from the center will come to check on them. They had been told that the centers would be 
there to support them – and often they are not.  
Some CVCs or camp leaders have pointed out that they had been promised further visits by reception 
center staff to check on problems with the returnee in the community and felt helpless when such visits 
never materialized. One CVC put it succinctly when she said, ‘Follow-up is just a way of making the 
abductees know that they are loved and cared for by the community so that they feel that togetherness.’ 
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Often, IDP camp officials and community leaders state that they lack status because they have no 
resources for their work. One camp leader in a camp without any CVCs said that ‘we should organize a 
kind of ‘counseling’ for these children provided that we [camp leaders] attain some training from NGOs 
responsible for such…We as leaders need the following things to welcome these children: We need a 
‘counseling’ center. We need to give them some gifts after ‘counseling’ but we can’t afford to do so…if 
we have gifts, food and drinks all the others will come back and those counseled will get well.’ Such a 
remark seems to reflect that the community feels that the reception center approach should be mirrored 
after the FAPs return to their communities – in any case, resources are persistently stressed as a 
prerequisite for being able to act effectively.  
3.5.3 COMMUNITY NETWORKS  
Various centers have established their own support networks to do social work in the camps to help them 
identify vulnerable persons. These networks are sometimes based on a particular commitment to the 
center (CPA Parent Support Network) or a shared faith (CARITAS). Another project which is ostensibly 
community based and has had a link with GUSCO is the controversial Labora Farm (see Appendix 3). 
Many agencies and reception centers rely on the existent network of Community Volunteer Counselors or 
Caregivers78 (CVCs) for their follow-up work for obvious reasons: the CVCs are locally based  and 
volunteering has been a part of community work in Africa in various other contexts, although it is now 
increasingly challenged as an appropriate response in an emergency context. While the CVC set-up 
differs from district to district – also depending on which agency originally set up the system, they are 
generally registered and monitored through the Community Development Officer (CDO) or Community 
Based Services. Community Development Assistants are also employed by the district to assist the 
CVCs.79 Most CVCs have at some point received some training, often provided through UNICEF, Save 
the Children, the reception centers, religious organizations or other NGOs. Some of this training dates 
back years, even before the community moved into camps and refresher training beyond the monthly 
CVC meetings has been sporadic. 
The original concept of the CVC differs much from the current requirements. Originally, CVCs were 
appointed to provide community support in a war-torn, yet village-based society. Nowadays, CVCs are in 
many cases supposed to be the social workers in an extremely volatile community with very demanding 
individual cases. However, the CDOs generally feel that the CVCs are the only option since most NGOs 
cannot reach communities easily.  
CVCs are not provided with any salary, but may receive an allowance for ‘facilitation.’ With the current 
workload, it is a huge problem that these are volunteers who also need to support themselves. More often 
than not, they do not receive facilitation for transport to travel to another camp or to CVC meetings. 
However, it has become known that in practice material gains can be made from volunteering and this has 
become an incentive to become a CVC. There are cases of people who volunteer for various agencies to 
receive the CVC package.  
How the CVCs are seen in the community varies greatly from camp to camp and even in each district. 
While in some camps, they are committed and well known to the FAPs and the community; in others they 
are basically invisible. FAPs have not heard of them and camp leaders did not know they still existed. A 
few CVCs explained that it is extremely difficult for them to be accepted by the community as a serious 
resource because in the past, they have not been able to deliver any change or resources. On the other 
hand, in some cases the community is reluctant to work with the CVC because, as one CVC put it, ‘the 
                                                     
78 There is a difference in usage of the term in various districts. 
79 The CDA are few and far between: 13 CDAs cover 19 sub counties in Kitgum.  
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community sometimes don’t understand who I am. Sometimes they refuse me to sign attendance list in 
some meeting because they expect me to be demanding money.’ 
CVCs are used by various agencies for various types of work and this potentially renders them inefficient. 
Most respondents agree that a vast number of people deliberately bypass the system and go home directly 
after escaping from the LRA without going through the UPDF or a Reception Center. CVCs are expected 
to report those returnees to the local authorities, making it impossible to establish trust in the community. 
When the research team pointed out this conflict of interest, one CDO replied that this was not a problem 
since most returnees did not know that the CVCs are sending on their information to the sub-county and 
hence, no confidentiality is breached. Yet in some districts, such as Lira, the connection between the CDO 
and the CVCs is very strong and the CVCs seem to advise the majority of returnees not to go through 
reception centers.  
While many social workers still support the concept of the CVCs, they also agree that CVCs cannot be 
the main pillar of follow-up and ‘reintegration’ work in the camps. There are various reasons for this. The 
task is seen as simply too big for community volunteers. According to CVCs  interviewed, the numbers of 
FAPs for whom they are responsible range from 146 to 400 per CVC. Often, the CVCs are expected to 
deal with extremely difficult cases and there is an unwritten consensus that they are not able to provide 
the level of professionalism needed for such demanding social work. At best they can provide sympathy 
and a person to talk to. To rely on volunteers in the volatile camps is now seen by many social workers as 
ignoring the reality of the situation.  
In many cases, the CVCs are only in theory part of the information chain. This may be because of an 
agency’s fears that CVCs might demand payment for their work or simply lack of trust. Some CVCs are 
quite isolated in their work: they feel that centers do not give them enough information about the 
returnees. Several CVCs pointed out that they did not know who to turn to if there are real problem cases. 
While the active CVCs were aware of the reporting structure, it often does not work: CVCs complained 
about writing their regular reports to the CDO without any feedback whatsoever. Most CVCs say that 
even if they ask for services for a client, it is not delivered. When the team asked a CDO to see these CVC 
reports, he was not able to say where they were being filed. How closely a CVC works with the reception 
center varies greatly: it runs from no contact at all to ‘a very close relationship with [the reception center] 
because I am like their eyes in the community here to see what happens and give them the report.’ 
Mostly, the contact seems to be loose and poorly defined. 
CVCs receive limited training, which is seen as a problem by all parties involved. While some CVCs 
answered that they feel well equipped to handle their ‘counseling’ duties, most pointed out that they need 
‘more knowledge of handling complicated disorders’ and generally more in-depth and ongoing training.  
One problem that arises from such limited training is that it does not leave room for nuanced approaches. 
Most CVCs reported that one of the things that they had been trained in was to ‘sensitize’ the community 
by explaining to them that the returnees are traumatized and will be difficult to deal with. This has led to 
dangerous dynamics, as reception center staff pointed out: the children are told to expect stigmatization, 
and the community is told that they are receiving disturbed and dangerous individuals. Apprehension on 
both sides leads to tension and the conflict between the FAP and the community becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. When asked about problems in the community, some CVCs pointed out that “fear” was now a 
defining factor of society: returnees are scared of the community, the community is scared of the 
returnees, and everybody is scared for their safety and worried about supplies. Working against this fear 
with limited resources is considered by most to be a battle they cannot win.  
However, there are success stories: the CVCs report that the most rewarding aspect of their work is ‘that 
there are some formerly abducted children who were very stubborn but after consistently talking to them 
they have totally changed.’ The coping mechanism that seems to work best is empowering the FAPs to 
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form their own support group to ‘develop hope’. In some camps, this has happened without any outside 
input even among children. Other groups are led by a CVC. One CVC proudly explained that after his 
advice, 60 FAPs formed a drama group and the ‘money landed are being given to other members. They 
have also managed to convince more people into their group. It now has 150 members.’ 
Some organizations run their own networks of volunteers CARITAS in Gulu District for example has 
Community Resource Persons (CRPs). The challenges felt are very similar to those of the CVCs: too little 
time to do all the work needed, not enough resources and too many demands from the community. The 
community relies on the CRPs to communicate their problems (such as hunger, lack of clean water, 
diseases, no land for cultivation) to donors and other agencies and expect changes in return that do not 
materialize. In a broad generalization, we found the CRPs to be more aware of what was expected of them 
in comparison to the CVCs, perhaps because volunteering based on faith is linked to greater commitment. 
Also the connection to CARITAS is closer than the connection the CVCs have with their CDO. However, 
a lot is expected of the CRP and we are not able to say whether these expectations are fulfilled from a 
client’s perspective. We simply did not find a client in our sample who had actually been counseled a 
CRP. Information from interviews with CARITAS CRPs is presented in Appendix 6. 
New approaches are on the horizon. In the light of the growing awareness of the need to support the 
reintegration of FAPs within a system that also responds to the welfare and protection of a range of 
extremely vulnerable children in the wider community, district authorities, NGOs and UNICEF are now 
aiming to build stronger child protection teams based in IDP camps (and the non-displaced population). 
These will be answerable to the district authorities and technically supported by NGOs, with clear 
divisions of labor and clearly defined accountabilities. The team heard how CVC systems will be 
incorporated as an element into these wider teams. Following up with FAPs will be one of their roles. 
Reception centers and their supporting NGOs are key players in setting these systems up. In Gulu 
District, for example, the system is being pioneered by World Vision and GUSCO, working with six other 
NGOs and the district officials.   
4. CONCLUSIONS 
On Reintegration 
• Assumptions about what is happening are not always supported by evidence, and perceptions are 
shaped by the use of particular categories, such as 'abduction', 'child mother' and 'reintegration', 
which deflect attention from realities.  
 
• The term 'reintegration' is problematic in northern Uganda. FAPs are being sent to live in IDP 
camps or in the towns. The conditions they face are often awful. They find themselves dependent 
on impoverished relatives, and with no viable source of income, let alone land to cultivate. 
 
• Security in the IDP camps may have improved in the past year or so, but it remains poor. FAPs 
sent back to the camps have reasons to fear that they might be recaptured by the LRA. 
 
• The system of making people live in IDP camps need to be seriously examined. The morbidity 
and mortality rates in some camps is extremely high (see Appendix 1). Other camps are located at 
small towns, with a long history of settlement. A concentration of population may remain at some 
of these places after the war ends. 
 
• Most of those who have passed through reception centers have been sent to live in IDP camps and 
have remained there. One reason for the relative lack of movement is that they have little choice. 
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Most FAPs are unable to earn enough money in their IDP camp to travel to other places, and have 
no relatives who could look after them when they arrive. Even those wanting to register for the 
Amnesty find it difficult to travel to Gulu and Kitgum towns. 
 
• The family networks to which FAPs return are complex and dynamic. The lack of bride wealth 
exchange has weakened patrilineal kinship structures. Many FAPs end up living with their 
mothers or their mother's brothers. Families are not necessarily benign environments for FAPs.  
 
• Some FAPs complained about feeling out of place in the IDP camps, and many seek out each 
others' company. 
 
• Several FAPs have undergone welcoming rituals and a few have been involved in healing rituals. 
But the research team did not find that these procedures are as important as some analysts have 
suggested. Also concerns are voiced about cen. Rituals for dealing with cen are probably more 
important than the kinds of rituals that have been given most publicity. 
 
• A complaint voiced by many FAPs is that they find it hard to have a sense of hope for the future.  
 
• By no means had all of those who have spent time with the LRA found the experience to be 
horrific. There are also those who adapted to it, and quite few FAPs are surprisingly positive 
about their life in the bush, particularly when it is compared with life in the IDP camps.  
 
• The term ‘abduction’ does not encompass the range of ways in which people go to spend time 
with the LRA. People living in IDP camps sometimes have to live with LRA activity in the 
vicinity, and respondents mentioned many cases of multiple ‘abductions’, which usually involved 
short periods with the LRA.  
 
• The involvement of adults in the war has been underestimated, partly because of concerns about 
the effect of the war on children. Probably the majority of those ‘abducted’ by the LRA have been 
adults at the time of abduction.  
 
• Although a large number of those arriving at reception centers are adults (and may also have been 
‘abducted’ as adults), the majority of adults who have been abducted do not pass through the 
reception centers or report to the UPDF. 
 
• The use of the term ‘child mothers’ for women who have been impregnated by LRA combatants 
is misleading. The majority are adults, although most were abducted as teenagers. Also the 
number of women who give birth or become pregnant before the age of 18 is very high in the 
general Ugandan population, and it likely to be higher than the national average in the IDP 
camps. 
 
• The number of women who return from the LRA with children is relatively small. It is about 5 
percent of the FAPs who have passed through reception centers. 
 
• The attitudes of women who were ‘abducted’ and made to become the sexual partner of an LRA 
commander varies. Several have been deeply disturbed by what has happened to them. However, 
others express affection for their LRA husband and want to be reunited with him.  
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On Reintegration Structures 
 
• The Government of Uganda maintains limited ownership of the reintegration process: the 
Amnesty Commission is not efficient enough to be called a viable reintegration tool and in some 
districts, district responsibilities such as monitoring of the Child Protection Units are covered by 
local NGOs.  
 
• Knowledge of child protection principles is spread too thinly in the UPDF. This leads to 
mishandling and in some cases even abuse of FAPs while in the care of the UPDF. 
 
• Child-recruitment into the LDU is occurring, although the scale is hard to estimate. Currently the 
UPDF will not accept responsibility for it.  
 
• Social workers see a need for dialogue with the UPDF to address the various issues pointed out 
here in a more direct manner. 
 
• The Amnesty Commission lacks local credibility. Its existence is not sufficient to convince FAPs 
that a life outside the LRA can be more promising than one with the rebels.   
 
• A system has been set up whereby the amnesty, which is aimed primarily at adults, is only 
accessed by a selection of FAPs who have passed through reception centers, which are primarily 
aimed at children. Obviously there are many adults who pass through reception centers, and the 
amnesty is available to anyone over the age of twelve. Nevertheless, it is not a satisfactory 
situation. 
 
• Large numbers of people go unnoticed by research and reintegration mechanisms since they 
bypass the official system. Evaluating the experience of those is necessary as it could provide 
valuable insights into community integration mechanisms that may provide guidance for 
adjusting the institutionalized approaches. 
 
On Reception Centers and follow-up 
 
• Current ‘talk therapy’ teaches behavioral skills, but does not heal psychological damage. While 
Western concepts of psychotherapy should not be simply imported, it is vital to realize that the 
current use of the term ‘counseling’ has glossed over psychological problems that many returnees 
might still have. This is a potential minefield – especially if reception centers believe that they are 
releasing FAPs who are psychologically healed and need no further treatment.  
 
• FAPs who have passed through the reception centers tend to emphasize the need for individual 
follow-up and a fair, consistent and transparent procedure for the provision of assistance. 
Currently neither of these things is done. 
 
• One reason why it is not done is that data collation at almost all the reception centers is poor, 
making it impossible to make a robust assessment of particular interventions, or indeed to 
evaluate the overall effects of the reception centers contributions to the ‘reintegration’ of FAPs. It 
also makes case-by-case monitoring unfeasible without a considerable investment in data 
management. For some centers the costs of doing this may be too high, and the records in too 
inadequate a state, to make it a tenable proposition. 
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• The majority of those who had been through a reception center had nothing bad or good to say 
about the center which was interpreted as ‘the reception center was a good place’ by the Acholi 
researchers. However, most of those who did point out specific things said that ‘counseling’ was 
one of the best things, along with entertainment. ‘Counseling’ was understood as parental-like 
care and education about how to behave. Being given empty promises for further support was the 
worst memory for a lot of respondents.  
 
• Without some common understanding of what follow-up entails and aims to achieve, systematic 
reintegration work through follow-up that assists and does not divide people is almost impossible. 
At the time of this research, FAPs visited saw little benefit of such a visit if it was not done in a 
systematic way and with some means to improve their situation.  
 
• If follow-up means gathering information about individual and community needs, lack of 
information flow is a problem. Not sharing such information between agencies can at worst 
seriously hinder community work; at best it is a waste of resources as many agencies set out to 
gather the same information. There is need to streamline information exchange between agencies. 
At the same time, information about individual cases cannot be freely distributed amongst 
stakeholders without breaching confidentiality.  
 
• Various approaches also mean differing terminology from agency to agency, making a genuine 
inter-agency approach difficult. It also reflects that agencies differ vastly in their work and 
operate under a large set of assumptions, making a standardized procedure difficult and, for some 
agencies, undesirable. The two sides of the argument are that a standardized procedure will end 
up as a stenciled approach while various approaches are less efficient and difficult to sustain in 
the long run.  
 
• Referral mechanisms are inefficient because of the lack of inter-agency work and the often 
unclear responsibilities of the district administration.  
 
• A lack of information about those who have passed through reception centers is symptomatic of a 
broader problem. Both national and international agencies involved in assisting the population of 
northern Uganda have limited connections with the IDP camps. This is partly a consequence of 
security issues, but that is not a sufficient explanation. 
 
• Meaningful follow-up work in the camps is hampered by the security situation in the conflict 
affected districts.  
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IDP camps are very densely settled. Poor hygiene, fires and insecurity are a constant problem 
(Photo: Elliott Green) 
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
• The primary recommendation of this report is that efforts must be made to improve the security 
situation and provide adequate support to both FAPs and the population as a whole when the IDP 
system is dismantled. Without improvements in security, it is unlikely that substantial 
improvements in livelihoods are possible. Donors, agencies, and the government need to work 
towards this end. Security will not be achieved without the full cooperation of the UPDF. Notion 
of humanitarian neutrality makes little sense in northern Uganda given the current arrangements. 
For the situation to improve, the UPDF will need to be fully involved in planning and 
implementation. Whatever concerns stakeholders may have about this, there is no alternative. If 
the security problems cannot be resolved locally, as appears to be the case, the Ugandan 
government should be persuaded to accept the necessary assistance. 
 
• It cannot be acceptable that hundreds of thousands of people must live in IDP camps indefinitely 
because of a few hundred poorly equipped rebels. It is not an appropriate response to the problem 
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Aid programs should not be complicit in the perpetration of structural violence. For all sorts of 
very good reasons, that has effectively happened in northern Uganda. There is an urgent need for 
a reassessment. Donors must apply the necessary pressures to change the situation.  
 
• There is need for a decision about which IDP camps are seen as permanent and which to 
dismantle immediately. Those with extremely high crude mortality rates should be broken up as 
quickly as possible. IDP camps based as small towns might be made a focus of long-term, peri-
urban development initiatives. Without such schemes, the removal of population controls is likely 
to result in migration to the main towns, because it can be expected that many of those who have 
grown up in the IDP camps will not want to live as farmers. One effect of such migrations can be 
predicted to be a rapid increase in HIV incidence. Plans should be prepared to avoid such a 
situation. 
 
• Many interventions in northern Uganda are based on received wisdoms and perpetuated ideas. 
These tend to miss the reality on the ground. For better interventions it is critical to break away 
from them, improve the knowledge base and operate with a more balanced assessment of the war. 
Information flows and connections between actors and people in IDP camps need to be improved.  
 
• Donors should address the problems involved in targeting funding at categories that are 
misleading and/or too narrow. A more integrated approach requires much better ongoing 
monitoring, not just of FAPs, but also of social dynamics in the municipalities and IDP camps. 
The plight of the FAPs needs to be placed in context, and the acute needs of other groups given 
equal weight. An emphasis on providing assistance and follow-up only to those classified as the 
most vulnerable excludes too many people who are also in dire need. 
 
• FAPs naturally found peer support groups and these have often been overlooked by agencies 
working on reintegration.  The shared experience of the LRA acts as a form of social capital and 
many FAPs gain enormous strength and support from such groups. These groups should not be 
excluded from funding. However, monitoring of such groups is necessary both to ensure that 
vulnerable individuals are not exploited (including young men as well as young women) and to 
monitor the security implications (as LRA hierarchies tend to be replicated in these groups).  
 
• The existing procedures of locating children who are FAPs with their parents or extended families 
makes adequate case by case monitoring a priority for this particular group. Safeguards are not in 
place for family screening, placement and fostering. ‘Best practice’ is not necessarily served by 
locating children with relatives in circumstances in which even basic care is so limited, and in 
which scarce resources may not be apportioned in the interests of the child. Children born to 
fathers in the LRA may be especially at risk, and so might unaccompanied children – although 
reception centers do seem to have procedures in place that should protect the latter. 
 
• New approaches are required for the use of volunteers. Those who are required to do significant 
amounts of work need to be given incentives. In most cases this will necessitate payment. 
Currently there are unrealistic expectations of what volunteers should do. It is not adequate to try 
to plug the gaps in the current system with more registered volunteers. There are already too 
many ‘volunteers’. What is needed is a network of people who can be relied upon to do certain 
things, and who feel that it is in their interest to be conscientious. However, this should not be an 
alternative to agency staff themselves being much more actively engaged in follow-up, 
monitoring and outreach, possibly through social workers that live in the camps. 
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• While the term ‘psychosocial’ is potentially helpful in that it directs attention at both 
psychological and social aspects of the situation, its current use is misleading. The term has 
become a euphemism for just about anything that is done to assist FAPs, and gives the impression 
that more is being done than is the case. There is very little capacity on the ground in northern 
Uganda to deal with mental health issues. It would be more appropriate, given the resources in 
place, to redirect emphasis to a more holistic support for livelihoods. With respect to children, it 
would be appropriate to give much more emphasis to ‘child protection’, and programming should 
not just be targeted at particular categories of children. A system is required to make adequate 
assessments of vulnerability. Certain groups may well be exposed to risk, such as children whose 
lineage status is unclear, but case-by-case assessment is required.  
 
• Where there are indications of medical problems including those associated with mental health, a 
system of referral is needed. Untrained staff providing ad hoc first aid and ‘counseling’ is not 
sufficient. If agencies decide to foreground trauma issues, adequate mechanisms of providing 
therapy are required.  
 
• The reception centers should be helped to move in different directions. Their existence provides a 
range of experienced local partners for international agencies. But concentrating on the reception 
of FAPs passing through the official system is unlikely to be as demanding as it was between 
2002 and 2004. The Rachele Center plans to turn itself into a school, and some centers may close 
down. Others, such as GUSCO in Gulu town, might develop existing activities into new areas. In 
the case of GUSCO this might involve support for income generating activities in the 
municipality as a whole. Most reception centers are willing to become involved in targeting all 
war-affected populations in their follow-up work, but will need significant investment of staff and 
resources to do so.  
 
• For effective and adequate follow-up work, a coordinated and consistent inter-agency approach is 
needed. Agencies have different philosophies about interventions and currently the transaction 
costs for this work are very high as many agencies do similar research and work without 
exchanging information.  
 
• For effective case-by-case follow-up, case files have to be made available in a useable form by 
social workers. For some centers the investment needed to do this would be substantial, and it 
may not occur. Nevertheless, it should be seriously considered. Such follow-up also requires 
adequate investment in staff training and logistical support (notably for transport and security). 
 
• For the Amnesty to function as a political tool for community reintegration, the Amnesty process 
requires reorganization. There needs to be better information and access to the Amnesty 
Commission. Giving out more commodities will increase demands for Amnesty Cards, but there 
are dangers in appearing to reward those who have perpetrated crimes. Other systems might be 
more appropriate and should be explored. For example, income-generating schemes might be 
available to all war-affected people, including FAPs with Amnesty Cards. At present there is no 
monitoring of FAPs who have been granted Amnesty. It would be appropriate to introduce this 
for former LRA officers, some of who have a complicated attitude to their lives in the bush. 
 
• Child protection training for the UPDF still needs to be improved. It is also necessary for the 
UPDF to work more closely with the Amnesty Commission and social workers, even during 
times when an FAP is being interrogated.  
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• Lastly, it is understandable that a major preoccupation of assistance programmes is the provision 
of help to the most needy. The targeting to this assitance needs to be improved, but it is also 
important to consider the future. Even with adequate assistance, few of those currently most in 
need are likely to be able to play a leadership role at a national level. An effect of the war in 
northern Uganda has been to curtail opportunities for higher education. Producing cohorts of well 
educated secondary school graduates and supporting training at university level will be necessary 
for longer-term development on the region. At present only a small elite based in the main towns 
has such opportunities. It is not fashionable for aid agencies to support secondary education, but 
broadening access has the potential to play a vital role. Model schools can transform more lives 
than those of the students who are educated at them. 
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APPENDIX 1. 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT SITUATION 
The war in northern Uganda has been dragging on for almost 20 years. This is a brief background note on 
the current situation. Readers interested in a more detailed historical account are directed to the books by 
Finnstrom (2003) and Allen (2006) or the relevant section of Allen (2005) which can be downloaded at: 
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/others/AllenICCReport.pdf 
 
The current conflict dates back to the period immediately after President Museveni came to power. A 
variety of resistance movements resisted his government, most notably the Holy Spirit Movement of 
Alice Lakwena. Following the defeat of the Holy Spirit Forces near Jinja in 1987, other groups associated 
with spirit mediums continued to fight, including one lead by a relative of Alice called Joseph Kony. This 
group become known as the Lord’s Resistance Army. It has proved to be remarkably resilient, and very 
effective at terrorising a large region of the country. From the mid 1990s it received assistance from the 
government of Sudan, and most of it bases were located north of the border. It has also waged war against 
the SPLA in Sudan, ostensibly on behalf of the Khartoum administration. In spring 2002, the Uganda 
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) undertook a military offensive into southern Sudan called ‘Operation 
Iron Fist.’ with the intention of crushing the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) once and for all. However, 
the initial campaign was a failure. The LRA was able to outflank the UPDF, and retaliated with some of 
the worst attacks on the local population since the conflict started. Since then, the LRA has continued to 
operate in the districts of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader, and in June 2003 expanded its attacks on civilians to 
neighbouring districts. The escalation of conflict has caused a drastic increase in the number of displaced 
persons. 
 
During the early years of the conflict, there had been a shifting of the population in Gulu, and Kitgum 
districts towards the larger municipalities for protection, and from the mid 1990s, this had become an 
integral component of the Ugandan government’s anti-insurgency policy. In some places, anyone who 
refused to move from their rural homes was forcibly displaced. In early 1997 World Food Program food 
relief was delivered to 110,000 people in ‘protected’ IDP (Internally Displaced Person) camps. Two years 
later this had risen to over 400,000, and by mid 2002 to 522,000.80 The numbers then escalated 
dramatically as a consequence of the LRA incursions during the first Iron Fist offensive, and new IDP 
camps were established in neighboring districts. Something like 80percent of the population of war 
affected parts of northern Uganda now live in over 200 camps. The rest live in the main towns. The total 
number of people living in IDP camps is estimated at over 1.5 million.81 
 
The IDP camps vary in size, resources and security. Some of the bigger camps are basically small towns, 
and several are in fact located at places where there have been small town for a long time (e.g. Anaka and 
Atiak). Others are new settlements, sometimes in places where a concentration of population is 
inappropriate (e.g. where the soil quickly becomes water-logged when it rains). Almost all IDPs living in 
camps have very limited access to land and few opportunities to generate income. Services have largely 
                                                     
80 These figures are from WFP and UNOCHA sources and are quoted in Dolan, C. (2005). Understanding War and 
Its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda. PhD. thesis. Development Studies Institute. London, London 
School of Economics, London University. 
81 This figure is probably an overestimate. Numbers in some camps have been declining for some time, as the 
security situation has improved in certain areas. Also there has always been a tendency for numbers to be inflated to 
increase demands for food aid. In Lira District, we were told by district officials that they had checked one camp at 
night, and found only a third of the registered number of people living there. However, this may be exceptional. In 
Gulu, Pader and Kitgum districts, camp populations appear to be more stable. 
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collapsed. There is virtually no civilian policing, inadequate water supplies and sanitation facilities. 
Health care is minimal, and primary schools are massively congested and under resourced. Secondary 
school education is only rarely available, mostly in the municipalities. Camps are also over-crowded with 
huts spaced close together, compounding sanitation problems and making fires a permanent hazard. The 
displacement, the LRA’s violent assaults on civilians, and the strategies that local people use to search for 
safety, employment and income combine to create a complex web of vulnerability. The highly visible, 
war-related human rights abuses – abduction, night commuting, sexual and gender based violence – are 
part of a much broader spectrum of serious human rights violations exacerbated by war. With each year 
spent in the IDP camps residents become increasingly dependent on food relief and more despondent as 
they watch the familial and cultural fabric of their lives deteriorate. The situation for civilians is desperate 
with frequent rebel attacks, looting, destruction of property, abduction of children and brutal killings. 
Perhaps the most thorough investigation of camp life describes the whole system as a system of 
‘protection as violation’.82 
 
 
Overflowing pit latrine at Agweng IDP Camp (Photo: Elliott Green) 
 
 
In general, the worst public health situation is in the newer camps, which can have extremely poor 
sanitation. However, outbreaks of cholera are not confined to these. Atiak is one of oldest camps, but 
continues to have outbreaks. A survey of new camps in Pader and Lira was carried out by MSF-Holland 
                                                     
82Dolan, C. (2005). Understanding War and Its Continuation: The Case of Northern Uganda. Development Studies 
Institute. London, London School of Economics, London University. 
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in 2004.83 It found a ‘severe acute malnutrition rate’ of 4.4 percent and a ‘global acute malnutrition rate’ 
of 8.28% amongst children aged 5-59 months.84 These figures are comparable to other areas of northern 
Uganda. But the survey also collected mortality and morbidity data. The overall Crude Mortality Rate 
(CMR) was 2.79/10,000/day (a rate above 1 is generally categorized as an emergency) and the under-five 
mortality rate was found to be an astonishing 5.4 (in one camp, Agweng in Lira District, it was found to 
be 10.46). The main causes of reported morbidity were malaria/fever (47 percent), respiratory diseases 
(28 percent) and diarrheal diseases (21 percent) – all closely associated with the living environment. 
‘Malaria’ was the main reported cause of death, followed by ‘diarrhea’. In July 2005 a further survey was 
carried out, this time under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO). It was designed to be 
representative of all IDPs in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts. The CMR for all IDPs was found to be 
1.54, and the under five CMR was 3.18.85  
 
Several reports have also addressed the incidence and prevalence of HIV/AIDS, with some claiming that 
rates have been exploding as a consequence of the war and concentration of the population. This has 
become a piece of received wisdom about the region. However, evidence for the claim is weak. Not all 
bad things necessarily go together. Anti-natal rates recorded at Lacor in Gulu, among other indicators, 
suggest that rates have been declining steeply since the mid 1990s. It may be that the very constraints on 
social life in the IDP camps, which are in so many respects unacceptable, have had the effect of limiting 
the spread of the virus. But this may not last. It is very important to recognize that those at highest risk for 
HIV infection in Africa are migrants to urban areas. If the IDP camps are broken up suddenly, and 
thousands of people make for the towns, HIV rates can be expected to soar.86 
Illustration: Districts of Northern Uganda Affected by the LRA 
Total IDP population (April/July 2005): approximately 1.5 million living in over 250 IDP camps 
(excluding unregistered IDPs) 
Breakdown by districts 
Districts with a predominantly Acholi population 
Gulu District: total IDP population (July 2005) 460,226 living in 53 IDP camps 
Kitgum District: total IDP population (July 2005) 310,111 living in 22 IDP camps 
Pader District: total IDP population 283,781 (April 2005) living in 26 IDP camps 
Districts with a predominantly Langi population 
Apac District: total IDP population (July 2005) 98,193 living in 15 IDP camps 
Lira District: total IDP population (July 2005) 350,828 living in 40 IDP camps  
Districts with a predominantly Teso population 
Katakwi District: total IDP population (April 2005) approximately 140,000 living in 82 IDP 
camps 
                                                     
83MSF-Holland (2004). Internally Displaced Camps in Lira and Pader, Northern Uganda: A Baseline Survey, 
Preliminary Report. Uganda, Medicines sans frontieres Holland.  
84These data are based on anthropometric assessments. The findings from such surveys are useful, but can be very 
misleading if they are not linked to mortality assessments. Malnutrition figures of the levels found in camps in Pader 
and Lira might indicate an ‘acceptable’ situation, in that similar levels are found in other places. However, this may 
disguise the number of children who are dying. A high mortality rate for small children will mean that more food is 
available for those who survive. From the morality data collected by MSF-Holland, that would appear to be the case 
in this instance. 
85WHO and T. R. o. U. M. o. Health (2005). Health and Mortality Survey Among Internally Displaced Persons in 
Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts, Northern Uganda, World Health Organization. These findings have been 
questioned by the Ugandan Ministry of Health, even though the ministry was involved in the data collection. The 
report has added to pressure being brought to bear to break up at least some of the camps. 
86 These issues are discussed in detail in Allen, T. (2006). ‘AIDS and Evidence: Interrogating Some Ugandan 
Myths.’ Journal of Biosocial Science. 
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Soroti/Kaberamaido/Kumi Districts: total IDP 
population (July 2005) approximately 18,000 
living in 22 IDP camps 
(Source: OCHA, 2005) 
 
 
A particularly deplorable aspect of the conflict in 
northern Uganda is the abduction of children for the 
purpose of forced conscription and sexual exploitation. 
With the start of Operation Iron Fist, human trafficking 
by the LRA is said to have increased dramatically. 
UNICEF estimates that since the start of the conflict 
20,000 children have been abducted. 10,000 of those 
have been abducted since the escalation of LRA raids 
in June 2002. However, these data are not based on a 
well-established system of reporting, because 
monitoring in general has been extremely difficult, due 
to the security situation. Large numbers of adults are 
also known to have been abducted.  
 
Abducted people, including children are often forced to 
commit atrocities against their families and 
communities and to serve as soldiers and/or ‘wives’ of rebel commanders. The LRA has commonly taken 
children to its bases in southern Sudan for training. This life can be especially brutal for the girls who are 
not only used as porters and soldiers but are also ‘given’ to rebel commanders as ‘wives’ sometimes 
before they reach puberty. UNICEF uses the term ‘formerly abducted child’ to refer to persons who are 
under 18 at the time they return from the LRA. However, it should be noted that several thousand persons 
who were young adults when they escaped the LRA were children when they were abducted. In this 
report the term ‘formerly abducted person’ FAP is mostly used. 
 
It is generally thought that almost all abducted children and adults who escape from the LRA or who are 
captured pass through the hands of the UPDF. The UPDF have established Child Protection Units (CPUs) 
in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, ostensibly to create a more child-friendly environment for debriefing. From 
the CPUs children (and adults) are passed on to reception centers, which have been established for both 
children and adults. The reception centers provide basic medical screening and treatment, perform family 
tracing, give ‘psychosocial counseling’, and prepare FAPs to return to their families and communities. 
Often girls return as ‘child mothers’ with children they have had as the ‘wives’ of LRA rebels. The 
situation of this group has recently been complicated by a number of high-level LRA commanders 
reporting to take advantage of the Amnesty Act. These commanders are requesting to be reunited with 
their ‘wives’ and children. Military activity also leads to unaccompanied infants being rescued after their 
mothers have been killed.  
 
The reception centers were created as a response to a need felt by the communities, families and local 
politicians who were receiving their children from captivity. Concerned parents and community members 
created NGOs to respond to this need, and through the support of international NGOs and the donor 
community, created reception centers or transit centers to meet the needs of these children and adults. The 
first of these centers, the World Vision Center in Gulu, opened in 1995, but most of them have been set 
up at the time when large number of FAPs returned after the Iron Fist offensive of 2002. Currently, there 
are centers operating in the districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Apac, Lira, Soroti and Katakwi. Thousands 
of FAPs, many of them children, have passed through the centers. It is hard to say exactly how many, 
because of double accounting and poor record keeping, but it is over 20,000.  
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RECEPTION CENTER PROFILES 
Action Against Child Abuse and Neglect (AACAN), Soroti 
Founding Year 
• Established NGO working in advocacy before opening a reception center in June 2003 as a 
reaction to the fighting that took place in the Teso region 
Infrastructure 
• Small gated compound on the outskirts of town, brick building, latrines and washing facilities, 
large tent, small gardening patch, dispensary. 
Staff 
• Permanent counselors, staff nurse 
Role/ Vision 
• Recent change in administration, now administered by the Community Administration Officer. Its 
current role is hard to determine. Conflicts between AACAN, agencies and donors over funding, 
responsibilities and approaches have marred all areas of work: tracing, reunification and most of 
all, follow-up. Current practices are considered unacceptable by all parties involved. 
Services 
• Treatment of minor health problems but no lab access for testing 
• AACAN has occasionally taken in street children 
• Currently no skills training 
Tracing/ Reunification 
• Tracing and reunification work marred by the conflicts between AACAN, the Probation Office 
and the CDO; responsibilities are not entirely clear to the parties involved 
Follow-Up 
• Follow-up is done by various agencies, similar problems as with tracing 
 
CARITAS Apac 
Founding Year 
• Opened in May 2004 due to numbers of people abducted in Apac (first and only RC in the 
district). 
Infrastructure 
• Located in the countryside behind the large Catholic church 
• Three main buildings plus the kitchen 
• Volleyball field next to school  
Staff 
• 3 social workers 
Role/ Vision 
• Exchange FACs with CARITAS Pajule RC and others 
Services 
• CARITAS prepares parents of FACs with one day of counseling, as some don’t immediately 
accept their children back as they think that someone coming from the bush will be difficult.  
Some spend longer here than others: between 14 and 45 days, sometimes longer when they are 
sick 
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• Tailoring training 
• Package of a mattress, blanket, basin, jerry can and saucepans; child mothers get one kit for 
themselves and another for their baby 
• Money is given to children for transport to return home. 
Tracing/ Reunification 
• Staff has found that parents and children often lied about where they were located so that their 
child would spend longer in the RC, rather than being returned to the  IDP camp 
Views on Reintegration 
Follow-Up 
• conduct follow-up visits after 1 month, 3 months and 6 months 
• say that they are quite good at sticking to this schedule due to the small number of people coming 
through the center 
• not enough resources to carry out all of their activities 
Community Networks 
• works with CARITAS and through Catholic parish networks 
 
Christian Counselling Fellowship (CCF), Pader 
Founding Year 
• In 2003, Alice Acan set up a center in her home Pader – her initial idea was to run a center for 
child mothers, both from the bush and from the camp.   
Infrastructure 
• Fenced-off plot located in the center of Pader Town; three round huts, three tents and two sheet-
metal huts. 
Staff 
• 16: Program Coordinator, Center Manager, Administrator, Field Coordinator, Nurse, 7 social 
workers, accountant, 3 caregivers 
Role/ Vision 
• CCF hosts children, child mothers and occasionally orphans from outside the bush 
• CCF works in a very volatile security situation with very little resources and basic services 
• Providing more versatile and creative training in the camps is what they aim to do in the future. 
Services 
• Very limited health services, major cases are referred to hospital 
• No structured skill training 
Tracing/ Reunification 
• Tracing is done through CCF social workers 
Views on Reintegration 
• “Reintegration needs a strong social network in the camp and a livable economic situation.” 
Follow-Up 
• Not enough funds for systematic follow-up  
• Social workers go out to the field when possible 
• CCF would like to see a uniform approach to follow-up that should be shared by all agencies 
Community Networks 
• Work with CVCs, but feel that people volunteer hoping for material gains 
Community Work 
• Children are encourage to attend church outside the center 
• Secured some funds for interventions to secure economic livelihoods 
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• Other educational programs in camps: proper use of condoms, life skills, risky behavior, youth 
groups  
• Setting up peer support networks for child mothers: child mothers from the community come to 
the center a few times a week to talk to the child mothers in the center 
 
Concerned Parents Association (CPA), Kitgum 
Founding Year 
• 2003 
Infrastructure 
• Gated compound, several brick building (administration, men’s sleeping quarters, kitchen, 
recreation center), sleeping tent for women 
Staff 
• 13 RC staff: manager, 2 field officers, 2 counselors,  documentarist,  accountant,  store keeper, 2 
cooks, 2 watchmen, driver 
• 26 night commuter project staff: facilitators, social workers, drivers 
Role/ Vision 
• Interest in advocacy and night commuter project 
Services 
• Little skills training  (lamp making)  
• Referral to other agencies 
Tracing/ Reunification 
• Done in cooperation with Parent Support Group and the CVCs, who also assess the family’s 
living situation 
Views on Reintegration 
• “Healing is not done, even in a year. The reception center cannot heal trauma, but take the level 
down a bit.” 
• The center operates under the assumption that proper repatriation into society and the healing that 
goes along with it can only take place at home 
• Currently, the community lacks economic stability for reintegration and there is limited funding 
for community sensitization 
• Biggest problem during reintegration is enforced idleness. 
Follow-Up 
• About 60 field visits a month since spring 2005 when UNICEF began providing transportation 
• Staff says that follow-up falls short of what it should be because the time spent in camps is too 
short and the approach is not systematic enough 
Community Networks 
• Much of the center’s community work rests on the CVCs, although they do not document the 
visits for CPA 
• Other field work is based on (mostly dormant) Protection Warning Group, facilitated by CPA’s 
Parent Support Group. The Protection Warning Group aims to identify vulnerable persons: FACs 
who have not gone through the system, child-headed households or households headed by 
grandparents. 
Community Work 
• The center is anxious to rededicate itself to an organization that treats more than the symptoms 
and provides community care.  
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Concerned Parents Association (CPA), Lira 
Founding Year 
• CPA was in operation as a reception center from June 2003 through January 2004. 
Infrastructure 
• Shut down as a reception center when Rachele Center opened in Lira 
Follow-Up 
• Follow-up only done in town due to security problems elsewhere 
• Currently no funds for follow-up 
Community Networks 
• Parent support groups in every parish which CPA helped to set up, which have details of children 
returned, abducted, etc.  According to the CPA these groups are still working, although the 
research team could not find a representative. 
 
Gulu Support The Children Organisation (GUSCO), Gulu 
Founding Year 
• GUSCO has its origins in a 1994 initiative by a small group of concerned parents and other local 
citizens  
• GUSCO acquired DANIDA funding in1997, and established its first reception center  
Infrastructure 
• Large walled compound; tented accommodation; several brick buildings used for teaching; 
counseling sessions, administration, small dispensary; play area 
Staff 
• 6 trained social workers, 2 social work volunteers and 3 trainees, two nurses and one teacher 
 
Role/ Vision 
• The main focus remains formerly abducted children (although many of those arriving at the 
center are adults). The philosophy of the center is to be inclusive, avoid institutionalism, 
recognize the rights of the child, and to take an holistic approach to rehabilitation.  
 
Services 
• Basic skills in tailoring for girls 
• Basic skills in bicycle repair, carpentry, bricklaying 
• Children are brought back to the center for training   
• Trained staff for nursery and Montessori schools in Palenga, Paboo, Amourou and Awach camps 
Tracing/ Reunification 
Views on Reintegration 
• Staff at GUSCO encourage/ facilitate cleansing ceremonies 
Follow-Up 
• Follow-up on all formerly abducted children at schools (group discussion with children identified 
as FACs by teachers), in the camps and children that have passed through GUSCO 
Community Networks 
• Work with CVCs 
Community Work 
• Visit IDP camps to ‘sensitize the community’ on issues involving children returning from the 
bush 
• Hold meetings with stakeholders (traditional leaders, LC1’s, parish chiefs, CDO’s and CDA’s)  
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• Micro finance: helping child mothers, parent support groups and orphans or  victims of 
HIV/AIDS 
 
Katakwi Children’s Voice (KCV), Katakwi 
Founding Year 
• Katakwi Children’s Voice was registered as an NGO in May 2000. Four concerned mothers and 
three men from the area started the organization in 1998. 
Infrastructure 
• One building, no fence, sleeping and sanitary facilities 
Staff 
• 10: center leader, administrator, 3 social workers, 5 volunteers 
Role/ Vision 
• Keen to re-position itself as a focal point for child protection, rather than a reception center 
Services 
• Basic medical check-up 
• No skills training, have a list of 60 children waiting for training  
Tracing/ Reunification 
• Done by KCV social workers  
• Also have a network of volunteers in various areas of Katakwi but logistics are challenging part 
• Reunification often happens without a social worker present 
Views on Reintegration 
• “We are doing children a disservice by not being able to provide them with a package for proper 
start-up.” 
Follow-Up 
• Staff says follow-up is inadequate due to lack of transportation 
Community Networks 
• children are sometimes followed up by a volunteer who lives close by 
Community Work 
• Community outreach program consists of meeting with the local council, visiting schools, parish 
chiefs and opinion or religious leaders 
• KCV gives advice on child protection, handling a war-affected child and on how to facilitate 
reintegration from the community side 
• Aim to provide services for all children affected by the unstable security situation and the general 
problems in Katakwi which can be summed up as LRA, Karamojong and poverty.  
 
Kitgum Concerned Women Association (KICWA), Kitgum 
Founding Year 
• 1998 
Infrastructure 
• Gated compound, brick administrative building, kitchen building, several round huts and an open-
walled meeting house, basic sanitary facilities, small playground 
Staff 
• 15: manager, admin, 2 head social workers, 2 nurses, clerk, 4 counselors, 2 cooks and 2 
watchmen. 
Role/ Vision 
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• KICWA sees itself as a transition point, not the focus of reintegration or provider of skills 
training  
• It is the centers’ experience that families transfer their responsibility to the center. They think that 
once a child stayed in KICWA, this is KICWA’s child and hence KICWA should care for the 
child 
• Follow-up is considered the major challenge now – including other aspects of community 
support, taking away the focus from the emergency level 
• Major challenge ahead is seen to be the transition from camp life back to village life, renewing a 
spirit of independence and cultural identity. 
Services 
• First aid, referral to hospital, referral for testing (but not involved in counseling about test results) 
• Referral for school fees and training 
Tracing/ Reunification 
• With KICWA social workers 
Views on Reintegration 
• Focus should be on community into which the individual is reintegrated  
Follow-Up 
• Only recently more opportunities to do follow-up: visiting clients, identifying problems, talking 
to community leaders, school visits 
Community Networks 
• Original idea of the CVCs is seen as good 
• But consensus that proper social work cannot be done by volunteers in an extremely vulnerable 
and poor society 
• CVCs and LCs point out problems with people who came back straight from the bush; KICWA 
then suggests referrals. 
 
Rachele Center, Lira 
Founding Year 
• Opened in October 2003, set up with a three-year lease, to be turned into a school in 2006 
Infrastructure 
Staff 
• 10 social workers on staff, 4 nurses, one clinical officer  
Role/ Vision 
• Sponsoring Children Uganda pays school fees for 2500 students, only 400 of which came through 
RRC.   
Services 
Tracing/ Reunification 
• Staff said it is easy to find the children’s home as they all know where they come from   
Views on Reintegration 
Follow-Up 
• First follow-up conducted 2 ½ months after reunification 
• Focus group discussion with family and immediate community and others who see the child on a 
daily basis 
• Claim to have a minimum of 3 follow-ups per child 
• Much of follow-up time involves finding children for sponsorship 
Community Networks 
Community Work 
• Train teachers in psychosocial counseling and an all around approach to handling children  
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• Goal is that teachers will impart knowledge to other teachers who were not trained    
 
World Vision, Gulu 
Founding Year 
• March 1995 
Infrastructure 
• Three centers: children, adults, child mothers 
• Child center: walled compound, brick administrative buildings, open building for ‘group 
counseling’, circular banda, sleeping tents, basic sanitary facilities 
• Child mother center: gated compound with trees, brick administrative building, sleeping tent, 
basic sanitary facilities, cooking area, small playground, small gardening patch, netball hoops 
Staff 
• 24 staff at the child center: 6 counselors, 5 outreach facilitators; 1 outreach co-coordinator; a 
matron; a nurse; a nursing assistant; a warehouse assistant; 3 accountants; 2 drivers; a gateman; a 
central administrator; the manager 
Role/ Vision 
• World Vision is a Christian, international NGO, and runs the centers as part of its Uganda 
programme.  
Services 
• Restoring physical health 
Tracing/ Reunification 
• Facilitate re-unions between children and adults at the centers and their respective families, 
preceded by visits from staff to the camps with a view to informing and preparing them for the 
return of their relative. 
Views on Reintegration 
• Reintegration is a long process and it is not possible to successfully reintegrate into life in the 
camps without first proving a capacity to talk in an open and multi-dimensional way 
Follow-Up 
• Not possible to retrieve any follow-up data 
Community Networks 
Community Work 
• Makes visits to some IDP camps, but mostly supports IDPs in the Gulu municipality. However, 
the World Vision centers, like several of the others, have been developing a new outreach 
approach, using a support network based in the camps.  
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LABORA FARM – AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO 
‘REINTEGRATION’ 
Labora Farm has been put forward as an alternative to locating FAPs with their relatives. It is located near 
the road between Gulu and Opit. It is a large farm, which is supposed to be run on a commercial basis by 
former LRA combatants. It is an approach to supporting ‘reintegration’ that has received support from the 
UPDF and Gulu District government officials. It has also been endorsed by senior government officials (it 
is said to be the brain child of the Minister of Defense) and has been funded under a scheme supported by 
the Word Bank. It has, however, been very controversial. In many respects it builds on approaches to 
‘reintegration’ of former combatants used in other countries, such as Zimbabwe. Those experiments have 
been mixed. Many failed to be profitable and collapsed. But the reasons for the concerns expressed about 
Labora Farm from aid agencies and human rights activists working in the region derive from the use of 
'child mothers' as laborers and the fact that it was initially run under the auspices of Kenneth Banya. 
Banya is a former LRA Brigadier who had many young 'wives' himself while with the LRA and has 
sought to continue the unions after his capture and receipt of the Amnesty. For many of the aid agencies 
working in northern Uganda, it is impossible to support a scheme that is associated with such a man. Two 
years ago, when the farm was first being proposed, there was the suggestion that it would establish the 
model of the ‘reintegration’ of the majority of LRA veterans and their 'wives'. This caused considerable 
dismay in some quarters, but the project has now become much less ambitious. 
 
The team visited the farm on two occasions to see how it operates and talk to some of those who have 
become involved. The scheme is now run as three small-enterprise projects under the World Bank funded 
scheme (known as NUSAF). Each project has a chairman, all of whom are middle ranking LRA officers. 
The following is taken from an interview with one of them, who was a former major in the LRA. 
 
‘The farm is designed to help 'formerly abducted children' (FACs) who stay in town but lack jobs. The 
Farm consists of 'community workers' who are not paid but get a part of the produced food and of 'paid 
workers' (leja leja) from the nearby IDP camp. The food the 'community workers' are given is the same, 
independently from the size of their family. Therefore little is remaining to be sold normally. Female 
returnees additionally get food from WFP. I have wives myself and children. GUSCO and World Vision 
pay school fees for the children, the rest I have to provide on my own somehow. The main aim of Labora 
Farm is to make it possible for FAC to resettle and provide a 'future perspective'.... The harvested crops at 
Labora Farm this season will be sold to WFP. After two years, the money earned by Labora Farm will 
mainly go into micro finance for the community members. The aim is, to enable the community to start 
its own business after two years of work at Labora Farm. The area used to be a governmental project. The 
Minister of Defense came up with the idea to start a farm for the many FACs. To get NUSAF (i.e. World 
Bank) funding, the project has to be suggested by the community itself.’ 
 
He implied that the government had then invited FAPs to come together and have the idea of a farm. 
NUSAF projects start with facilitated workshops to 'sensitize' people, and to suggest a project that then 
will be funded. 
 
‘Initially 360 were involved in a meeting to suggest a project, but currently there are only 120 people 
working in three different projects that do the same thing here at Labora Farm. In the workshop, which 
took place at GUSCO, there were different suggestions for farming: piggery, cattle, crops etc. The 
NUSAF funding was only enough for three groups. Those three groups couldn't do what they actually 
wanted... NUSAF is funding the costs of labor, seeds and transport from town to the farm. The store here 
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had a new roof funded by NUSAF also. We are waiting for a second payment to build the facilities to stay 
at the farm, and to train the community members in large-scale farming. At the moment, the traditional 
way of farming is being done. But the young members lack knowledge to do farming properly.... Each 
project has a chairman, secretary and treasurer plus 6 other members.... Banya is the commander. He 
normally visits the farm regularly.... After two years, the community workers will get a loan and try to 
make their own business. The project will end then unless it is expanded or restarted. Many people are 
waiting to join the project. There are many FAC willing to join and the hope is to expand the project with 
our own finance.’ 
 
The research team also spoke to the chairmen of the other projects, and was given slightly different 
accounts. There was some confusion about the number of FAPs originally involved, those who are still 
involved, and the members of the three groups. It was not at all clear what some laborers would be paid. 
Those coming from the local IDP camp were paid the normal (very low) daily rate for farm labor. But in 
theory the FAPs were paid nothing except food, although they had some sort of stake in a possible 
development of the scheme. Exactly what this would involve was vague. There was also ambiguity about 
the position of Banya. The other chairmen claimed that he was no longer in charge. When this was later 
checked with Gulu District officials it was confirmed that he had officially stepped down. Apparently this 
was because the World Bank had insisted. He nevertheless still has an influence on proceedings. It was 
also striking that the chairmen of the projects were all former LRA officers. As in other situations, such as 
mutual support networks and in the 105th Battalion, the former LRA hierarchy was replicated. 
 
One of the major concerns that have been raised about Labora Farm is that the young people who go to 
work there, including ‘child mothers’ are being exploited. Fears have been expressed that this might 
involve sexual exploitation as well as exploitation of their labor. Another concern is that the concentration 
of FAPs in such a project separated them from the rest of the population and thereby hinders 
‘reintegration’. However, the research team did not find any evidence of this during the visits to the farm. 
On the contrary, the young women met there, some of them with their children, seemed happy to be 
associated with it. Two of those interviewed said that they had known Banya in the bush. They said that 
they were not afraid of him. He was ‘alright in the bush unless you misbehave, then you have to suffer.’ 
They additionally said that they liked being with other FAPs. During the same visit, the team interviewed 
other women who said much the same thing. What was particularly interesting was that a couple of young 
women were known by one of the team. They both told stories about their ‘abduction’, but apparently 
they had really never spent time with the LRA. They seemed to be claiming to be abducted so that they 
could be part of the group that might have some involvement with the Labora Farm project in the future. 
They wanted to be more than daily laborers. It was not the only time that the team came across people 
wanting to be classified as ‘formerly abducted’ as a coping strategy. 
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ACCOUNTS OF LIFE IN THE IDP CAMPS AND  
LIFE WITH THE LRA 
This appendix presents extracts of interviews with FAPs about life in the IDP camps and with the LRA. 
Here is an example of an FAP who said that she does not like living at home. She was one of many FAPs 
who talked about being treated badly by close relatives, and who commented on being abused because 
they were associated with reception centers.87 
 
D: ‘Do you still talk to your friends about your time in the bush?’ 
P: ‘No I do not, because it just reminds me of what was happening while I was there. And 
sometimes some women give me such a hard time by talking about my being in the bush and 
abusing me that I sometimes feel I should go back to the bush.’ 
D: ‘Really? Which women are those?’ 
P: ‘My mother is one of them. Any slight thing I do she brings my having been in the bush in it. 
Even my neighbors do the same so I just keep quiet or walk away, and yet if I walk away they say 
I am bigheaded and disobedient and she beats me up. Sometimes from school the same thing 
happens. You hear comments that some children make or even the teachers, sometimes I cannot 
help but answer back because it is painful that they find us funny or make jokes at our expense. 
When you answer back, you are punished so we are supposed to take all these insults from them. 
When we left GUSCO they gave us these small black bags that have ‘duk paco’ on them. [Her 
voice catches as she speaks]. Everybody knows those bags so when we pass they point at either 
our bags or at us and they snigger or make funny comments, then they laugh. It is so much harder 
to stay here than it was in the bush. At least when we were in the bush no one laughed at us and 
we were the same community.’ 
D: ‘What do the neighbors say about this?’ 
P: ‘They are not any better, maybe even worse. Sometimes a child does something and you knock 
their head even playfully, but when the neighbors see that – they shout at you, they like saying 
things like, ‘look at the wives of the rebels, I am not the one who sent you to the bush so do not 
bring what you carried from the bush here. If ever you touch my child with that ‘cen’ you have in 
you I will kill you’. So sometimes even if you have done something very small you get a torrent 
of words, a lot more than you deserve. It is worst when they have been drinking. When I think 
about it, life in the bush was much easier, we had food to eat, there was no worry about being 
abducted and no one yelled at you if you carried out your duties.’ 
 
Cen is an issue of concern for many of the returning people as well as those they live with. It can be an 
explanation for various kinds of misfortune, including illness and death. Concerns about cen are voiced 
quite frequently and seem to affect the sense of self worth of some FAPs, limiting their capacities to 
socialize. Here is an exchange with a teacher, reflecting on her experience of dealing with returned 
children.88 
 
D: ‘What do you think of this attitude the children have of themselves and towards life in 
general?’ 
Teacher: ‘I have spoken to many of them; a few want to go back to school, especially the younger 
ones. Others feel that school will never help them in any way so they just want to go back to their 
                                                     
87 The interviewer was Doreen Alaro, and the interview took place in the Acholi language. 
88 Again the interviewer was Doreen Alaro. 
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homes and cultivate land. Then there are those who were taken when they were quite young, 
about seven or eight and are now eighteen or in their early twenties. Those ones feel like their life 
is useless, they cannot make anything of it.’ 
D: ‘Why do you think they feel that way?’ 
Teacher: ‘Well, when they see some of their friends who are now in the university or are working 
or have made something of themselves, they feel worthless and become very bitter about life and 
the unfairness of it all. Actually, some of the children refuse to go back to school and others 
continue with the very atrocities they were committing while in the bush, like stealing, fighting, 
torching peoples’ houses when the feeling of worthlessness returns. Many of these children do 
not fear death and it is a pity to see a person so young talk about death the way they do. Then 
there are children whose parents feel they have ‘cen’, and thus feel they are accursed.’ 
 
An issue that often became apparent in the course of the interviews in the IDP camps and among returned 
people living in the towns was that they often tended to spend time with each other rather than their 
relatives or childhood friends. They would sometimes comment that their former age-mates had moved 
on with their lives, while they had spent months or years away. Often, they just seemed more comfortable 
in each other’s company. Here are some examples of statements by LRA veterans living at an IDP camp. 
 
‘During our participatory observation, we got to know four young LRA veterans living at an IDP 
camp. One of our team members lived with each of them for several weeks. Here are some 
remarks from them about socializing and living in the camps. The comments were all made in the 
Acholi language.’89 
 
‘The feeling of being a stranger here is there, especially when I am alone at home. Because 
somebody may come and ask something I don’t know. There’s nothing I can say. Maybe a 
relative comes and I don’t know him. When I am with friends and we are busy talking, that 
feeling goes away.’ 
 
‘You cannot tell your friends here in the camp ‘I have been in the bush’. If I am engaging a girl to 
be my ‘wife’ (i.e. to have sexual intercourse) and she finds out I have been in the bush, she says 
‘O those people used to do very bad things…’ The girl will think that I will kill her. I cannot tell 
her about my past.’ 
 
‘Formerly we knew the boundaries, where to play. The different families knew their neighbors 
and that they were not having witchcraft. But now we are in the camp, you don’t know the 
immediate person who is next to you, they may be from another parish, another village. They 
may come with witchcraft. And when something happens, you cannot even imagine who is 
responsible. So we just fear.’ 
 
‘The community in the bush is very strong. Everybody had the same laws and the same order. 
Here some people think to be more equal… In the camp, there is no appreciation. You are 
digging your own garden, nobody is appreciating that. In the bush there, you go to battle: maybe 
you are successful, and they appreciate you for that. Life here, there’s nobody who appreciates.’ 
 
‘If I would have gone home to my original home, I would have got used very fast, because with 
my own people, my own clan’s mate who knew me, I would have been free to easily adapt with 
life. In the camp it was very difficult to get used to things. Like when I came, I got a lot of 
                                                     
89 The researcher who carried out the participant observation research from which these quotes are taken is Ben 
Mergelsberg. A paper presenting some of his findings is B. Mergelsberg. ‘Crossing boundaries’ available at 
www.mergelsberg.de .2005. 
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neighbors who talked about me: ‘this one has just come back from the bush…’ Even my own 
brothers, we could not talk freely in the way we used to talk. And sometimes I can even stay one 
whole month without meeting my brother who lives in another camp. Getting used to this is very 
difficult.’ 
 
Unlike most men, women who return from the LRA have the possibility of marrying and moving into 
another family. But this may not be easy, even when they have not come back with children that were 
born in the bush (i.e. a so called ‘child mother’), as a local council officer women in Anaka IDP camp 
said about those who have come through a reception center. 
 
The women go looking for husbands here at home [they look for men to live with]. Their 
activities are dangerous. They fight with men, and when they fight it is a war. People fear them. 
They cannot re-marry after being in the bush. They join the UPDF or the LDU... People fear them 
because they are polluting. They will not greet you by shaking hands. They are not friendly with 
us and do not trust us. In the bush they covered themselves in oil. If people have not been 
anointed like that, they do not greet them. If they do greet you, it is only out of fear. Some were 
living with the LRA for 10 years or more. They have that wild mentality. 
 
Finally, here are some quotes from young men, all in their teens, who have spent several years with the 
LRA, and have passed through reception centers.90 Obviously they are a particular sort of FAP. But they 
are particularly interesting because they have had to come to terms with, and make the best of, both life in 
the bush and life in an IDP camp 
 
‘Do you know, I think life in the bush was a lot easier than living in the camp with my mother. At 
least we had proper food, it is only when we have to move that we might not eat much but even 
that is not for long but at home you have to wait for WFP to distribute food and sometimes they 
miss out your names.’ 
 
‘Life there (in the bush) was just like that, I did not feel anything bad about killing. Not until 
when I started listening to Radio Mega (the FM radio station broadcast from Gulu town). They 
were having programs with music, and with people sending greetings… about peace, called 
Come Back Home... I actually heard over the radio, how we used to move (i.e. what the LRA was 
doing). We burnt homes … and I started to think: are we really fighting a normal war? That is 
when I started realizing that maybe there is something better than being here in the bush. And that 
is when I started learning that ‘Oh! So this life is bad’. I started feeling that some of these orders 
are not genuine. I am trying to fight for liberty, for the people. But now if you are killing the same 
people, whom are we going to rule?’ 
 
‘Only when you are still in the bush, the Holy Spirit has power over you. When you come back, 
you are now like a civilian, there’s nothing which happens to you.’ 
 
‘While I was in the bush, the rules helped me to be very obedient; I would follow the order all the 
time. This brought meaning to my life and helped me.’ 
 
‘You are taken to the bush as a fighter. But when you reach there, you also have to struggle to get 
food for your survival. When I was taken to the bush, the type of life was different from that of 
home. The place where I was living was far from home, so I felt as if I was in a different world all 
together.’ 
                                                     
90 These quotes are from the participant observation research carried out by Ben Mergelsberg. See B.Mergelsberg. 
‘Crossing boundaries’ available at www.mergelsberg.de, 2005. 
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‘What makes it very easy to kill, is the gun and the uniform. That will make you strong hearted, 
feeling to be a military. But now here, I don’t have a gun, I don’t have a uniform; killing would 
be something very difficult.’ 
 
‘Fighting was very good for me, because it was part of my work. And if I had stayed for maybe 
two weeks without firing, I would feel something was missing, something is not very normal.’ 
 
‘I was striving so much to get a rank. That is why they sent me to go and lay an ambush: I would 
go. I was given difficult tasks. I would perform them, because I was striving to get the rank and 
that was how I got it.’ 
 
‘Killing in the bush: to the commanders it was fame. When a commander orders killing, he 
becomes famous.... Everybody would struggle to get a rank or to be famous’. 
 
‘Fighting was very nice for us, especially when we were on the winning side. If you go and find 
you have killed many of your opponents you are very happy. It was not bad, we felt it was nice.’ 
 
‘This was like fame to us: if we didn’t want people to move along a certain road, we didn’t want a 
vehicle to pass that road and actually the vehicle didn’t pass, we would feel very proud and 
strong. When we arrested (i.e. abducted) somebody, we used to say: we told you if you had come 
to join us we would have overthrown the government. Do you see this road: are there vehicles 
moving? So it made us very happy and we felt famous.’ 
 
‘We were living in the bush like people who had closed their eyes. It was as if we were being 
used, we couldn’t reason, we couldn’t look any further; just like somebody whose eyes have been 
closed. You are moving and you cannot see where you are going. All those things are painful, but 
now after reopening your eyes you can see something. It is painful when I am reminded.’ 
 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE RECEPTION CENTER PROCESS 87
APPENDIX 5. 
 
INTERVIEWS WITH ‘CHILD MOTHERS’ 
The attitudes and experiences of women categorized as ‘child mothers’ vary widely. Some have very 
negative feeling towards their children; others are like ‘normal’ loving mothers. Some are very bitter 
about what they were forced to undergo, but several are keen to return to their LRA husbands when the 
war ends or if they surrender. To give an impression of the range of experiences and attitudes among 
FAPs categorized as ‘child mothers’ at reception centers, here are a few examples. Of the first five 
extracts, four are taken from the research team’s sample interviews and the other from an interview at 
CCF Pader. These are followed by extracts of interviews with ‘child mothers’ at the World Vision Center 
in Gulu town.  
 
1. A ‘child mother’ who is still under the age of 18, and who fits the model of a sexually abused child. 
 
‘Life was very good in the center. I forgot the past by then but when I came back I started dreaming 
of what used to happen in the bush. No ceremony was done for me when I came back. In the bush I 
was given to a man called Okot and I produced with him one child (a girl) who is now almost two 
years old. He did not have other women, but I don’t know where he is these days.’  
 
2. Another ‘child mother’ under 18. She has not yet given birth, and was interviewed at the CCF 
reception center. According to staff at CCF, her date for going home had been set, and she would be 
followed up by the reception center nurse and brought back to hospital in time for delivery. It is 
worth noting that this is much better antenatal care than that available to other women in the IDP 
camps. 
 
‘I like staying at CCF… My friends are here help me and the workers give me what I like. I am not 
scared of going home because I know my mother supports me. At CCF I spend a lot of time talking 
about the time in the bush with my friends. Mainly, we talk about the kind of food we ate…. We 
rarely, if ever, talk about the bad things that happened…. I feel a lot of pain whenever I think about 
the bush. Although we don’t talk about it among ourselves, we all know what everybody else has 
been through out there… I think about two things in the future: I want to learn tailoring and I am 
scared of the delivery. When I was in hospital for check-up (in Gulu), I heard the women scream 
from the maternity ward… I plan to give the child to my mother and will go back to school. When I 
came back, I had an STD with a lot of discharge…. That makes the thought of delivery even worse.’  
 
3. A woman in her 20s whose child died, and who loved her LRA ‘husband’. 
 
‘Life at home is good but people call us rebels. I tell people or friends about my life in the bush, but 
I sometimes get angry when people say I’m from the bush. At times I forgive them, but my family 
will leave (gives name of IDP camp) next year… I am scared because where I live…they always 
say I am a rebel. They caught me once (i.e. people in the camp attacked her) and I never went back 
to that route again. It was the husband of my sister who saved me. My neighbors are good. They 
like me. They said I shouldn’t mind about the stigmatization… There was a party, traditional 
cleansing and prayers when I first came back…. I don’t know where my husband is. I escaped and 
left him in the bush. If he comes back and wants to stay with me, I will stay with him. I love him 
because he used to love me too. I was happy about my child but unfortunately I lost her.’ 
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4. A woman in her 20s who has had difficulties returning to her family, but has no interest in being re-
united with the father of her child. 
 
‘I have friends here who I was with in the bush. They are renting near us. Life at home is difficult 
because people keep saying that we are rebels. Even if you take your child to school, they say the 
child has gone to kill their children. Most of the time, I stay indoors because of fear. They came to 
know that we were abducted after being taken home by the center vehicle, and because we who are 
renting houses have got to explain to our landlords the type of person we are. I don’t tell the 
community that I was abducted. I only stay with those who were also abducted. I get angry when 
people say I’m from the bush. People should not keep on saying it because I’m already back 
home… I don’t know where my husband is. We were four women and two of us escaped. I don’t 
feel like staying with him, but I am happy about my child.’ 
 
5. A woman in her 20s who admits to having killed in the bush, and who wants to be reunited with her 
LRA husband, even though she now has another sexual partner. 
 
‘I killed one man when I was in the bush. I beat him to death with a stick. I am scared now, because 
when I sleep at night, I see the picture of that person whom I killed. Sometimes at night I see him 
kicking me and when I wake up I feel that it is very painful where he kicked me… My parents were 
pleased that I came back, and I had a ritual of stepping on eggs… I was pregnant from the bush with 
a child from (one of the senior LRA commanders) and I delivered the child at home. It is a baby 
girl. It is staying with my mother. The neighbors like my child. If my husband could come back 
from the bush, I want to stay with him because he is still my husband. But I have a new husband 
now… but he is not a good man. He disturbs me every day by fighting or quarrelling. He likes my 
child from the bush. But I would leave him if my first husband came back.’ 
 
The remaining interviews were all made at the World Vision reception center for ‘child mothers’ in Gulu 
town. These eight women were interviewed individually. They were all in their 20s, although with one 
exception they had been abducted before the age of 18. One had a child, but he had died. Another had a 
child who was born while she was staying at the reception center, but the father was her former husband 
in the IDP camp who had abandoned her after she had her face mutilated by the LRA. Five of the women 
were adamant that they wanted to be reunited with their LRA ‘husbands’. Another group of seven women 
were interviewed at St. Monica’s training school in Gulu. This is a place at which ‘child mothers’ are 
taught skills in tailoring and cooking. The average age of the seven was 20. Three of them wanted to be 
with their LRA ‘husbands’. One was a ‘wife’ of Kony. One liked her LRA husband, but he had died. One 
was not impregnated when she was with the LRA, but was abducted with her baby, who was killed by a 
land mine. Just one said that she would not stay with her LRA husband if he returned, although she also 
said that he was ‘good’ to her in the bush. 
 
The first is with a woman of 19 years. She had been abducted at the age of nine and had spent 10 years 
with the LRA. At the time of her abduction she had completed five years at primary school. She had been 
captured/rescued by the UPDF. Like the woman above, she was pregnant with her first child, but was 
over the age of consent. She was nevertheless still categorized as a ‘child mother’. She had been at the 
reception center for two months. The interview was short, reflecting the woman’s reluctance to talk. It 
also became apparent that she had several close relatives still fighting with the LRA in addition to her 
‘husband’. 
 
‘I think if the war ends then I would like to be re-united with the father of my child…. I hope to go 
back to school after the baby… My father was very happy when he heard that I had come out of the 
bush, but he is sickly and weak and cannot help me … I would like to go to tailoring school…  
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I cannot tell how my relatives will treat the child but, for sure, I shall be responsible for the child … 
and I shall have to make sure that the child studies… There is no need for the child to know that he 
is a child of the bush … Its needs will be the same as all the other children in the camp … I will 
only tell my father and close relatives exactly what happened… There is no need to tell everyone … 
my ‘husband’ has one other wife who also has a child. He is still fighting in the bush….’ 
 
The following quotes are taken from another ‘child mother’ who is over the age of consent. She is 21 
years old and had spent six months at the reception center. She had two children: one is 5 years old and 
the other is 6 months old. Her first son was born in the bush and has never known a world other than the 
bush and the reception center. Her second child was also born in the bush and was only 5 days old when 
he came to the reception center. She spent about 7 years with the LRA.  
 
‘My husband helped me to escape … I was caught two times trying to escape... My husband warned 
me that they would kill me if I tried to do it again… But he helped me. No one else knew my 
plan…. The day I escaped, I met some hunters in the bush. When they saw me, they started to 
run…. Fortunately, I met some women who helped me find the UPDF barracks in Awach. I went to 
the CPU where I stayed for 4 days. I was then taken to the reception center [gives name] where I 
was given clothes, blankets and mattresses… I wanted to escape because the UPDF were pursuing 
us … it was too much carrying our things with our children…. My husband did not escape with me 
because he feared he would be killed … but he is watching what happens to Banya [a well known 
former LRA Brigadier who has accepted the Amnesty] and plans to come in 2006…. My plan is to 
see my children have an education and to set up a restaurant in Gulu. I can’t go back to my parents 
in Pacho camp... they drink too much... [and] I would like to stay with my husband in the future as 
there is nowhere else to go … I need to stay in a place where I can be peaceful and forget … if I go 
home, I shall be provoked … My husband has two other female children but the wife of these 
children died… They are still with him at the moment…. Life at the reception center is really 
good… We are taught how to be friendly, and how to respect others. I have learnt how to write my 
name.’ 
 
The next woman is another ‘child mother’ who is both over 18 and also does not actually have a child. 
She did have a child when she was in the bush, but it died from malaria. She was about 16 years old at the 
time. She is now 20 and has been at the reception center for 2 months.  
 
‘I was abducted from Pader while I was visiting my grandmother. They came at night while I was 
sleeping with my mother… and they took me to Sudan. There were more soldiers there than 
abducted people…. I stayed in Sudan until 2004…. In the bush, we lived as a group of 50 [but] we 
divided into groups of 10 when we were fighting. I can assemble and disassemble a gun … So long 
as Kony is still in the bush, this war will not end … Kony talks well/good, but sometimes his orders 
are bad and destructive. Whatever he does, he is not under his own control but under the influence 
of spirits…. One day, he just announced that we should stop eating meat…. I met Kony in 2004 … 
He is a tall and light-skinned person…. There is nothing I miss about life in the bush…. How did I 
escape? We were in the bush … the UPDF were dropping bombs … many people died and my 
husband was shot dead. I left shortly after that … at the reception center, they tell me not to think 
about the past, … that the bad things that happen are part of war. … That I am still young and I have 
a bright future…. ‘Before being abducted, I planned to get a job in an office, just like other ladies. I 
now feel that I can’t make it at school … it is too late … I would like to do a tailoring course… I 
shall go and live with my uncle… My parents are alive, but I don’t know where my father is. I have 
met with my mother, who lives with someone else now so I cannot stay there. My brother is 16 
years old and he lives with my uncle …  it is possible that I might be abducted again, but I don’t 
think that they will come looking for me in particular. They will always know that I have been in 
the bush. I will say that I was injured … otherwise they will kill me…’  
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE RECEPTION CENTER PROCESS 90
 
The following case is about the same age, and also had a child who died in the bush. She was abducted at 
the age of 13 and spent seven years with the LRA. She is partially sighted as a result of war wounds. She 
has no vision in her right eye and very limited vision in her left eye.  
 
‘I escaped … there was crossfire between the LRA and the UPDF … the UPDF were dropping 
bombs and everyone scattered … so I took my chance and escaped…. I did not plan to escape … it 
was just God that helped me… It is nice at the reception center… There are no battles … We are 
being counseled and we are being taught, but a cassette player and a TV would make it better … I  
don’t know when I will leave the center.... They are trying to raise money for an operation 
(apparently two million Ugandan Shilling are needed to cover the cost of removing a bullet lodged 
in her eye)…. Both my parents have died…. My ‘husband’ is still in the bush in Sudan … He will 
never come back as he is certain that he will be killed if he returns. He has 10 other wives in the 
bush  … I don’t miss him… He refused to come back … Why should I miss him?… He had 7 
children altogether … He told me that he just joined the LRA and that he was not abducted. He 
comes from Pader. He is a fierce man … but there is no soldier that is cool…. He claims to be 35 
years old, but I think he is older.’ 
 
The next example is of a woman of 27 years who was not impregnated by an LRA combatant, but by her 
own husband in the IDP camp. However, he refused to accept her back as his wife after she was caught 
and mutilated by the LRA. Her lips were sliced off and her ear removed. She subsequently gave birth 
while staying at the World Vision reception center, and has two other children who stay with her mother. 
 
‘There were six of us in the garden in Paicho … Four were killed, one was captured and I was 
tortured. They tortured me, and released me on the same day…. They did not kill me because they 
want to terrify the civilians and show that it is not good to tell the UPDF where they [the LRA] are 
… They hacked them to death with sticks and the butt of a gun. I was pregnant at the time [so] they 
did not want to kill me, as it would have brought them misfortune…. One of the women who died 
was my co-wife, the other three were neighbors ... After the attack, I ran but I was bleeding so much 
that I collapsed. A man on a bicycle stopped and rang for a car. Then they took me to Gulu hospital 
where I stayed for a week. World Vision subsequently collected me from the hospital and brought 
her to the child mother center until I delivered my baby… They then took me to Mulago hospital, 
Kampala where they gave me a large number of stitches and tried to re-shape my face (they used 
plastic surgery for her nose and the ear that had been removed)… When I came back from the 
hospital, the door of my house was locked and my husband was gone … I am deformed [so] I 
cannot be his wife … whenever he sees me, he turns his face as if he doesn’t know me. He was not 
really my husband, because there was not enough money for bride wealth payments. … I was 17 … 
I eloped with him… My father died three years ago but her mother is still alive. My father died at 
the same time as two of my brothers. They were killed by the LRA in Paicho … The rebels came at 
dawn. They were asleep and they killed them with a log. I was with my husband at the time, and 
they only spared my mother and young children ... It is difficult to know why they left them.. it is 
just God … My mother is responsible for my children … My husband doesn’t help at all. He has 
taken two new wives….’ 
 
In complete contrast, here is a woman 22 years old, who had been abducted at the age of 15. She loves her 
‘husband,’ who is still fighting with the LRA, and also has a brother in the UPDF. She has one child, who 
was born in Sudan. She had much to say, spoke very quickly, and was sometimes quite hard to follow.  
 
 ‘I was digging with my father in the garden … they came from nowhere … they began a ritual on 
me … and after the ritual, we went on the road which goes from Lira to Kitgum. We were taken to 
meet Kony at 3.00pm near Kitgum… then we started the journey back to Labor … we went back to 
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the original point [Kitgum / Lira road) that we started from ... then we went to the mountains. Kony 
went one way, we went another. We took a month doing all of this in Uganda, but Kony said he 
wanted to see us in Sudan … by then, some had swollen feet, some were killed and some collapsed 
and left…. In Sudan, we were trained in marching and how to assemble and disassemble a gun. 
Then we were taught how to march with a gun; and then we were subjected to many tasks like 
carrying heavy tins of bullets to the Sudan/Uganda border and hiding them there; cutting grass; 
working in gardens in Sudan … growing sim sim and other crops for Kony…. Only when you are 
pregnant, then there is not much work, except when there is a battle. Then you are expected to 
fight…. In 2004, things got worse … the Ugandan army used bombs to hit us. It was painful to see 
my friends die … So too was the thought of going home to find my parents had died too .. and the 
thought of having to start life all over again…. It is hard to escape as we heard that the UPDF would 
rape women and then kill them … My husband released my co-wife, so I asked to go too and he 
agreed to the idea…. However, he was worried about our child’s life…. So he took the child to his 
sister in Ajulu, Gulu District… I escaped 5 months later. 
 
Interestingly, the father of the child wrote a letter, which was sent to Mega Radio and read out on air. It 
said that the child should be taken to the mother’s family (i.e. her father’s home) until he could be 
reunited with her. The mother’s family heard the message and tried to claim the child, but the father’s 
sister refused to give him up, saying, ‘this is our child’ (i.e. the child belonged to the clan of the mother 
because no bride price had been paid). The UPDF became involved, and would not allow the child to go 
to the mother’s family (which would have been a recognition that the parents were married, rather than 
the mother abducted and raped). Eventually the child was brought to World Vision where he was an 
‘unaccompanied child’ for 4/5 months. As the mother explained: 
 
‘I knew about the whereabouts of the child during this time, and felt he suffered a lot.  He used to 
cry a lot and frequently asked to return to the bush. In fact, he used to make guns out of sticks and 
carry them around on his arm ... Sometimes he disturbed the night watchman at dawn by saying 
‘I’m going back to the bush’. He still misses his dad and misses carrying his dad’s gun around…. In 
the end I escaped….there was bombing … people scattered and a UPDF soldier came over and 
picked me … I spent 4 nights with the UPDF…  On the 5th day, they brought me to World Vision 
… My husband is a captain in the LRA. He has one other wife, with whom he has had two children, 
but one of them died. My co-wife now lives in an IDP camp (gives name). She was abducted at the 
age of 15 and lived in the bush for 7 years too…. I have many loving feelings for my husband…. 
When the war ends, I would like to be re-united with him because he loves me … he tells many 
people that he loves me … that is why he did not release me before. I am not interested in any other 
person…. I am told that he is looking for me … I want to talk to him so that he knows that I am 
alive.’ 
 
The woman went on to say that her husband will not come out of the bush while Museveni is still in 
power: ‘He is determined to fight, even if there are only five of them left.’ At this point the research team 
member asked her about the International Criminal Court and the possibility of warrants being issued. 
The member of staff at the reception center who was translating then stopped the interview, stating that 
this woman cannot be asked or told about the ICC, because she might be an LRA spy. It was however 
possible to ask the woman about life in the reception center, and about her future. 
 
‘I am very grateful to God who spared my life … and to all the people who have helped me … I 
want to do a business, to learn how to do bakery and how to sell things….I want to make sure that 
my child has a good education…. The counseling is strange … we are told such different things to 
the things we are told in the bush. We are taught how to start afresh and to be hopeful … I love 
playing here, and I love the things they teach us … [However, among the women] there is a lot of 
quarrelling and abusive language which is not good … My mother is fine about the child.... She says 
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‘my greatest love (joy?) is seeing you alive. But my father is an alcoholic … and my brother is in 
the UPDF. I think my mother will accept the child, but I think our neighbors will see things 
differently. They can plant evil on my child, as it is a child of the bush; and they can do bad things 
to my mother, as they will not like the fact that she has come to help her. In the future, I would like 
to rent a house and stay with my child in Gulu town.’ 
 
The quarrelling mentioned between the ‘child mothers’ is perhaps not surprising given the fact that this 
woman was sharing accommodation with some of the others who were interviewed, including the woman 
with the mutilated face. The next interview is also of a woman who loves her LRA husband, although in 
his case he has surrendered and joined the UPDF. She had spent almost a year at the reception center, 
although for much of this she has actually been staying at the hospital, because of her bullet wound. 
Initially, she went to Pader hospital, then Gulu hospital, and then Mulago, Kampala. She has been told 
that there is nothing more they can do for her. The bullet is lodged in her throat and the doctors have told 
her that they are afraid to cut her throat to remove the bullet in case they kill her. She has one child of 
about 12 months, who was born in the bush shortly before she was captured by the UPDF. She is 18 years 
old and spent about 6 years with the LRA. Her parents are still alive, and she has many siblings, although 
one was taken by the LRA and died in the bush. She was asked about how she came to the reception 
center and about her future. 
 
‘The UPDF were pursuing us. Many died in the battle and a bullet hit me in the throat. I was then 
captured by the UPDF. Now I can only talk in a hoarse whisper as the bullet is stuck in my throat … 
and it is still painful…. Two months after my capture, my husband left the bush. He joined the 
UPDF straight away. He knows that I am currently at the center [gives name] and visited me only 
yesterday…. I want to stay with him because he has not abandoned me … I miss him a lot…  If I 
am to plan going home, I think it would be helpful to be given some money to start a business… I 
do not fear to return … they will welcome the child.’ 
 
Lastly, here is an extract from a woman of 19 years, who has an 18-months old boy, born in the bush. She 
too had been at the reception center for almost a year. She had been abducted in 1997 at the age of 11 
years. 
 
‘It was mid-day and Aida was in the market place of Paicha, an IDP camp. The LRA opened fire 
and the UPDF retaliated. The LRA ran away, but returned later in the day and abducted 5 girls. I 
was one of the five and we were taken to Sudan. I stayed in Sudan for about 7 years – farming and 
digging. There was no fighting until I returned to Uganda in 2003/4…. I decided to escape because 
the UPDF were pursuing us … my child was crying a lot and giving me a lot of grief ...  The child’s 
father was in Sudan at the time. He has three other wives:  but one was captured (she was pregnant 
at the time); one was released (with her two children); and one is still in the bush…. On arrival at 
the reception center, I was given a package of clothes, soap, a mattress, oil, slippers, a blanket, a cup 
and plate, and a sweater for my child… There is good teaching/counseling about: health; how to 
stay in the community, how to forget life in the bush … they are teaching us good morals… But I 
want to go … I have spent a long time in the bush and I want to be with my family…. [I am] 
waiting for an amnesty card; a letter from the RDC and some training’ 
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APPENDIX 6. 
 
EXPERIENCES OF CARITAS COMMUNITY RESOURCE PERSONS 
 
As it was explained to us by staff at CARITAS and CRPs, CRPs are trained by CARITAS to provide 
community services to all members of the community. The list of CRPs is quite extensive and many 
camps in Gulu district have at least one assigned CRP. While the CRPs are an important part of 
CARITAS follow-up work, their contribution is not seen as sufficient for systematic follow-up. 
CARITAS states that ‘due to the bad security situation and financial constraints, we have not been able to 
implement our follow-up activities as we had planned. To be frank and clear, most of the returnees are 
thus left on their own after reunion with no further assistance.’91 
 
CRPs have various reasons for becoming involved, but the most common reason given was a strong 
grounding in the Christian faith (some of the CRPs were training to be catechists when they were 
approached about becoming a CRP). Others cite their own history of abduction or general concern with 
the community: 
 
‘The…reason that made me to become a counselor, is looking at how the children who are 
returnees behave. This puzzled me, then I decided to be come a counselor. Seeing parents whose 
children have been abducted made me to become a counselor. Seeing people who are suffering in 
the camps with hunger, sickness, problems of accommodation, lack of water, problems of death 
and burial grounds, the problem of education in general; all the above reasons made me to go to 
CARITAS to be taught, get training to become a counselor, so that I can help people.’  
 
The CRPs receive training, described by the participants as ‘seminars, which takes some time, like one or 
two weeks, but it is always frequent. We would have training three times in a year. And the whole 
training took three years.’ CRPs mentioned that they received refresher courses from CARITAS and have 
also worked ‘together with CVCs and social workers. For example…World Vision called their resource 
persons for a briefing, and they called me too.’ 
 
During training, CRPs are taught to: ‘…welcome people well. They train us to be patient and listen to a 
client. We are taught how to talk to a person, how to ask questions, because if you carelessly ask a 
traumatized person, he or she will keep quiet and not answer you.’ There is an emphasis on continuous 
support for problematic cases ‘to follow our clients, especially clients whom we have counseled. The 
client may say ‘I am now okay’ but as a counselor, you have to follow and find out whether the person is 
really okay. If you find that the person is okay, then you can just have some conversation with the client.’ 
 
CARITAS uses their CRPs during the tracing process: CRPs are provided with the child’s and the 
parent’s names to find the family. There seems to be little involvement of the CRP during the 
reunification process. Most CRPs report not meeting the child or family prior to the child’s reunification. 
Family preparation is left to CARITAS: ‘when a child is being brought home, they [the staff from the 
reception center] meet the parents. They have to tell the parents what the child likes and dislikes…so that 
when a child is brought back, the parents know how to handle the child.’  
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The CRPs are seen as responsible for community sensitization work: ‘when the child returns home, we as 
counselors have to inform the community that this child has not done anything bad. He has been forced to 
do it, or another person did it. ‘  
 
After the child is reunited, CRPs do the follow-up work. The frequency of follow-up visits varies greatly: 
some report going back to the child every day for the first week, others make their first home visit after 
three days or even a couple of weeks or months if they feel that reunification went well and ‘the person is 
coping up.’ Some returnees take initiative and seek out the CRP. This usually happens when there are 
problems and children want to return to the Reception Center.  
 
Working with FAPs is referred to as ‘counseling’ and gaining the trust of the client is considered a 
challenge: ‘I first have to ask questions, introduce, socialize with them, before I begin the exact issue. 
Approach is really very difficult. I normally spend two hours in my work [each time he counsels people], 
because of the approach...If I please them they tell me about their lives in the bush, but this depends on 
the questions someone asks them. Most times they like keeping quiet.’ 
 
CRPs are not trained specifically for follow-up work with FAPs: ‘I do my work with everyone, that is the 
formerly abducted, the rest of the community…from anywhere.  Not only in the camp. I do my work 
irrespective of religions or denomination.’ Much of this work is based on education and counseling about 
such issues as ‘defilement, street kids in the camp, drunkenness and theft problems.’ Most CRPs pointed 
out that marriage counseling and family conflicts takes up a lot of their time as they do individual 
sessions with each partner first and then attempt a ‘group session’ with both, or even the entire family.  
 
Most CRPs feel that they cooperate well with CARITAS and that they are taken seriously as a resource: ‘I 
asked CARITAS to always consult the community when they want to do their work or make decisions’ 
said one man who was asked to describe how much influence he has on the work CARITAS does in the 
camp. CRPs are confident that they have back-up support from CARITAS and are not expected to solve 
every problem: ‘we are taught that in a case where we cannot handle a problem, we should not say ‘I must 
manage it.’  We have to refer to other people, who are above us.’   
 
CARITAS say that each CRP is equipped with the FAP’s case file to be able to follow the progress, 
however, while some CRPs confirmed receiving detailed files about each child, others had not received a 
single one and had to request individual files of children if problems occurred. All CRPs are asked to 
keep detailed records and most of them are aware that they are expected to do so. How well 
documentation actually works and whether reports are then used for further intervention is impossible for 
us to say in the scope of this case study.   
 
Just like CVCs, CRPs are not paid for their work, but seem to more regularly receive a token payment or 
other items. Items mentioned were bicycles and even cash for bicycle repair, mattresses or clothes. Some 
say that they have not received anything, not even paper to write their reports. It is thus not surprising that 
most cite office equipment as their biggest need. There is a clear sense here that the CRPs would like to 
have their position to be made more official through an office, ‘all the stationery, office equipment, and 
furniture to welcome our clients’, a ‘room for my client’ and even ‘uniforms to show people that we are 
really a counselor, like t-shirts and IDs.  People will recognize us better if they see these things.’Others 
speak of more sophisticated equipments, such as ‘a video screen for demonstration of our activities, i.e. 
defilement is bad, war is bad, prostitution is bad’, or ‘little things to give to clients like soap, sugar or 
clothes.’ This is seen as a way to ‘make our clients understand us better.’ 
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APPENDIX 7. 
 
STATEMENT OF WORK  
A REVIEW OF LESSONS LEARNED BY RECEPTION CENTERS 
ON EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR FORMER ABDUCTEES 
IN NORTHERN UGANDA 
BACKGROUND  
 
The war in northern Uganda has been labeled ‘the hidden conflict,’ ‘the forgotten war,’ and ‘Africa’s 
most brutal conflict.’ USAID/Uganda has responded to conflicts in Uganda since the 1980s and from 
1998 to 2001 funded a Special Objective for Reintegration of Northern Uganda, which supported food 
security, psychosocial and community conflict prevention and mitigation activities. USAID is currently 
funding the Community Resilience and Dialogue program, which provides funding to several reception 
canters and supports reintegration activities. UNICEF is the main UN agency supporting child protection.  
UNICEF has recently increased staffing in the conflict areas by placing international Child Protection 
Officers in Kitgum, Gulu and Lira and is intending to recruit three more protection officers for 
information collection and advocacy.  
 
In Spring 2002, the Ugandan army undertook a military offensive into southern Sudan called ‘Operation 
Iron Fist.’  This action sought to put an end to the conflict in northern Uganda.  The Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) retaliated with the most severe violence the region has seen since the start of the conflict 18 
years ago.  The LRA returned to northern Uganda, resuming fierce attacks on Ugandan civilians and 
abducting greater numbers of children. The LRA has sustained its warfare in the districts of Gulu, 
Kitgum, and Pader, and in June 2003 expanded its attacks on civilians to the neighboring districts of Lira, 
Katakwi, Kaberamaido, and Soroti.  The escalation of conflict has caused a drastic increase in the number 
of displaced persons. The Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) responded by moving people to 
largely unprepared camps in order to cut off the LRA food supply. Currently approximately 1.4 million 
people are living in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, a reduction from a peak of nearly 1.8 
million in May 2004.  This displacement figure illustrates the rapid growth of the camps when compared 
to 500,000 displaced prior to the initiation of Operation Iron Fist.  
 
The displaced living in camps comprise 80% of the population of the five most conflict-affected districts 
in northern Uganda.  IDPs have limited access to land and few opportunities to generate income. Services 
have largely collapsed; there is virtually no civilian policing, inadequate water supplies and sanitation 
facilities, limited access to health care, massively over-congested primary schools and no access to 
secondary education in the camp setting. Camps are also over-crowded with huts spaced close together. 
All the social problems that exist in other parts of Uganda (high numbers of HIV/AIDS orphans, domestic 
violence and sexual abuse and exploitation) distress the war-affected population, intensified by conflict, 
displacement and camp life. The displacement, the LRA’s violent assaults on civilians, and the strategies 
that local people use to search for safety, employment and income combine to create a complex web of 
vulnerability. The highly visible, war-related human rights abuses – abduction, night commuting, sexual 
and gender based violence – are part of a much broader spectrum of serious human rights violations 
exacerbated by war. With each year spent in the IDP camps residents become increasingly dependent on 
food relief and more despondent as they watch the familial and cultural fabric of their lives deteriorate. 
The situation for civilians is desperate with frequent rebel attacks, looting, destruction of property, 
abduction of children and brutal killings.  
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A particularly deplorable aspect of this conflict is the abduction of children for the purpose of forced 
conscription and sexual exploitation. With the start of Operation Iron Fist human trafficking by the LRA 
increased dramatically. UNICEF estimates that since the start of the conflict 20,000 children have been 
abducted - 10,000 of those since the escalation of LRA raids in June 2002. Abducted children are forced 
to commit atrocities against their families and communities and to serve as soldiers and/or ‘wives’ of 
rebel commanders. The LRA generally takes children to its bases in southern Sudan for training. This life 
is especially brutal for the girls who are not only used as porters and soldiers but are also ‘given’ to rebel 
commanders as ‘wives’ sometimes before they reach puberty. UNICEF uses the term ‘formerly abducted 
child’ to refer to persons who are under 18 at the time they return from the LRA. However, it should be 
noted that several thousand persons who were young adults when they escaped the LRA were children 
when they were abducted. 
 
Almost all abducted children and adults who escape from the LRA or who are captured pass through the 
hands of the UPDF. The UPDF have established Child Protection Units (CPUs) in Gulu, Kitgum and 
Pader, ostensibly to create a more child-friendly environment for debriefing. From the CPUs children 
(and adults) are passed on to reception centers, which have been established for both children and adults. 
The reception centers provide basic medical screening and treatment, perform family tracing, provide 
psychosocial counseling for the children, and prepare them to return to their families and communities.  
Often girls return as child mothers with children they have had as the ‘wives’ of LRA rebels. The 
situation of this group has recently been complicated by a number of high level LRA commanders 
reporting to take advantage of the Amnesty Act.  These commanders are requesting to be reunited with 
their ‘wives’ and children. Military activity also leads to unaccompanied infants being rescued after their 
mothers have been killed.    
 
The reception centers were created as a response to a need felt by the communities, families and local 
politicians who were receiving their children from captivity.  Concerned parents and community members 
created NGOs to respond to this need, and through the support of international NGOs and the donor 
community, created reception centers or transit centers to meet the needs of these children and adults. 
Currently, there are centers operating in the districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Apac, Lira, Soroti and 
Katakwi. About 15,000 formerly abducted children have either escaped or been rescued by the army since 
1995, and most of these have gone through the centers. It is assumed that most are now resettled with 
their families. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
To best meet the needs of the abducted children and adult men and women forced to fight in LRA rebel 
forces, USAID and UNICEF are commissioning an independent study:  
To examine the assumptions made when dealing with this target population;   
To review the services provided in the child and adult reception centers;  
To review the reintegration challenges facing formerly abducted children, including child mothers and 
infants born in captivity, and  
To review the reintegration process of former adult combatants in the Ugandan setting and identify the 
interventions and methods that most effectively facilitate family and community reintegration of children 
formerly associated with the LRA.   
 
This study will use a wide variety of sources to develop a report which recommends sound practices for 
reception centers and the reintegration process within the Ugandan setting allowing USAID, UNICEF, 
other donors, and implementing partners to better respond to the complex needs of returnees.  
 
Abducted children are exposed to traumatic events beyond the normal boundaries of human experience 
and as a result many show stress reactions. In response, current programs provide immediate psychosocial 
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support to enable them to return to as normal a family life as possible under these stressful circumstances. 
Their families and communities are provided with preparation and support that will enable them to accept 
the children back and treat them as valued members, and the future of their community. USAID and 
UNICEF believe that sustainable, age and gender-appropriate solutions need to be developed to 
strengthen community based coping mechanisms and support to the children who have lived in captivity 
of the LRA. The challenges that young (and older) adults face on return may differ in degree and 
substance from those facing children.  This study will provide recommendations for improving current 
interventions. 
 
STUDY QUESTIONS 
1. Under what key assumptions do the reception centers operate and what assumptions are 
made during the reintegration process?  
a)  Compile an exhaustive list of basic assumptions under which the reception centers were established 
and operate.  These may include, but are not limited to, the following: the family structures can support the 
return of a formerly abducted child; the best place for the child and young adult is with the family and back in 
the community; the communities will be accepting of the people; there are economic opportunities for the 
formerly abducted child once they are trained in a vocation; all children (including those returning as adults) 
who were abducted are traumatized, vulnerable and need counseling; clinical counseling is necessary; clinical 
counseling is not necessary; young adults can be treated the same way as children (the term formerly 
abducted children and associated response is used/is not used to include all persons who were children when 
they were abducted); centers should work as transit centers holding the children and adults for short periods 
of time; centers should hold children and adults for longer periods of time until they are fully ‘healed’; 
children fear re-abduction; the child and adult will be willing to live in a displaced setting in order to be with 
their family, and; children and adults are staying with their families after reunification.  
b)  Analyze the relevance of the assumptions to the reception centers and reintegration process (different 
reception centers may operate under a different set of assumptions). What are the consequences, if any, of the 
assumptions identified?  
 
2.  What are the roles of the UPDF (including UPDF CPUs), reception centers and 
organizations and authorities involved in family tracing and how do they meet the needs of the 
formerly abducted children? 
Review all stages persons returning from the LRA (children and adults) go through after reporting or after 
being captured by the UPDF. Assess the treatment of the children and adults once received by the UPDF, and 
follow it through the reception centers.  Be sure to include the time spent with military units before being 
transferred to the Child Protection Units, all stages at which they are questioned and by whom, and next step 
options provided to the former abductee while in the care of the UPDF.  The report should discuss whether 
the CPUs are achieving the objectives of creating a child-friendly environment for children while they are 
with the UPDF and are contributing to reducing the length of time it takes for the transfer of children from the 
military to civilian reception centers. It should also assess the extent to which CPUs are used by the UPDF to 
facilitate the processing of adults, if so whether this poses problems in terms of child protection and what 
alternative channels, if any, are used for adults. 
Identify at what stage adults and children who wish to apply for amnesty get access to the Amnesty 
Commission and how this takes place. How does this differ from district to district? What access does the 
Amnesty Commission have to persons still held by the UPDF? To what extent is the Amnesty Commission 
able to maintain civilian oversight of returnees while they are in UPDF hands?  
Describe the intake procedures and support services provided at the reception centers and transit centers and 
assess the appropriateness, adequacy, and quality in relation to children’s needs.  Describe and assess the role, 
functioning, and services of each center, including their support systems, programs, and the tracing and 
reunification process.  Division of roles and responsibilities, coordination, timing, practices and methods, and 
information exchange in the family tracing process should be reviewed. Evaluation of the quality of care and 
counseling the child receives from the centers should be analyzed as well as how the centers determine when 
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a child is ready to return home. Describe in detail the factors that determine how a child’s length of stay at the 
center is determined, and ask center staff for statistics on the average length of stay and the range (shortest to 
longest) of length of stay at the center, identifying the factors that determine length of stay. Centers should 
also be examined on how they are accountable to their target population, the receiving communities, their 
funders, and to government. Describe the nature, extent and purposes of the contacts of each center with other 
centers assisting formerly abducted children.    
   
3.  What lessons can be learned from the current reintegration process to establish 
recommendations for sound principles for reintegration of former abductees in the Ugandan 
context? 
a) Assess the needs of the formerly abducted children, the receiving community and identify what is 
necessary for the receiving community to successfully welcome the return of children and adults. Identify 
steps and measures that appear to have facilitated successful reintegration. So far as possible, where 
reintegration has not been successful, try to identify factors that appear to have contributed to this result.  
Solicit feedback from center staff, family members, reintegrated children, community members (e.g. leaders, 
neighbors of reintegrated children) representatives of local social structures and those who play a significant 
role in reintegration such as teachers, the District Probation and Social Welfare Department, psychosocial 
practitioners and community volunteer counselors. Where possible, ask informants to list the various factors 
that contributed to successful reintegration, then ask them to rank the factors mentioned in order of 
importance (This method may work with some and not with others. Only pursue it where it seems to be 
productive). Ask informants about the importance of religious practices and traditional cleansing or healing 
ceremonies as a factor in reintegration, and gather information about what such ceremonies involved and who 
participated in or observed them (examples of issues include whether ceremonies contributed to family 
acceptance, community acceptance, a feeling of acceptability or transition on the part of children, whether 
there appeared to be any negative consequences, etc.).  It should be noted that all abductees do not go through 
reception centers.  This study should include a review of the reintegration process for those individuals who 
received no formal care.  
b) Analyze the current reunification and reintegration process and packages, its successes and 
challenges in the Ugandan context basing on reception center guiding principles. Special consideration 
should be given to child mothers, infants (accompanied and unaccompanied), reintegration of formerly 
abducted children into a conflict-affected area, reintegration of ex-combatants into a war-time economy, 
and reintegration of the abductees into a displaced setting.   
c) Analyze the reintegration of child mothers and infants born in captivity, and special concerns 
related to their acceptance into the Acholi community.  Also review their needs and desires as related to 
their returning ‘husbands’ who may have been high-ranking LRA commanders who are now reporting to 
take advantage of amnesty.  Also consider the needs of the child mothers whose ‘husbands’ are high-level 
officials still fighting with the LRA.  This analysis should include a cultural as well as a legal assessment 
of the norms and rights of the child mothers and the fathers of the children born in captivity.   
d)  Analyze the options open to adult men and women and which paths they most often follow and 
why. 
e) Examine the issues related to follow-up with children and adults after they have returned to their 
families and communities, highlighting approaches and aspects that appear to contribute to effectiveness 
(or negative outcomes), and ability of the centers to reach the children with adequate follow-up, the 
frequency of follow-up, innovative approaches, etc. Seek to identify factors (both personal characteristics 
and actions of the children and action taken by others) that appear to contribute to the resilience of 
formerly abducted children.  Note whether any respondents report negative attitudes or actions resulting 
from the attention and support given to formerly abducted children as apposed to other sub-sets of the 
population who may be vulnerable. Identify if current methods of supporting formerly abducted children 
and adults actually facilitate reintegration or whether they inadvertently create barriers between children 
and the rest of the community. Identify lessons learned or policy recommendations regarding how follow-
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up should be done, by whom, and provide creative ideas for reaching this population during time of 
insecurity.   
f) Analyze the specific coping mechanisms used by the formerly abducted children and adults such 
as night commuting, living in town centers and not living with family for fear of re-abduction. 
 
STUDY METHODOLOGY 
The researchers are expected to visit, as security allows, and review the key reception centers in northern 
Uganda. These include the following; 
GUSCO in Gulu town 
World Vision in Gulu town (one center for children, one for adults, and one for child mothers)  
World Vision in Kalongo, Pader District 
KICWA in Kitgum town (for children)  
Christian Counseling Fellowship (CCF) in Pader District 
Rachele Center in Lira town 
CPA in Lira town  
Concerned Parents Center (CPA) in Kitgum town, (for adults) 
As time allows, the following should also be visited: 
CARITAS center in Pajule, Pader District 
CARITAS center in Apac District 
Action Against Child Abuse and Neglect (ACCAN) in Soroti  
Katakwi Children’s Voice in Katakwi        
 
The majority of the data is expected to come from former abducted child and adult returnees themselves, 
their families and the people who live in the community around them and the researchers are expected to 
visit children and adult returnees and their families living in IDP camps and municipal areas. The 
researcher should conduct interviews with those former abductees pursuing a military career or planning 
to join a local defense unit. The researcher should interview members of the UPDF 105 Battalion in Gulu (if 
possible). This battalion is made up of LRA ex-combatants. Follow-up in the receiving community should 
include an assessment of skills training provided to the teachers and others working with the returnee 
population, a review of the community volunteer counselors should also be included. Former abducted 
children and adults will be interviewed on their life skills training and their ability to cope with their current 
situation. Neighbors, religious and traditional leaders, extended family members including in-laws should be 
interviewed to assess their attitudes toward those abducted by the LRA.    
 
The consultant’s methodology will be based on the following: 
Information from secondary sources and the contractor’s knowledge of the reception centers and the 
levels of the conflict situation in the northern Uganda; 
Reviews of relevant documents, assessments, and reports; 
Interviews with USAID/Uganda, UNICEF staff and other key informants; 
Interviews with reception center staff; administrators/designers; 
Interviews with a significant number of formerly abducted children and adults who vary in the amount of 
time spent in captivity, gender and their role in the LRA; 
Interviews with the brothers and sisters of formerly abducted children, classmates, their parents and other 
older relatives, neighbors and community members;  
Interviews with other donors who are supporting institutional development of the centers, local 
governments staff in the area, district CSO networks, local CBOs and NGOs working with the focus 
population; and  
Other methods deemed appropriate and proposed by the consultants. 
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The report will be a sizable research paper that will analyze the situations in the reception centers and the 
reintegration process to develop a listing of sound practices for successful reintegration of formerly 
abducted children and ex-combatants in the northern Ugandan within the LRA context.  The researcher 
will be required to do a desk review of available literature. The final report will be a compilation of 
existing materials and field research. 
 
DELIVERABLES 
The following are the deliverables expected from this study: 
USAID, UNICEF and the National Psychosocial Core Team (NPCT) are expected to approve a study 
outline, research plan/instruments prior to the start of the field research.   
The study methodology should also be outlined and rigorous to address the study questions. 
The key component of this contract is a report, which will be reviewed and approved in draft form by 
USAID, UNICEF and the NPCT.  It is expected that the contractor will give a presentation of the report 
to USAID/Uganda, UNICEF, the U.S. Embassy Kampala, donor technical groups, NPCT, the field 
offices and reception centers, and possibly to USAID/Washington.   
Listing of lessons learned and recommendations for the way forward and/or improving the current status 
of reception centers. 
There will be a special section on the child mothers, the challenges they face while in captivity, how the 
reintegration of themselves and their infants born in captivity differs from the other abductees, and how 
they are managing to provide for themselves and their children.  
 
The Consultants shall produce a report (no more than 60 pages of text in the body of the report (exclusive 
of the Executive Summary and annexes) addressing the questions listed above.  The report shall focus on 
evidence required to answer the questions posed by this SOW. The report shall also include a list of 
recommendations as to how UNICEF and USAID Uganda on how their programs could more effectively 
support the reception centers and reintegration process. The Consultants shall provide seven hard copies 
and three electronic copies (in Microsoft Word, Times New Roman 12 point font) of the final report. 
 
STUDY INFORMATION SOURCES 
During the performance of this assignment, the following are some of the information sources that the 
consultants should review/consult:  
‘Amnesty Commission Sub-Committee on Reception Center Minimum Standards – Center 
Workshop:  Final Report’;    
Dyan Mazurana, PhD and Susan McKay, PhD, ‘Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra 
Leone, and Mozambique: Policy and Program Recommendations’, June, 2003;   
‘Good Practice Principles of Working with Formerly Abducted and Other Vulnerable Children in 
War-Affected Areas of Uganda’, National Psychosocial Core Team, September 2004 (draft 
copy); 
‘Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict’, ICG 2004; 
‘An Investigation into the Psychosocial Adjustment of Formerly Abducted Child Soldiers in Northern 
Uganda’, International Rescue Committee, March 2002; 
‘Draft Trip Report – Kitgum, Northern Uganda’, Marie de la Soudiere, Director, Children Affected 
by Armed Conflict Unit, International Rescue Committee; 
‘Behind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern 
Uganda’, Refugee Law Project, February 2004; 
‘UNIFEM/UNDP Fact-finding Mission to Gulu, Northern Uganda’, 15 – 17th November 2004; 
‘Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internatzionale (AVSI) Interim Evaluation of Community 
Resilience and Dialogue (CRD) Program’, June 1, 2002 – August 27, 2004; 
 ‘Psychosocial Baseline Survey for Kaberamaido, Katakwi and Soroti Districts’, Transcultural 
Psychosocial Organization (TPO), November 2004; 
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Workshop on Reception and Reunification of former Abductees in Kitgum District, February 14, 
2005, Workshop Findings; 
‘Nowhere to Hide: Humanitarian Protection Threats in Northern Uganda’, CSOPNU December 2004, 
and; 
Other studies/documents as identified by the consultants. 
 
STAFFING 
The USAID funded Monitoring and Evaluation Management System (MEMS) contract with Management 
Systems International (MSI) will assist the research team to carry out the special research project.  
MEMS, with the assistance of USAID and UNICEF will identify the primary international researchers 
who are experts in the field of child combatants, demobilization and reintegration and anthropology.  It is 
expected that the staffing will be one or two international consultant(s) matched with a group of local 
researchers.  USAID and UNICEF will require approval of all local and international staff used for field 
research.  Local organizations in Uganda such as the NPCT, The Refugee Law Project or Isis-WICCI can 
assist in identification of a local partner to assist with the research in Uganda. International staff selected 
on the basis of their skills and knowledge who have previously worked in Uganda should have the 
opportunity to nominate local staff on the basis of prior work relationships.   
 
USAID and UNICEF are envisioning a research team made up of an international anthropologist, a 
psychosocial expert, and perhaps a gender specialist all with experience working with -- or analyzing the 
work of -- reception centers and reintegration. If there is no gender specialist on the international team, it 
is expected that a local researcher with gender expertise will be included. The research team is expected 
to work with psychosocial practitioners and the National Psychosocial Core Team in developing a report 
that will reflect the many years of experience acquired through the reception centers, NGOs and CBOs 
working in the north with this target population – as well as, most importantly, the experience of the 
target population itself.  
  
COORDINATION 
The researchers will provide the technical expertise in their field while MEMS will be responsible for 
providing evaluation and review technical support to the researchers, coordinating the research process, and 
meeting the USAID requirements for the project. UNICEF will provide logistical support when the 
researchers are in northern Uganda, and both UNICEF and USAID will review requested drafts and the 
research plan to ensure a study of extremely high quality. MEMS and the researchers will be expected to 
coordinate closely with the NPCT, the reception centers, NGOs supporting reception centers, UNICEF, 
USAID and its implementing partners and civil society organizations.  The researchers will have the technical 
capability and expertise to perform the research and the reporting function.  MEMS will be expected to 
provide office space and general office support to the researchers.   
 
ESTIMATED PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE 
It is estimated that the performance period will be 60 days total research time (based on a 6-day work week) 
total writing time, including revisions of drafts.  USAID and UNICEF require that the researchers perform a 
desk review of recommended literature prior to their arrival so that field research can begin April 1, 2005 as a 
target starting date.  Due to the draft and review process the deadline for the final report will be August 15, 
2005. 
 
CONTRACTOR SELECTION 
Primarily USAID and UNICEF will make recommendations to MEMS for the international and local 
researchers, where appropriate.  MEMS will make a recommendation for the research team based on skill, 
availability and past research experience working with the target population.  USAID and UNICEF will 
provide final approval of the team. USAID and UN regulations must be considered when evaluating the 
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cost of the contractors. MEMS should competitively bid the process of researcher selection in accordance 
with USAID regulations.   
  
TERMS OF PAYMENT: 
The Consultants assigned to work on this study will be paid in accordance with their individual contract 
with UNICEF or MEMS, but in no case will final payment be issued prior to USAID and UNICEF’s 
acceptance of the final report. 
 
 
ILLUSTRATIVE REPORT OUTLINE 
 
Cover Page (standard format, identifying the title of the study, the date of the study both recipient’s name 
and those of the members of the study team) 
 
Preface or Acknowledgements  
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
Lists of Charts, Tables or Figures [Only required in long reports that use these extensively] 
 
Executive Summary [Stand-Alone, 1-3 pages, summary of report.  This section may not contain any 
material not also found in the main part of the report] 
 
Main Part of the Report 
 
Introduction/Background and Purpose: [Overview of the study. Summarizes the development problem 
addressed and the kind of assistance provided. Covers the purpose and intended audiences for the study 
and their main concerns as identified in the SOW. 
Study Approach and Methods: [Brief summary. Additional information, including instruments should be 
presented in an Annex] 
Findings: [This section, organized in whatever way the team wishes, must present the basic answers to 
the questions, i.e., the empirical facts and other types of evidence the study team collected. This section 
must include the 3 key elements of the report, the assumptions, roles of the receiving organizations and 
centers, and the reintegration process.] 
Conclusions: [This section should present the team’s interpretations or judgments about its findings.  This 
section must include the 3 key elements of the report, the assumptions, roles of the receiving 
organizations and centers, and the reintegration process.] 
Recommendations: [This section should make it clear what actions should be taken as a result of the 
study.92] 
Lessons Learned:  [In this section the team should present any information that would be useful to people 
who are designing/manning similar or related new or on-going activities in Uganda or elsewhere.  Other 
lessons the team derives from the study should also be presented here.] 
Special Section on Child Mothers: [This section should include an analysis of the special concerns and 
challenges facing child mothers. Recommendations should be included for proper intervention and 
support to this population.] 
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Annexes  [These may include supplementary information on the study itself; further description of the 
data collection/analysis methods used; data collection instruments; summaries of interviews; statistical 
tables, an other relevant materials.] 
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